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Title VII's disparate treatment model of discrimination is premised on the
notion that intergroup bias is motivational in origin. This premise, in turn, is
based on a number of assumptions regarding the nature of human inference
and the respective roles played by cognition and motivation in social judgment
and decisionmaking. Applying insights from cognitive psychology, Professor
Krieger examines the assumptions about human inference embedded in current
disparate treatment theory and questions the premise that discrimination nec-
essarily manifests intent or motive. She suggests that a large number of biased
employment decisions result not from discriminatory motivation, as current
legal models presume, but from a variety of unintentional categorization-
related judgment errors characterizing normal human cognitive functioning.
Because of the lack offit between the present disparate treatment model and
the phenomenon it purports to represent, courts and litigants are presented
with a confising array of increasingly ill-defined and questionably premised
analytical paradigms. Worse, as currently constructed, it may be exacerbating
intergroup tensions and inflating both social and financial adjudication costs.
Searching for solutions Professor Krieger explores the legal and policy impli-
cations of a cognitive process approach to discrimination and equal employ-
ment opportunity and evaluates a variety of modifications to existing equal
employment opportunity law.
INTRODUCTION
A few years ago, I had one of those experiences that slips almost unnoticed
into your consciousness and then quietly wreaks havoc on your tidy way of
looking at something.
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I was working on an unremarkable Title VIII case. My client was a young
Salvadoran man who had been the only nonwhite employee at a box manufac-
turing plant in California's Central Valley. He had been denied a promotion,
then fired, and he was convinced that he had been treated less favorably than
his Caucasian coworkers because of his national origin. Their transgressions
had been systematically overlooked or explained away; his had consistently led
to oral and written reprimands that now served to justify his termination. They
received commendation for their achievements; his seemed to go unnoticed, or
were attributed to the efforts of others. And then there were the subtle things:
the way people looked at him, their tone of voice-telltale signs of bias that, he
told me, "I can't prove, but I just know."
This was not going to be an easy case. The employer had no facially dis-
criminatory policies,2 nor any identifiable neutral policies that I might argue
disproportionately disadvantaged Latinos.3 No one had made any derogatory
ethnic comments, so far as I could determine.4 But there was a subtle, yet
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -16 (1994),
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion.
2. "Facial discrimination," the most conspicuous form of discrimination, describes adverse em-
ployment decisions made explicitly on the basis of a person's membership in a protected class. Facial
discrimination almost always violates Title VII. It may be justified in only two instances. The first is by
proof that restricting employment to a particular class is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).
See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) (restricting the BFOQ defense to
objective, verifiable requirements concerning job-related skills and aptitudes). The second is by proof
that the discriminatory policy is within the context of a valid affirmative action plan. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 642 (1987) (stating that such a plan is "fully consistent with
Title VII, for it embodies the contribution that voluntary employer action can make in eliminating the
vestiges of discrimination in the workplace").
3. Because this case implicated no such practices, Title VIl's disparate impact theory-which,
unlike disparate treatment theory, does not require a showing of intent to discriminate-could not be
used to establish liability. One common misperception about Title VII is that a plaintiff can prevail in
virtually any type of case by making an unrebutted showing of disparate impact on a group protected by
Title VII. This is not true. Disparate impact theory requires that the plaintiff first identify a specific
employment practice. The plaintiffimust then prove that this particular practice has a statistically signif-
icant disparate impact on a qualified group protected by Title VII. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). These requirements were not eliminated by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
relevant portions of which are now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (1994). Even if this show-
ing is made, the employer may prevail by proving that the practice is "job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1994).
Because most individual employment decisions do not implicate identifiable practices that can be
shown to have a statistically significant disparate impact on members of a protected group, very few
Title VII cases are actually amenable to disparate impact treatment. According to an American Bar
Foundation study, disparate impact cases comprised only 1.84% of all employment-related civil rights
cases in the federal court docket between 1985 and 1987. American Bar Foundation Employment Dis-
crimination Litigation Survey, Computer File (1990), cited in John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman,
The Changing Nature ofEmployment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. Ray. 983, 998 n.57 (1991).
4. The lack of derogatory comments barred the use of the relatively plaintiff-friendly burdens of
proof articulated in the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,244-45
(1989), to establish liability. Since Price Waterhouse was decided, many circuit courts have limited its
applicability to situations in which a plaintiff can prove by "direct evidence" that his or her gender, race,
or ethnicity was a motivating factor in a challenged employment decision. See e.g., Caban-Wheeler v.
Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1555 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 848 (1990); Jackson v. Harvard Univ.,
900 F.2d 464, 467 (1st Cir. 1990); Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 315 (6th Cir.
1989).
For a discussion of the confused and limited scope of the Price Waterhouse "motivating factor"
paradigm in disparate treatment litigation, see text accompanying notes 262-282 infra.
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discernible pattern of differential treatment emerging from the time records and
personnel files obtained in discovery.
If my client were to prevail in establishing a Title VII violation, it would
have to be-as in well over 90 percent of all Title VII cases 5-under the "dis-
parate treatment" theory of discrimination first established in McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green.6 Under this theory, he would have to prove not only that he
received less favorable treatment than his Anglo coworkers, but that his superi-
ors purposefully, deliberately, and intentionally treated him differently because
of his national origin.7 To be blunt, to establish that my client had been
wronged, I would have to prove that the plant manager was a racist and a liar.8
As is usual in employment discrimination cases, the challenged manager
adamantly denied that my client's national origin played any part in his deci-
sionmaking process. He claimed instead that my client had arrived late to work
too many times, had violated too many safety rules. As for the promotion, even
without these performance problems, he was just "too easy-going"--not the
"take charge, don't-mess-with-me kind of guy" that a foreman has to be.
Interviewing this manager had not been pleasant. He was angry and defen-
sive and, as I questioned him about time records indicating that two Anglo
employees had been late as often as my client, he got even angrier. Finally,
ignoring his attorney's admonitions "to answer only the question asked," he
exploded. "Look, I don't appreciate being called a bigot. Mateo's being a
Mexican [sic] didn't make any difference to me; it's like I didn't even notice
it."
Later that day, I came back from the Valley, changed my clothes, grabbed
the newspaper, and sat down with my three-year-old son to watch Sesame
Street. That's when it happened. I looked up from my newspaper and saw the
television screen divided into four sections. In each section was a child in a
raincoat-three of them red, one yellow-and Big Bird was singing:
One of these kids is not like the others.
One of these kids just isn't the same.
One of these kids is not like the others.
Now it's time to play our game.
9
The point of the game was, of course, to figure out that the child in the
yellow raincoat was different than the three children in the red raincoats. The
pedagogical purpose of the game was to teach children to categorize-to notice
differences between objects and to group those objects, on the basis of those
differences, into categories.
5. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 3, at 1019 (citing American Bar Foundation Employment
Discrimination Litigation Survey, supra note 3).
6. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
7. See text accompanying notes 56-67 infra for a discussion of the McDonnell Douglas model.
8. Existing disparate treatment jurisprudence in many ways equates a finding of pretext in plain-
tiff's favor with a finding that the employer has lied about the reasons for its decision. See St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2763, 2764 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
9. Sesame Street (PBS television broadcast).
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Children must learn to categorize. They must categorize to understand
speech, to move safely through their environment ("Don't touch a strange dog;
it might bite you. But yes, it's okay to touch a strange cat; cats don't bite."
"Don't get into a stranger's car; but yes, you can get into Uncle Hurley's car;
he's a relative.").
Children must learn to categorize before they can learn much of anything
else. And when they get a little older, before they can learn to read, they have
to learn to stereotype. You simply can't read if you can't stereotype. You have
to minimize all those differences between the ways different people write an
"F." Without even thinking about it, you have to exaggerate the subtle differ-
ences between a capital "D" and a capital "P." Your mind has to fll in when
part of a line is missing, or ignore a stray mark that your eyes indeed see, but
your mind knows does not really go with an "a."
It seemed ironic. There I sat, watching with maternal satisfaction as Big
Bird taught my son to notice and categorize by color differences, while the
plant manager's indignant claim of colorblindness echoed in my mind. It un-
settled me as I sat there, and left me with a vague sense of disquiet.
In retrospect, I see-that this experience was a turning point in my thinking
about intergroup relations, discrimination, and equal employment opportunity.
In the years that followed, I became increasingly uneasy about the enterprise in
which I, as a Title VII lawyer for over a decade, had engaged. As I encoun-
tered more offended, defensive decisionmakers accused of discrimination, and
as I counseled and consoled more embittered employees who knew they had
been treated differently because of their race or gender or ethnicity but could
not, as the law requires in such cases, prove that their employer harbored a
discriminatory motive or intent, I became convinced that something about the
way the law was defining and seeking to remedy disparate treatment discrimi-
nation was fundamentally flawed. This article represents my endeavor to un-
derstand what that "something" might be.
In this article, I argue that the way in which Title VII jurisprudence con-
structs discrimination, while sufficient to address the deliberate discrimination
prevalent in an earlier age, is inadequate to address the subtle, often uncon-
scious forms of bias that Title VII was also intended to remedy.10 These subtle
forms of bias, I suggest, represent today's most prevalent type of discrimina-
tion. While Title VII jurisprudence gives lip service to the notion that actiona-
ble intergroup bias can be subtle or unconscious, courts have so far failed to
develop doctrinal models capable of addressing such phenomena--especially
subtle or unconscious race and national origin discrimination.
This failure, I propose, stems from the assumption that disparate treatment
discrimination, whether conscious or unconscious, is primarily motivational,
rather than cognitive, in origin." This one-sided understanding of bias leads
10. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801 (explaining that "Title VII tolerates no racial
discrimination, subtle or otherwise").
11. It is here that my perspective differs from that so compellingly offered by Professor Charles R.
Lawrence III in The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STA.
L. REv. 317 (1987). Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, Professor Lawrence argues that much of what
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courts to approach every disparate treatment case as a search for discriminatory
motive or intent. To the extent that intergroup bias stems from other sources,
current models may either fail to identify discrimination or wrongfully attribute
discriminatory motive to a well-intentioned, though biased, decisionmaker. We
need a deeper, more nuanced understanding of what intergroup discrimination
is, how and why it occurs, and what we can do to reduce it.
My endeavor is divided into four parts. Part I examines the analytical struc-
ture of Title VII's disparate treatment model of discrimination and the rhetoric
courts employ in analyzing disparate treatment cases. I explore the unexam-
ined central premise of Title VII's disparate treatment paradigm-that the ori-
gin of intergroup bias is motivational. In Part I, I also examine a number of
assumptions regarding the nature of social judgment and decisionmaking re-
flected in Title VII's disparate treatment jurisprudence and trace those assump-
tions to personality and social psychological theories prevalent in the 1930s
through the 1960s.
In Part II, I test these assumptions against insights derived from more con-
temporary empirical and theoretical research in cognitive and cognitive-social
psychology. I conclude that, while the assumptions undergirding disparate
treatment theory generally reflect the thinking about intergroup bias and human
inference accepted into the 1970s, these assumptions have been so undermined,
both empirically and theoretically, that they can no longer be considered valid.
Specifically, I suggest in Part II that a broad class of biased employment
decisions now analyzed under Title VII's disparate treatment theory results not
from discriminatory motivation, but from a variety of categorization-related
judgment errors characterizing normal human cognitive functioning. Conse-
quently, I propose, there now exists a substantial discontinuity between the jur-
isprudential construction of discrimination and the real life phenomenon it
purports to represent.
In Part HI, I examine the consequences of this discontinuity and the impli-
cations of a cognitive bias approach to discrimination for various aspects of
equal employment opportunity law and policy. First, I suggest that the lack of
fit between the disparate treatment model and the phenomenon it purports to
represent has led to analytical incoherence in Title VII jurisprudence. This un-
certainty and confusion, I argue, can be expected to decrease the validity of
employment discrimination adjudications, increase adjudication costs, and dis-
courage the voluntary settlement of employment discrimination cases. Further-
more, by attributing disparate treatment to discriminatory intent, current
doctrine may exacerbate rather than reduce intergroup tensions.
Part IV searches for solutions. First, I argue that the pretext model of dispa-
rate treatment proof should be eliminated entirely and replaced by a "motivat-
ing factor" analysis similar to, but in some ways quite different from, that
is classified as disparate treatment discrimination results from subconscious instincts and motivations.
While Professor Lawrence does mention cognitive bias as a potential source of discriminatory decision-




adopted in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.12 Second, I advocate grafting onto
Title VII a 2-tier approach to liability and relief, similar to that used in cases
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 13 under which "willful" and
"nonwillful" discrimination are distinguished and accorded different remedies.
Finally, Part IV suggests that the nondiscrimination principle, currently in-
terpreted as a proscriptive duty "not to discriminate," must evolve to encom-
pass a prescriptive duty of care to identify and control for category-based
judgment errors and other forms of cognitive bias in intergroup settings. How-
ever, unlike other scholars who advocate a "negligence" approach to employ-
ment discrimination,' 4 I suggest that additional empirical and theoretical work
must be done before the contours of such a duty can be precisely defined, let
alone crafted into practical and effective legal rules.
I. THE CONSTRUCTION OF DISPARATE TREATMENT DIsciminATioN IN TrrLE
VII JURISPRUDENCE
Cases tell stories. Indeed, judicial opinions and the legal theories they ex-
pound function somewhat like a society's core stories, structuring the interpre-
tation of experience and providing the authors and audiences of future stories
with commonly recognized plots, symbols, themes, and characters.
In a sense, one's task as a litigator is to choose a core story from existing
jurisprudence and then to construct, from the available facts, a new story that
resembles the core story as closely as possible. Thus, to bring one's experience
into the world of the law by filing a lawsuit is implicitly to consent to its being
interpreted and judged through the lenses of the law's core stories. To be
"dragged into court" as a defendant is to find oneself and one's experience cast
in the story's mold. Doctrinal models define for the litigants which facts be-
long in their stories and which do not. The assumptions upon which those
models are constructed-the "meta-stories," if you will--define how those
facts will be interpreted in legal decisionmaking.
I knew that if I wanted to understand why so many of my clients and their
opponents felt frustrated and misunderstood in their encounters with civil rights
enforcement, I would have to examine the core stories told by Title VII dispa-
rate treatment caselaw. How do the stories define intergroup bias and how it
operates? What are the stock plots? Who are the stock characters? How are
characters' actions interpreted, and what assumptions shape those interpreta-
tions? In this section, I attempt to answer these questions.
One sees in the stories that Title VII cases tell certain assumptions about
human inference and judgment-both generally and in intergroup contexts.
First, intergroup discrimination, even when subtle and unconscious, is assumed
to result from discriminatory motive or intent. Thus, to ask whether an em-
12. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
13. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202 § 1, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994)).
14. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 899, 915-17
(1993).
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ployer discriminated against an individual because of group status is seen as
equivalent to asking whether a discriminatory purpose motivated the em-
ployer's decision. Under this equation of causation and intentionality, even
discrimination that results from applying racial, ethnic, or gender stereotypes is
understood as a product of discriminatory motivation. Indeed, evidence that a
decisionmaker holds stereotypes is relevant in disparate treatment analysis be-
cause it presumedly unmasks discriminatory intent. In the stories told by dispa-
rate treatment caselaw, there is no discrimination without an invidiously
motivated actor. Every successful disparate treatment story needs a villain.
Second, disparate treatment analysis assumes that, unless they harbor dis-
criminatory intent or motive, decisionmakers will act objectively and judge ra-
tionally. Evidence that a particular decisionmaking strategy was suboptimal in
light of all decision-relevant events is often construed as indicating that a dis-
criminatory purpose really motivated the decision in question, and that the em-
ployer is now lying about his "true" intentions. In the process of fitting the
facts into the doctrinal forms, evidence of judgment errors is interpreted as
indicating that the nondiscriminatory reasons now given for an employment
decision are "phony reasons"-"cover-ups" for the "real" discriminatory moti-
vation. As a result of this "real reason/phony reason" distinction, the adjudica-
tion of most disparate treatment claims sinks inevitably into a thinly disguised
brawl over whether the accused employer is lying about the reasons a particular
decision was made.
Third, disparate treatment jurisprudence construes the process of employ-
ment decisionmaking as being functionally distinct from the processes of per-
ception, encoding, and retention in memory of decision-relevant events. Title
VII disparate treatment caselaw constructs intergroup discrimination as some-
thing occurring at the moment a decision is made. Current disparate treatment
jurisprudence does not recognize that categorization based on race, sex, or na-
tional origin may distort perception, memory, and recall for decision-relevant
events such that, at the moment of decision, an employer may be entirely una-
ware of the effect of an employee's group membership on the decisionmaking
process.
Finally, disparate treatment jurisprudence-indeed the entire normative
structure of anti-discrimination law-is based on an assumption that deci-
sionmakers possess "transparency of mind," that they can accurately identify
why they are about to make, or have already made, a particular decision. Ac-
cording to this view, if an employee's protected group status is playing a role in
an employer's decisionmaking process, the employer will be aware of that role,
even if he is not honest (or careless) enough to admit it. Equipped with con-
scious self-awareness, well-intentioned employers become capable of comply-
ing with the law's proscriptive injunction not to discriminate. They will
monitor their decisionmaking processes and prevent prohibited factors from af-
fecting their judgments.
Let us examine more closely how these assumptions undergird disparate
treatment jurisprudence and shape the stories told by Title VII caselaw.
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A. The Equation of Causation and Intentionality
Section 703 of Title VII15 prohibits employers from failing or refusing to
hire, or from discharging or otherwise discriminating against any individual
because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It would be
reasonable to interpret this language as simply requiring proof of causation
without proof of intent. In other words, a Title VII claimant would need only
establish that his or her protected status "made a difference" or "played a role"
in a challenged employment decision.
This is not, however, how section 703 has been construed. Under existing
law, the disparate treatment plaintiff, whether proceeding under Title VII or
under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 or 1983, must prove not only that she was
treated differently, but that such treatment was caused by purposeful or inten-
tional discrimination. 16 Particularly in the context of race and national origin,
discrimination is represented as resulting from the decisionmaker's discrimina-
tory animus towards members of the plaintiff's racial or ethnic group. 17 This
stands in marked contrast to the law's construction of age discrimination. Con-
15. Specifically, § 703(a) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
16. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993) ("(The plaintiff has]
the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.")
(quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). Accord EEOC v.
Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1312 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiff had to prove termination of
employment was result of intentional discrimination based on plaintiff's national origin); Warren v.
Halstead Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 746, 752-53 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding discriminatory intent means actual
motive and cannot be presumed based upon a factual showing of less than actual motive); Smith v.
Honeywell, Inc., 735 F.2d 1067, 1068-69 (8th Cir.) (holding individual alleging disparate treatment has
the burden of showing not only a difference in treatment, but that he is a victim of intentional discrimi-
nation), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1077 (1984); Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 898 (3rd Cir. 1980)
(holding disparate treatment plaintiff is required to prove not only disparate treatment, but that such
disparate treatment was caused by purposeful or intentional discrimination).
The plaintiff's burden in a Title VII disparate treatment case mirrors the showing required of an
equal protection claimant proceeding under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186-87 (1989) (requiring both disparate treatment and intent); Gutzwiller v.
Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that the required showings are similar under Title
VII and § 1983). AccordAFSCME v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985) (apply-
ing the standard articulated in Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,279 (1979), that discriminatory
purpose is more than awareness of consequences in a Title VII disparate treatment case).
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks, the Second Circuit ruled that in disparate treatment
cases, the plaintiff's group status need only have "made a difference" in the contested employment
decision. See, e.g., Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460,465 (2d Cir. 1989); Hagelthorm v.
Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 1983). No other circuit follows this approach, and its contin-
ued viability following Hicks is uncertain.
17. See Gomez v. Medical College, No. 92-5048, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11274, *9 (E.D. Pa.
1994) ("A plaintiff may not prevail on a mere showing that the defendant's proffered reasons are false,
but must prove a discriminatory animus."); EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992)
("Merely finding that people have been treated differently stops short of the crucial question: why people
have been treated differently."); Minority Police Officers Ass'n v. City of South Bend, 617 F. Supp.
1330, 1358 (N.D. Ind. 1985) ("Mere conclusory allegations of discrimination are clearly not sufficient to
prove discriminatory intent").
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sider the following language, which originated in the Seventh Circuit and was
subsequently adopted by many other courts:
Unlike race discrimination, age discrimination may simply arise from an un-
conscious application of stereotyped notions of ability rather than from a delib-
erate desire to remove older employees from the workforce: "Age
discrimination is not the same as the insidious discrimination based on race or
creed prejudices and bigotry. Those discriminations result in nonemployment
because of feelings about a person entirely unrelated to his ability to do a
job. This is hardly a problem for the olderjobseeker. Discrimination arises for
him because of assumptions that are made about the effects of age on
performance."l
8
It is hard to understand why a court would assume that race discrimination
could not, as easily as age discrimination, result from the unconscious applica-
tion of stereotyped notions of ability or other characteristics. It is also difficult
to understand why a court would assume that race discrimination results exclu-
sively from a deliberate desire to exclude members of a particular racial group
from the workforce.19 Yet, in equating the causation requirement of section
703 with discriminatory intent, courts have constructed disparate treatment the-
ory on these two dubious assumptions.
This is not to say that one cannot find language in disparate treatment cases
acknowledging that race, sex, or national origin discrimination can be subtle or
even unconscious. But one can literally count on one hand the number of pub-
lished Title VII decisions in which, after acknowledging the existence of un-
conscious bias, the court rules for a race or national origin discrimination
plaintiff or reverses a trial court ruling for the defendant.20 Many more courts,
after acknowledging the existence in society generally of subtle or unconscious
18. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting 113 CONG.
REc. 34,742 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Burke)). Accord Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1066 (7th
Cir. 1989) (age discrimination may exist absent an intent to discriminate); Brooks v. Woodline Motor
Freight, 852 F.2d 1061, 1064 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Syvock for the proposition that unconscious stereo-
types often underlie age discrimination); Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 453 (7th Cir. 1988) (reaf-
firming Syvock regarding age discrimination); La Montagne v. American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750
F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Age discrimination may be subtle and even unconscious."); McCor-
stin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1980) (asserting that age discrimination "is
more subtle but just as injurious to the worker").
19. See Oppenheimer, supra note 14, at 902; see also Lawrence, supra note 11, at 322.
20. EEOC v. Inland Marine Indus., 729 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir.) (holding that racial discrimina-
tion occurs where subjective employment criteria embody racially discriminatory attitudes, even where
intent is not established), cert. denied sub nom. Inland Marine Indus. v. Houston, 469 U.S. 855 (1984);
Johnson v. Stone, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 656, 656 (D. Colo. 1992) (finding for plaintiff in race
discrimination case where only evidence of discrimination was that plaintiff was not promoted and
employer had nicknamed him "Bub").
One can find a somewhat larger number of sex discrimination cases resolved in plaintiff's favor on
these grounds. See, eg., Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (asserting
that unawareness of bias "neither alters the fact of its existence nor excuses it"), aff'd sub nom. Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337,
1343 (9th Cir. 1981) (asserting that "disdain for women's issues.., is evidence of a discriminatory
attitude towards women"); Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 604 F.2d 106, 113
n.12 (1st Cir. 1979) (sex discrimination case affirming judgment for plaintiff because the district court
reasonably concluded that the decision not to promote plaintiff was "determined by a subtle, if unex-
pressed, bias against women").
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forms of bias, rule against the disparate treatment plaintiff on the grounds that
she has failed to prove the existence of such bias in her case.
21
It is easy to overlook this equation of causation and intentionality in dispa-
rate treatment jurisprudence. When we think about race "making a difference"
in an employment decision, we usually think of a decisionmaker who, were he
honest, would admit, "I just don't feel comfortable working around blacks" or
"I just think men are, on the whole, more effective litigators than women." But
the complete picture is more nuanced. To say that a decisionmaker made an
employment decision because of someone's race or sex is not the same as say-
ing that the decisionmaker meant to take that group status into account. An
employee's group status may have affected the decisionmaker in completely
nonconscious ways by affecting what he saw, how he interpreted it, the causes
to which he attributed it, what he remembered, and what he forgot. Yet under
current doctrine, if the factual record leads us to believe that race, gender, or
national origin "made a difference," we must either find that the decisionmaker
intended to discriminate or that no discrimination occurred. Disparate treat-
ment doctrine is simply structured that way; these are the only two stories it
knows how to tell.
Interestingly, courts long ago rejected this assumption in age discrimination
jurisprudence and built a doctrinal and remedial scheme that differentiated non-
conscious, unintentional bias and conscious, deliberate age discrimination.
Courts have interpreted language in the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act 22 identical to language in Title VII's section 703(a) as requiring only that
age have "made a difference"or "played a part" in a decisionmaking process.3
To establish "first tier" liability24 entitling him to back pay, reinstatement, at-
torney's fees, and other equitable relief, an age discrimination plaintiff need not
21. This phenomenon is illustrated by the Sixth Circuit's decision in Nichelson v. Quaker Oats
Co., 752 F.2d 1153, 1156 (6th Cir. 1985). In reversing a jury verdict in favor of a black disparate
treatment plaintiff, the court opined:
We are aware that employment discrimination based on race can occur both in subtle and
obvious ways, both of which are contrary to the equal opportunity goals set out by Congress in
Title VII .... We are also aware that subtle forms of discrimination may be difficult to prove,
but the burden of proof is on the plaintiff ....
Id. at 1156; see also O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the
plaintiff must show that more likely than not, the employer failed to promote women because of discrim-
inatory intent).
22. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988), provides in pertinent
part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age.
23. See Lowe v. Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1376 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding
that court did not err in instructing jury that to prevail in an age discrimination claim, plaintiff must
show age was a "significant contributing factor" in employer's decision); Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting
Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1568 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that an inference of discrimination can be drawn
absent direct evidence of discriminatory intent); Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1067 (7th Cir.
1989) (holding that a "finding that age was a 'determining factor' ... is tantamount to a finding of
intentional discrimination").
24. The ADEA establishes two tiers of liability. Under the first tier, an employer can be held
liable for damages for a simple violation of the ADEA. Under the second tier, the employer can be held
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prove invidious intent--only that age "played a role" in motivating, in the
sense of animating or inducing, the decisionmaker's action. Unlike Title VII
caselaw, in which motivation and intentionality are used interchangeably, age
discrimination jurisprudence has distinguished these two constructs.25 Con-
sider the following language from the Seventh Circuit's 1989 opinion in
Burlew v. Eaton Corp.:
This standard-that age was a determining factor-does not in itself re-
quire a finding as to defendant's state of mind, for in law there is a distinction
between motive and intent. "Motive is what prompts a person to act, or fail to
act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done or omit-
ted." Indeed, in 1981, we stated:
Congress, in our opinion, intended that liability under the ADEA could be
established without any showing as to the defendant's state of mind... 26
It is difficult to understand why the insight the Burlew Court articulated--
that motive and intent are not homologous constructs-could have escaped
courts interpreting Title VII. But this is the state of equal employment opportu-
nity jurisprudence.
2 7
The requirement that a Title VII plaintiff prove purposeful discriminatory
intent applies both in "pretext" cases, and in "mixed-motives" cases analyzed
under the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.28
One might reasonably assume that Price Waterhouse, in which liability was
based on the finding that gender-based stereotypes infected the employer's
decisionniaking process, would have shaken Title VII disparate treatment anal-
ysis free from the equation of causation and intentionality and moved it into
greater alignment with the understanding of first-tier ADEA liability articulated
by the Seventh Circuit in cases such as Burlew and La Montagne.2 9 But a
liable for double damages if it committed a willful violation of the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
(1994). 1
25. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1708 (1993) (holding that "willful violation"
refers to an employer's act evincing knowledge or reckless disregard of ADEA prohibitions).
26. Burlew, 869 F.2d at 1066 (quoting BLAcK's LAW DcrmoNARY 727 (5th ed. 1979); Syvock v.
Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 144-55 (7th Cir. 1981)) (emphasis in original); see also
EEOC v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 957 F.2d 1446, 1458 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that "the legislative
history of the ADEA suggests that the Congressional framers thought that nonwillful discrimination
directed towards an individual was quite possible") (quoting Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665
F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1981)); MacDonald v. Eastern Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115, 1119
(10th Cir. 1991) (stating that because age discrimination may be subtle, ADEA plaintiffs "may establish
discrimination indirectly"); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 827 F.2d 13, 20 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting
that "federal courts have long permitted [ADEA] plaintiffs to submit indirect evidence of discrimina-
tion'); Wood v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 725 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that
an ADEA plaintiff can establish a prima facie case with circumstantial evidence); Trent v. AT & T
Technologies, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1461, 1465 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that "[a] jury could find that an
employer intentionally discriminated even though ... he did not do so willfully").
27. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989) (requiring plaintiff to prove
purposeful discrimination); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (" 'Discriminatory
purpose' ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences."); Warren v.
Halstead Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 746, 751-52 (4th Cir. 1986) ("Discriminatory intent means actual motive
and is not a legal presumption to be drawn from a factual showing of something less than actual
motive.').
28. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
29. La Montagne v. American Convenience Prod., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1984).
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careful reading of Price Waterhouse reveals that there, as in pretext cases, the
concepts of motive, intent, and causation are confounded and liability is pre-
mised on the presence of conscious discriminatory animus.
For example, while Justice Brennan's lead opinion, joined by Justices
Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, rejects the requirement that a plaintiff show
"but for" causation, it does not reject the assumption that causation in employ-
ment discrimination is commensurate with conscious discriminatory intent.
States Justice Brennan:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision,
we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its
reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons
would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.
30
Justice Brennan states that a plaintiff proceeding under a mixed-motives
theory must prove that an employer "relied upon sex-based considerations in
coming to its decision."31 And while at one point Justice Brennan writes that a
mixed-motives plaintiff must prove only that her group status "played a part" in
the employer's decision, it then defines "playing a part" as the conscious inclu-
sion of the plaintiff's group status in the decisionmaker's judgmental
calculus.3
2
Thus, the plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse frames causation not sim-
ply as an attempt to discern what actuated an employer's decision, but as an
inquiry into the employer's conscious state of mind at the moment a decision
was made. The distinction between motive and intent made by the Seventh
Circuit in Burlew and subsequent cases appears to have escaped the Price
Waterhouse Court. In both the plurality opinion and Justice O'Connor's influ-
ential concurrence, evidence that a decisionmaker holds stereotyped views of
the plaintiff's group is deemed evidentially significant not in and of itself, but
because it is assumed to betoken discriminatory animus. Nor is evidence of
stereotyping itself sufficient to establish a Title VII violation-the plaintiff
must prove the connection between stereotyping and discriminatory intent to
prevail.33
30. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
31. Id. at 242.
32. Id. at 250.
33. This is the only point on which the Price Waterhouse dissenters agreed with their colleagues.
Justice Rehnquist wrote:
Although the District Court's version of Title VII liability is improper under any of today's
opinions, I think it important to stress that Title VII creates no independent cause of action for
sex stereotyping. Evidence of use by decisionmakers of sex stereotypes is, of course, quite
relevant to the question of discriminatory intent. The ultimate question, however, is whether
discrimination caused the plaintiff's hann.
Id. at 294 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Numerous post-Price Waterhouse cases express this view of the connection between stereotyping
and discriminatory motive. See, e.g., Hong v. Children's Memorial Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1265-66 (7th
Cir. 1993) (remarks evidencing ethnic stereotypes do not necessarily prove intentional discrimination);
Bruno v. City of Crown Point, 950 F.2d 355, 362 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the fact that deci-
sionmaker asked only female applicant family-oriented questions was relevant, though insuficient, to
prove discriminatory intent); Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104,
1112 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that stereotyped remarks indicated presence of discriminatory intent); Lin-
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One can reasonably conclude that evidence of stereotyping indicates inten-
tional discrimination if one understands the relationship between stereotyping
and biased decisionmaking in any of three particular ways. First, the assumed
connection is warranted in situations where stereotypes bias decisionmaking
through the conscious use of race, sex, national origin, or age as a proxy for
some other characteristic stereotypically associated (or disassociated) with
group membership. Without the assumption that the use of group membership
as a proxy for some other characteristic is a conscious process, one cannot
reasonably conclude that this type of stereotype-based discrimination is neces-
sarily intentional.
Cases in which plaintiffs have prevailed under a stereotyping/proxy theory
are relatively common in age and sex discrimination jurisprudence, 34 but they
are increasingly rare in the race and national origin contexts. Seldom is an
employer willing to admit, or a plaintiff able to prove, that the decisionmaker
consciously used race or national origin as a proxy for some job-related trait.
But, if we take the plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse at face value, this is
precisely what a plaintiff must establish if he is to show that the employer
"relied upon ' 35 or "took into account ' 36 race or ethnicity in coming to a
decision.
Second, the assumption that evidence of stereotyping indicates discrimina-
tory intent makes sense if stereotypes are understood as normative constructs.
A normative stereotype is a composite of one's expectations as to how mem-
bers of a particular group should behave. Price Waterhouse decisionmakers'
comments that as a woman partner candidate, plaintiff Ann Hopkins should
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry" 37 reflect normative
stereotypes.
dahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that decisionmaker comments re-
vealing stereotypes regarding the relative abilities of male and female flight attendants indicated
discriminatory motive); Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1569 (2d Cir. 1989)
(finding comments reflecting stereotypes are direct evidence of discriminatory intent); see also note 4
supra.
34. With respect to the use of age as a proxy, see, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct.
1701, 1706 (1993) ("[A]n employer cannot rely on age as a proxy for an employee's remaining charac-
teristics, such as productivity, but must instead focus on those factors directly.'). Accord Baker v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 6 F.3d 632, 645 (9th Cir. 1993) (age can not be used as a proxy for other disqualifying
factors); Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 876 (6th Cir. 1990) (ADEA is "directly aimed at
the evil of taking age into account in making employment decisions, or using age as a proxy for some
legitimate factor, with which it is somewhat, but not totally, correlated."). With respect to the use of
gender as a proxy, see, e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1086 (1983) (holding
that employers cannot calculate retirement benefits based on sex); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
332 (1977) (holding employers may not use gender as a proxy for strength, although it might be a fairly
accurate one). In the constitutional context, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976)
(holding that use of gender as a proxy for other, more germane bases of classification violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment).
35. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241. Justice Brennan asserted that the critical inquiry in deter-
mining whether an employer violated Title VII is "whether gender was a factor in the employment
decision at the moment it was made." Id. The focus is on the decisionmaker's thoughts at the moment
of decision.
36. l at 239.
37. Id. at 235 (citing Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
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Expressions of gender-based normative stereotypes do indeed indicate that
an employee's gender is entering into decisionmaking; it is logical to infer from
such statements that males and females are being subjected to differing role
expectations and behavioral standards because of gender. If one understands
stereotypes in this way, it is reasonable to conclude that statements reflecting
stereotypes, made in connection with a particular employment decision, indi-
cate the presence of conscious discriminatory intent.
Third, the assumption that statements reflecting stereotyped views betoken
discriminatory animus makes sense if one understands discrimination as result-
ing from prejudice and further understands prejudice as comprising a cognitive
component (stereotypes), an affective component (aversion or dislike), and a
behavioral component (discrimination aimed at creating or enforcing social dis-
tance). If we believe that these three components necessarily function as insep-
arable parts of an integrated whole, then the presence of one can be assumed to
evidence the others. Significantly, this view of the relationship between inter-
group animus, stereotyping, and discrimination characterized social psycholog-
ical theories about intergroup relations prevalent in the 1950s, 1960s, and into
the 1970s. 3
8
As these observations indicate, the current jurisprudential understanding of
the nature and causes of discrimination did not originate in federal discrimina-
tion caselaw. Rather, current jurisprudence reflects the perspective taken by
personality and social psychologists who studied and theorized about inter-
group discrimination from the 1920s into the 1980s, before the emergence of a
cognitive approach to intergroup relations. While a thorough examination of
this history is beyond the scope of this piece, a brief review will illustrate
points significant to our inquiry.
Prejudice emerged as a subject of psychological inquiry during the 1920s. 39
Between that time and the present, one can distinguish various stages reflecting
different theoretical and empirical approaches to the subject.40 However these
stages are divided, each is associated with particular social circumstances and
38. See notes 103-111 infra and accompanying text.
39. Before that time, few academics questioned the central premise of "race theory"---that non-
white peoples were inferior to whites and that racial distinctions were a rational response to those "obvi-
ous" differences. See generally Franz Samelson, From "Race Psychology" to "Studies in Prejudice".
Some Observations on the Thematic Reversal in Social Psychology, 14 J. HiST. BEHAVIoR.AL SCi. 265
(1978) (examining the shift in psychology from embracing the idea of racial inferiority to labeling it as
irrational bias); see also JoHN DucKrrT, THE SocIAL PsYcHoLOGy oF PR.a=iuICE (1992) (exploring the
social and psychological variables contributing to prejudice and the means by which their expression can
be mitigated); John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. G-aertner, Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism: Histori-
cal Trends and Contemporary Approaches, in PRmtmica, DiscRaNMAToN, & RACISM 1, 1-34 (John F.
Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) (examining the extent to which contemporary egalitarian
ideals have affected racial attitudes and tracldng trends in attitudes and stereotypes about race); Graham
M. Vaughan, The Psychology ofIntergroup Discrimination, 17 N.Z. J. PsYcHOL. 1 (1988) (tracing the
development of theories about prejudice from genetic theories to current sociopsychological models).
40. Scholars divide the history in different ways. Phyllis Katz, for example, discerns four distinct
research periods. Phyllis A. Katz, Racism and Social Science: Towards a New Commitmen4 in To-
WARDs THE ELIMINATION OF RACISM 3, 8-11 (Phyllis A. Katz ed., 1978). John Duckitt, in contrast,
describes seven distinct periods. Ducrrr, supra note 39, at 47.
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historical events, and each focuses attention on specific theoretical constructs
and empirical agendas.
The 1920s and 1930s saw a radical change in how the academy approached
the study of race relations. Samelson characterized the change as follows: "In
1920, most psychologists believed in the existence of mental differences be-
tween races; by 1940, they were searching for the sources of 'irrational preju-
dice.' "41 Thus, from the 1920s to the early 1930s, social psychologists were
busily repudiating the "accepted wisdom" of nonwhite racial inferiority posited
by nineteenth century race theory and taking their first steps to understand the
longevity of the belief in white superiority. In this endeavor, they invented the
concept of prejudice,42 designed instruments to measure it,43 and began to theo-
rize about its psychological origins.44
During the late 1930s through the early 1950s, research and theoretical
work on prejudice centered primarily around the question of intrapsychic etiol-
ogy. The problem was straightforward: If prejudice were irrational and unjus-
tifiable, as the academy had collectively come to believe, how could its
geographical and temporal ubiquity be explained? Psychodynamic theory pro-
vided a ready explanation: Prejudice is a defense mechanism. It subcon-
sciously diverts inner conflicts, needs, and externally induced frustrations onto
less threatening external targets. 45 The universality of these intrapsychic phe-
nomena explained the temporal and geographical ubiquity of prejudice.
4 6
After World War II, the theoretical paradigm shifted somewhat. While
prejudice was still seen as psychodynamically based, its origins were no longer
sought in universal psychodynamic processes. Rather, prejudice was seen as
stemming from a particular pathological personality structure. Thus the prob-
lem confronting students of intergroup relations became identifying the preju-
dice-prone personality-the bigot. Primary symptoms of this pathological
personality structure included "stereotypy," the tendency toward "either-or,"
categorical thinking, and hostility towards racial or ethnic "outgroups."
41. Samelson, supra note 39, at 265.
42. See generally GARDNER MuRuHY, Lois BARcLAY MtuRHm & THEODORE M. NEwcomB, Ex-
PERPAENTAL SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1931) (containing parts on measuring and changing attitudes con-
cerning race and ethnic relations).
43. See Daniel Katz & Kenneth Braly, Racial Stereotypes of One Hundred College Students, 28 J.
,aNORMAL & SOC. PS YcHOL. 280 (1933).
44. See T.W. ADORnO, ELSE FRI qEL-BRuNsWfK, DANIEL J. LEVINSON, & R. NaVrrT SANFORD,
THE AUTHORITARIAN PERsoNALrry (1950); JoHN DOLLARD, LEONARD W. DOOB, NEAL E. MILLER, O.H.
MowRER, & ROBERT R. SEARS, FRUSTRATION Am AAGREssioN (1939); JOHN DOLLARD, CASTE AND
CLASS IN A SoUrERN TowN (1937).
45. See, e.g., DOLLARD, DOOB, supra note 44; I.D. MAcCRoNE, RACE ArnTtmr s IN SOUTH AF-
RICA: HISTORICAL, ExPiuiEmrAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUD.S (1937); Gordon W. AlIport & Bernard
M. Kramer, Some Roots of Prejudice, 22 J. PSYCHOL. 9 (1946); Carl Iver Hovland & Robert R. Sears,
Minor Studies in Aggression V1: Correlation of Lynchings with Economic Indices, 9 J. PSYCHOL. 301
(1940); Helen V. McLean, Psychodynamic Factors in Racial Relations, 244 ANNA.s AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sc. 159 (1946). For a review of the psychodynamic approach to prejudice, see GORDON W.
ALLPORT, Tan NAuRiE OF PREmDIcE (1954).
46. The most influential work under this paradigm was ADoNo, supra note 44.
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By 1954, when Gordon Allport wrote his now classic work, The Nature of
Prejudice,47 a mind-dazzling number of definitions of prejudice had been pro-
posed. Among them all, there existed at least two points of agreement: first,
that prejudice is a negative orientation, and second, that prejudice is an
"attitude.",
48
During the entire period preceding the emergence of the cognitive perspec-
tive, discrimination was seen as resulting from prejudice. Prejudice, in turn,
was understood as an attitude, consisting of various dimensions or components.
During the 1920s and 1930s, and into the 1940s, attitudes were conceived as
unidimensional, consisting of only an affective component.49 During the late
1940s and into the 1960s, attitudes came to be understood as consisting of three
components: beliefs about the attitude object (the cognitive component), feel-
ings toward the attitude object (the affective component), and behavioral dispo-
sitions toward the attitude object (the behavioral component).50 During the
1970s and into the 1980s, a 2-component model was advanced, in which the
attitude of prejudice was defined as "[a] learned disposition consisting of...
(1) negative beliefs or stereotypes ([the] cognitive component), and (2) nega-
tive feelings or emotions ([the] affective component). '' 51 Under this 2-compo-
nent approach, the behavioral element was split off and viewed as an
independent construct referred to as the "behavioral intention. '52 The behav-
ioral intention was seen as comprising a consciously formed intent to act to-
wards the attitude object in a particular way.5 3 Seen in this way, prejudice, an
attitude, causes discrimination, a behavior. Mediating between the two is con-
scious behavioral intention. Discrimination, in other words, is the intentional,
behavioral manifestation of prejudice.
54
47. ALLPoRT, supra note 45.
48. See, eg., Richard Ashmore, The Problem of Intergroup Prejudice, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1
(B.E. Collins ed., 1970); John Harding, Bernard Kutner, Harold Proshansky, & Isidor Chein, Prejudice
and Ethnic Relations, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1021-22 (Gardner Lindzey ed., 1954)
(explaining that a prejudice is an attitude toward members of some outgroup and in which the valuative
tendencies are predominantly negative). For a useful review of various definitions of prejudice encom-
passing these components, see DUcKrrr, supra note 39, at 10.
49. See, e.g., L.L. THusroiom & E.J. CHAVE, THE MEASUREMENT OF ATrrrurDE 6-7 (1929); R.
LIKERT, A TECHmQUE FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF ATrrrUDES (1931); Louis Guttman, A Basis for Scal-
ing Qualitative Data, 9 AM. Soc. REv. 139 (1944).
50. See, e.g., DAVID KRECH & RICHARD S. CRUTCHFIELD, THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (1948); THEODORE M. NawcoMB, RALPH H. TURNmR, & PHILn, E. CoNVERSE, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 40-79 (1965); Isidor Chein, Notes on a Frameworkfor the Measurement ofDiscrimination
and Prejudice, in RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 381, 386-90 (Marie Jahoda, Morton
Deutsch, & Stuart W. Cook eds., 1951); John Harding, Harold Proshansky, Bernard Kutner, & Isidor
Chein, Prejudice and Ethnic Relations, in 5 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 4, 7-11 (Gardner
Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 2d ed. 1969); Daniel Katz & Ezra Stotland, A Preliminary Statement to
a Theory of Attitude Structure and Change, in 3 PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDY OF A SCIENCE 423, 428-32
(Sigmund Koch ed., 1959).
51. JACK LEVIN & WuAM C. LEVIN, THE FUNCTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION AND PREJUDICE 66
(1982).
52. ICEK AizEN & MARTIn FIsHBEN, UNDERSTANDIG ATTrrruDEs AND PREDICTING SOCIAL BE_-
HAVIOR 42-43 (1980).
53. Id. at 41-42.
54. See, e.g., Walter G. Stephan & David Rosenfield, Racial and Ethnic Stereotypes, in IN T
EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN SEEorypiNG 92, 93 (Arthur G. Miller ed., 1982).
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The parallels between these psychological models of discrimination and
current disparate treatment jurisprudence are apparent. Discrimination-at
least in race and national origin contexts-is construed as resulting from hos-
tile animus towards and accompanying negative beliefs about an individual be-
cause of his or her membership in a particular group. Mediating between
prejudice and discrimination is the "discriminatory motive," which is seen in
both the psychology and race/national origin discrimination jurisprudence as a
conscious behavioral intention to create social distance by denying outgroup
members certain benefits and opportunities.
B. The Assumption of Rational Decisionmaking and the Presumption of
Invidiousness
Disparate treatment plaintiffs face a thorny problem. In short, courts have
construed section 703 of Title VII, like 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1983, to
require proof of intent to discriminate in disparate treatment cases. But, as
numerous courts have acknowledged, proving such intent is particularly diffi-
cult in employment-related disputes. As the Seventh Circuit observed: "Proof
of such discrimination is always difficult. Defendants of even minimal sophis-
tication will neither admit discriminatory animus nor leave a paper trail demon-
strating it; and because most employment decisions involve some discretion,
alternative hypotheses (including that of simple mistake) will always be possi-
ble and often plausible. '55
The pretext model of disparate treatment proof first articulated in McDon-
nell Douglas and later clarified in Burdine was intended to address this problem
by providing a 3-step analytical framework for proving intentional discrimina-
tion in situations where only circumstantial evidence is available. Specifically,
pretext analysis commences with the plaintiff's presentation of a prima facie
case of discrimination. In a termination case such as my client Miguel's, to
establish a prima facie case the plaintiff need only show that: (1) he is a mem-
ber of a protected class (in his case Latino); (2) he was working in a job for
which he was qualified; (3) his employment was terminated; and (4) his posi-
tion remained open or was subsequently filled by someone of similar qualifica-
tions.56 Upon making this showing, a burden of production-not a burden of
Allport also endorsed this view in The Nature of Prejudice, maintaining that the attitude of prejudice
tends to manifest itself in negative actions towards the object of that prejudice. ALLPORT, supra note 45,
at 14-15. As the prejudice becomes more intense, the negative actions increase in severity in the follow-
ing five-step sequence: (1) antilocution; (2) avoidance; (3) discrimination, defined as "an attempt to
exclude all members of the group in question from certain kinds of employment, from residential hous-
ing, political rights, educational or recreational opportunities, churches, hospitals or from some other
social privileges"; (4) physical attack; and (5) extermination. Id.
55. Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987).
56. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981) (quoting
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The elements of a plaintiff's prima facie case change slightly depending on
the employment decision at issue. For example, in failure to hire or promote cases, some courts have
held that subjective criteria forming part of the applicant's qualifications-normally part of the plain-
tiff's prima facie case-are more properly considered at the pretext stage, based on the rationale that the
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proofP7-shifts to the defendant to articulate one or more legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reasons for its decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment.58
This is what the box manufacturer defendant was doing when it identified tardi-
ness and safety violations as the reasons underlying its decision. Because no
one is perfect, few employers will be unable to articulate some plausible reason
for firing or failing to hire or promote any particular employee or applicant. As
a result, virtually all individual treatment cases turn on the third step in the
McDonnell Douglas minuet: proof of pretext.
Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine model of disparate treatment proof,
after a defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the con-
tested employment decision, the plaintiff can prevail only by proving that the
proffered reason was not the "true reason ' 59 for the decision, but a "pretext for
discrimination, 60 In any cause adjudicated under the McDonnell Douglas!
Burdine paradigm, the reason an employer offered to explain the negative ac-
tion taken against a target employee must accordingly be classified as either the
"true" reason for its action or a "phony reason" 61-a "sham," 62 "mask," 63
"facade," 64 or "cover-up" 65 for the "true" discriminatory motive.66 Given the
rhetoric of McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, finding against an employer at
the third stage of proof is, in essence, finding that the employer has lied to the
plaintiff and the court. 67
"evaluation[] that a plaintiff lacks these qualities [is] more susceptible of abuse and more likely to mask
pretext." Fowle v. C & C Cola, 868 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 1989).
57. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2753 (1993); Burdine 450 U.S. at
254.
58. Seee.g., Hick, 113 S. Ct. at 2747; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802.
59. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; see also Foster v. MCI Telecom. Corp., 773 F.2d 1116, 1118 (10th
Cir. 1985).
60. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56; see also McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 804.
61. Visser v. Packer Eng'g Ass'n, Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1991) (defining pretext as a
"phony reason"); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 898 (3d Cir.) (defining pretext as a
"fabricated justification'), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987).
62. Acrey v. American Sheep Indus. Ass'n, 981 F.2d 1569, 1581 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Wil-
son v. Belmont Homes, Inc., 970 F.2d 53, 54 (5th Cir. 1992); Ramsey v. City and County of Denver,
907 F.2d 1004, 1007 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 302 (1992); Gunby v. Pennsylvania Elec.,
840 F.2d 1108, 1116, 1119 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that jury could have concluded that [defendant's]
alleged discriminatory reasons for not promoting [plaintiff] were a sham), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905
(1989).
63. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 512 (3d Cir. 1992) ("pretext
contrived to mask sex discrimination"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993); Galbraith v. Northern
Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 282 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that defendant's reasons may be "unworthy of
belief"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1497 (1992); see also Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 898.
64. Acrey, 981 F.2d at 1574.
65. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-08; EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1317 (10th
Cir. 1992) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 825); Williams v. Valentec Kisco, Inc., 964 F.2d
723, 726 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 635 (1992); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1011-12
(1st Cir. 1979).
66. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 522 (quoting Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 49 n.7
(3d Cir. 1989)).
67. As the Seventh Circuit stated in Visser v. Packer Eng'g Ass'n, Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 657, "[a]
pretext, in employment law, is a reason that the employer offers for the action claimed to be discrimina-
tory and that the court disbelieves, allowing an inference that the employer is trying to conceal a dis-
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Within the pretext paradigm, it is simply not possible for an employment
decision to be both motivated by the employer's articulated reasons and tainted
by intergroup bias; the trier of fact must decide between the two.68 As this
implicit dichotomy was described by the Seventh Circuit in Riordan v.
Kempiners,69 once an employer comes forward with explanatory evidence, the
issue becomes: "(1) Was [defendant's] proffered reason-a noninvidious rea-
son-the true reason? (2) If not, was [plaintiff's] sex the real reason? Only if
the first question was answered 'no' and the second 'yes' was [defendant]
guilty of sex discrimination."
70
How is the trier of fact to choose between these two mutually exclusive
characterizations of an employer's proffered justification and thereby resolve
the central issue of discriminatory intent? As mentioned above, in the vast
majority of cases, nothing even approaching "smoking gun" evidence is avail-
able. Furthermore, while statistical evidence of underutilization of members of
plaintiff's group in relation to its representation in the relevant, qualified labor
market is probative of discriminatory intent,71 it is widely deemed insufficient
to prove pretext in an individual case. 72
The most common method of proving pretext is to show that the employer's
proffered reason is not worthy of credence either because it appears implausible
in light of data upon which such an employment decision should have been
based, or because it appears inconsistent with decisions reached in similar cases
involving employees outside of plaintiff's protected class. So, in Miguel's
case, for example, because the employer maintained that my client was dis-
charged because of tardiness, absence from work, and safety violations, pretext
analysis required me to obtain his attendance and discipline records and com-
pare them with the records of his Anglo coworkers.
criminatory reason for his action." See also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2764
('The majority's scheme therefore leads to the perverse result that employers who fail to discover non-
discriminatory reasons for their own decisions to hire and fire employees not only will benefit from
lying, but must lie, to defend successfully against a disparate-treatment action.") (citations omitted)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
68. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 (1st Cir. 1974) ("If an employer were to
prove that he was motivated by a legitimate reason, there would be no room left for showing that reason
was a 'pretext,' as pretext is 'a purpose or motive alleged or an appearance assumed in order to cloak the
real intention or state of affairs.' ") (citation omitted); see also Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp.,
879 F.2d 43, 49 n.7 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that the issue in a pretext case is "whether either illegal or
legal motives, but not both, were the 'true' motives behind the decision") (quoting NLRB v. Transporta-
tion Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 n.5 (1983)).
69. Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 1987). This dichotomy reflects the ap-
proach taken in United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983), in
which the Court stated that "the district court must decide which party's explanation of the employer's
motivation it believes.'
70. Riordan, 831 F.2d at 696.
71. See, e.g., Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 1985), modified, 784 F.2d
1407 (9th Cir. 1986); Box v. A & P Tea Co., 772 F.2d 1372, 1379 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1010 (1986).
72. Se4 eg., Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978); Person v. J.S. Alberici
Constr. Co., 640 F.2d 916, 919 (8th Cir. 1981); Hudson v. IBM Corp., 620 F.2d 351, 355 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1066 (1980); Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 817 (1985).
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More specifically, the hundreds of disparate treatment cases I had read in-
structed me that the conscious, discriminatory purpose required to prevail in a
disparate treatment case might be inferred from the following types of
evidence:
(1) Evidence that the objective data maintained by the defendant did not sup-
port the result reached by the decisionmaker; 73
(2) Evidence that the decisionmaker seemed to undervalue or ignore facts
favorable to the employee; 74
(3) Evidence that the decisionmaker made a judgment about the plaintiff with-
out being able to point to specific events which would reasonably support such
a judgment;7" or
(4) Evidence showing that similarly situated Anglo employees were on occa-
sion treated more favorably.
76
In the end, if I succeeded in uncovering evidence of this sort, pretext theory
not only permitted,77 but indeed compelled 78 me to argue that the plant man-
ager's stated reasons were a "sham," a post hoc fabrication to cover up inten-
tional discrimination. It would not suffice to urge that the employer was a
well-intentioned " 'good' person" who, through lack of care, did a "'bad'
73. See, e.g., Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396-98 (3d Cir.) (evi-
dencing that actual sales data showing plaintiff's performance was in fact superior to that of nonpro-
tected employees retained in a reduction in force), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984); Jauregui v. City
of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 1988) (employer's assertion that plaintiff was denied a
promotion due to lack of interpersonal skill found pretextual because plaintiff's evaluations had failed to
mention specific examples of this shortcoming).
74. See, e.g., Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 901 (3d Cir. 1987) (showing that
defendant, which attempted to justify plaintiff's termination on grounds of uncooperative behavior,
could not explain highly positive material in plaintiff's prior employment evaluations).
75. Id. at 901 (decisionmaker testified that plaintiff was "less cooperative... than [he] would
have liked" and "not adaptive," but was unable to offer any specific examples of uncooperative or
nonadaptive behavior to justify such a conclusion); see also Jauregui, 852 F.2d at 1135.
76. See, e.g., Wilson v. Stroh Cos., 952 F.2d 942, 945 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiff may
establish pretext by establishing that other employees who engaged in similar misconduct received less
severe sanctions); Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 179-80 (3d Cir. 1991), cert denied,
502 U.S. 1066 (1992) (finding pretext in plaintiff's showing that nonminority professor was granted
tenure under more lenient standards than those applied to plaintiff); Jauregul, 852 F.2d at 1135 (holding
that fact that white police officer was promoted despite noted deficiencies in "interpersonal skills" dis-
credited employer's assertion that lack of interpersonal skills was basis for Hispanic officer's
nonpromotion).
Were I to succeed in uncovering evidence of Anglo coworkers treated more favorably, the em-
ployer would then attempt to demonstrate that those employees are not really "similarly situated." The
employer would argue, for example, that these comparable employees had "better reasons" for having
been late or that the safety violations disclosed in discovery were not really "their fault," thus justifying
a lesser sanction. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 1980); Fong v. American
Airlines, Inc., 626 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1980). Similarly situated individuals are those who "have
been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or
mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for
it." Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992).
77. See, e.g., DuJJy, 738 F.2d at 1395-96; Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n.6 (1st Cir.
1974) ("The reasonableness of the employer's reasons may of course be probative of whether they are
pretexts.").
78. See notes 6-8 supra and accompanying text.
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thing."' 79 The pretext story boards required me to paint him as an intentional
wrongdoer who was lying to the court.
In fairness, it does not necessarily follow that because a judgment was irra-
tional, suboptimal, or inconsistent with judgments made in similar situations, it
must have resulted from a deliberate intent to discriminate. Some sort of pre-
sumption must serve as a bridge between the two. Pretext analysis permits this
inferential leap from an apparently irrational or inconsistent judgmental process
to an intentionally discriminatory one through the operation of a "presumption
of invidiousness" first articulated by the Supreme Court in Furnco Construc-
tion Corp. v. Waters.80 The Court in Furnco stated:
[W]e know from our experience that more often than not people do not act in a
totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a busi-
ness setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have
been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely
than not the employer, whom we generally assume acts only with some reason,
based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race.81
Or, as the presumption was subsequently described by Judge Adams of the
Third Circuit: "Our intuitive understanding of bigotry supports an inference of
pretext from virtually any defect in an employer's explanation of a decision to
disfavor a member of a Title VII protected class."182
Pretext analysis thus rests on the assumption that, absent discriminatory
animus, employment decisionmakers are rational actors. They make even-
handed decisions using optimal inferential strategies in which all relevant be-
havioral events are identified and weighted to account for transient situational
factors beyond the employee's control. If an employer's proffered explanation
for its decision is shown to be irrational or implausible in light of the relevant
data set, the trier of fact may conclude, and to find for the plaintiff, must con-
clude, that the reasons given did not really motivate the decisionmaker, but
were simply contrived to mask discriminatory intent. The presumption of in-
vidiousness permits the trier of fact to infer discriminatory intent from flaws in
a decisionmaker's inferential process. Without this presumption, one could
only infer that an irrational decision was made; such a decision, in the absence
of a duty to discharge only for good cause, would not be actionable.
C. The Moment of Decision Doctrine and the Bifurcation of Perception
and Judgment
If, according to disparate treatment theory, the inferential strategy used by a
nondiscriminatory decisionmaker conforms to idealized normative standards,
how can we understand the judgmental strategy employed by an employer
whose decisionmaking is tainted by discriminatory motivation? Current dispa-
rate treatment jurisprudence answers this question in three different ways.
79. Oppenheimer, supra note 14, at 970.
80. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
81. Id. at 577.
82. Duffy, 738 F.2d at 1401 (Adams, J., dissenting) (contrasting age discrimination proof, where
invidiousness cannot reasonably be presumed, from race discrimination, where it can).
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First, it recognizes the possibility that discrimination occurs when a deci-
sionmaker refuses ito consider an individual for a particular position either be-
cause he holds antipathy towards members of that individual's social group, or
because placing the individual in the position in question would violate role
expectations for members of the individual's social group. This particular
model of how and why discrimination occurs is reflected in the law and eco-
nomics scholars' concept of a "taste for discrimination."83 In this situation, the
employer's desire to exclude members of the disfavored group operates inde-
pendently of-and in a sense preempts-any effort to assess the applicant's
objective qualifications.
According to this approach, intergroup bias affects decisionmaking not by
distorting the decisionmaker's perceptual or inferential processes, but by cor-
rupting decisionmaking at the moment of decision. Current disparate treatment
jurisprudence assumes that the biased decisionmaker, like Furnco's "rational
actor," is or could easily choose to become aware of all decision-relevant
events and of the contextual factors by which the value of those events should
be utility-adjusted in decisionmaking. He could, if he chose, reach an objective
judgment in light of the relevant data. However, at the moment of decision, the
discriminatory decisionmaker consciously "puts his thumb on the scale;" he
adds the employee or applicant's group status as a factor in the equation.
Alternatively, current disparate treatment jurisprudence recognizes that ste-
reotypes can cause discrimination when group status is consciously used as a
"proxy" for some other job-relevant trait. In this way, stereotypes are seen as
influencing decisionmaking through the operation of a syllogistic reasoning
process. For example, an employer who fails to select a particular woman for
promotion to a highly demanding, responsible upper management position may
reason:
[Pm ] Women with young children are preoccupied with family responsibilities
and do not put their jobs first;
[Pm ] Margaret is a woman with young children;
[C ] Margaret cannot be expected to put the job first.
According to current jurisprudence, if this reasoning serves as the sole basis
for the employer's decision, the pretext model would be applied to adjudicate
any resulting employment dispute. If such reasoning serves as one factor
among others leading to the decision, mixed-motives analysis is applied. In
other words, under current doctrine, "proxy-based discrimination" occurs when
an employer uses the target employee's sex as a "decision-relevant event." If
we were to model the employer's decisionmaking process symbolically, the
employee's group status would appear as a factor in the equation, its predictive
value varying with the strength of the employer's stereotypic expectancy. In
the mixed-motives context, it would appear as one factor among others; in the
pretext context, it would be the only factor considered. But in either case, the
83. See, e.g., GARY S. BEcKER, Tim ECONOMICs OF Disc mmAoi'39-54 (2d ed.,'1971); RIcH-
aRD A. PosNiz, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 615-17 (3d ed., 1986); John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII
Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1411, 1415-20 (1986).
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stereotype of working mothers is seen to operate as an explicit expectancy, by
which I mean that the employee's gender is consciously taken into account by
the decisiomnaker. Group status, as such, functions as an "additive constant"
in the employer's decisionmaking calculus.
The Supreme Court vividly illustrates this understanding of discrimination
as occurring at the moment of decision in Price Waterhouse:
The present, active tense of the operative verbs of § 703(a)(1) ("to fail or re-
fuse") ... turns our attention to the actual moment of the event in question, the
adverse employment decision. The crucial inquiry, the one commanded by the
words of § 703(a)(1), is whether gender was a factor in the employment deci-
sion at the moment it was made.
84
Price Waterhouse in essence directs the trier of fact to take a snapshot85 of
the decisionmaker's mental state at the moment the allegedly discriminatory
decision was made. If the "additive constant" appears in the picture, liability is
established. If it is absent, the trier of fact should conclude that the decision
was untainted by intergroup bias and find for the defendant.
The Price Waterhouse plurality's focus on the moment of decision is
echoed in Justice O'Connor's concurrence, which attempts to delineate the rel-
ative spheres of application of the mixed-motives and pretext paradigms. Un-
like the plurality, who remained silent on the issue, Justice O'Connor would
limit the applicability of mixed-motives analysis to cases in which the plaintiff
presents "direct evidence of discriminatory animus in the decisional process.
'86
"[S]tray remarks in the workplace," which Justice O'Connor defines as, "state-
ments by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the
decisional process itself,"87 are not sufficient in her view to trigger mixed-mo-
tives analysis.88
84. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989).
85. See Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners Local 33, 921 F.2d 396, 403-04 (lst Cir.
1990) (stating that Price Waterhouse directs the trial court "to essentially take a snapshot at the moment
of the allegedly discriminatory act").
86. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 278.
87. Id. at 277.
88. Following Justice O'Connor's lead, most courts now decide whether to apply mixed-motives
analysis, rather than pretext analysis, by determining whether comments reflecting stereotypes or other
forms of bias were made "during the decisionmaking process." See, e.g., Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28
F.3d 366, 375 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that sexually demeaning remarks made to plaintiff by her supervi-
sors were "unrelated" to decisionnmaking and thus insufficient to trigger mixed-motives analysis);
Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, 997 F.2d 444, 449-50 (8th Cir. 1993); Griffiths v. Cigna Corp., 988 F.2d
457, 472 (3rd Cir. 1993); Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 968 F.2d 171, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1992);
McCarthy v. Kemper Life Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 683, 686-687 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that racial remarks
must be relatively contemporaneous to the termination of employment and "related to the employment
decision in question" to suffice as evidence of racial animus); Smith v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.,
875 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989) (requiring a "nexus between the statements made by defendant and
the demotion of the plaintiff to demonstrate that plaintiff's race was a 'substantial factor' in the defend-
ant's decision"); Williams v. Mead Coated Bd., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 1552, 1571 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (finding
racially derogatory remarks not related to the employment decision at issue were insufficient to trigger
mixed-motives analysis); O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 829 F. Supp. 155, 158
(W.D.N.C. 1993) (holding that decisionmaker's comments including, "[i]t's about time we started to get
some young blood in this company," were unrelated to the decision to fire plaintiff and thus did not
show age was a motivating factor in the employer's decision).
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This notion that discrimination occurs at the moment of decision has led to
astounding results in recent disparate treatment cases. Perhaps the most shock-
ing example is Heim v. State of Utah.89 In Heim, the plaintiff alleged that she
was denied access to training and advancement opportunities because of her
sex. At trial, she proved that her supervisor had made the statement, "Fucking
women, I hate having fucking women in the office." 90 Shortly after making
this statement, the supervisor denied plaintiff a desirable assignment. Despite
this proof, the trial court refused to give a mixed-motives instruction. Unable
to prove that her gender was the sole motive for her treatment, the plaintiff lost.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating that, although they might have been "inap-
propriate and boorish," the supervisor's statements were nonetheless "stray re-
marks in the workplace," insufficiently connected with plaintiff's claims to
prove that her gender had been a motivating factor in her supervisor's
decisionmaking. 91
Similarly, in Jackson v. Harvard University,92 a tenure review case, the
court dismissed as not probative of sex discrimination numerous decisionmaker
practices and comments evidencing sex stereotypes. The court, relying on Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurrence in Price Waterhouse, opined that because those
comments were made prior to the commencement of the plaintiff's tenure re-
view, they did not tend to prove that gender played a part in the tenure decision
at the time it was made.
93
Since Price Waterhouse, the federal courts' delineation of precisely where
the realm of "stray remarks" ends and the "decisionmaking process" begins has
reached a level of absurdity rivaling the grotesqueries of Jarndyce vs.
Jarndyce.94 Consider, for example, Young v. Lukens Steel Co.,95 one of a
number of recent age discrimination cases applying Justice O'Connor's "stray
remarks" doctrine to disparate treatment cases brought under the ADEA. In
Young, the plaintiff's coworkers and superiors consistently referred to him as
"the old man" and."the oldest guy in maintenance. '96 It does not require a
great leap to infer from these statements that plaintiff's age was salient in his
superiors' minds. Nonetheless, the trial court refused to give a mixed-motives
instruction to the jury, reasoning that because "there was no reference to age in
the October 4th meeting at which the plaintiff's employment was termi-
nated," 97 the comments were not made in the decisionmaking process and thus
constituted mere "stray remarks in the workplace."98
This bizarre distinction between bias-revealing remarks made before rather
than during the decisionmaking process makes sense only if one views deci-
89. 8 F.3d 1541 (10th Cir. 1993).
90. Id. at 1546.
91. Id. at 1547.
92. 721 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Mass. 1989).
93. Id. at 1403, 1431-32.
94. CARLPFs DicKErs, BLEAK HousE 7 (Everyman's Library 1991) (n.p. 1853).
95. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5681, 65 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43, *193 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
96. Id. at *15.
97. Id. at *18.
98. Id. at *16 (citing 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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sionmaking as distinct from the processes of perception and interpretation of,
and memory for, decision-relevant events. If, however, subtle forms of inter-
group bias intrude into decisionmaking by somehow distorting the perceived
data from which decisions are made, it makes little sense to distinguish be-
tween bias-revealing comments made prior, as opposed to during, the "process
of decisionmaking." As I demonstrate in Part II, cognitive forms of intergroup
bias affect decisionmaking at all points along a perceptual/inferential/judgmen-
tal continuum. When interpersonal judgment is understood as an integrated
system involving perception, interpretation, attribution, memory, and decision-
making, the distinction between stereotype-revealing comments made during
decisionmaking and before decisionmaking utterly breaks down.
D. The Assumption of Decisionmaker Self-Awareness99
The final assumption underlying disparate treatment analysis is the most
obvious and, perhaps for that reason, the easiest to miss. Not only disparate
treatment analysis, but the entire normative structure of Title VH's injunction
"not to discriminate," rests on the assumption that decisionmakers possess
"transparency of mind"--that they are aware of the reasons why they are about
to make, or have made, a particular employment decision. Possessed of such
knowledge, well-intentioned decisionmakers are able to comply with Title
VII's injunction "not to discriminate." Ill-intended decisionmakers know when
they are taking an employee's group status into account; when challenged, they
design "pretexts" to cover their tracks.
Nowhere is the assumption of decisionmaker self-awareness better illus-
trated than in the "moment of decision" language from the Price Waterhouse
plurality, considered above.' 00 As Justice Brennan opined:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we
mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its
reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons
would be that the applicant or employee was a woman. 10'
As the Price Waterhouse plurality constructs reality, employment deci-
sionmakers have ready access to the workings of their own inferential process.
If they simply chose to be truthful, they could tell us whether an employee's
race, ethnicity, or gender had influenced their decision. Gilbert Ryle describes
this belief, which he refers to as "the official theory," in the following terms:
[A]ccording to the official theory, a person has direct knowledge of the best
imaginable kind of the workings of his own mind. Mental states and processes
are (or are normally) conscious states and processes, and the consciousness
which irradiates them can engender no illusions and leaves the door open for
no doubts. A person's present thinkings, feelings and willings, his perceivings,
rememberings and imaginings are intrinsically "phosphorescent"; their exist-
ence and their nature are inevitably betrayed to their owner.102
99. GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 154 (1949).
100. See notes 83-88 supra and accompanying text.
101. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250; see text accompanying note 84 supra.
102. RYaE, supra note 99, at 13-14.
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Because we so readily assume that people have privileged access to the
content of their own thought processes, we may easily overlook the signifi-
cance of this assumption of decisionmaker self-awareness. But if one thinks
about it, one must immediately recognize that the normative utility of a rule
prohibiting discrimination depends entirely on decisionmaker self-awareness.
One can refrain from "discriminating" only to the extent that one can accurately
identify the factors inducing one's actions or decisions. Absent decisionmaker
self-awareness, the nondiscrimination principle-if framed solely as a prohibi-
tory injunction "not to discriminate"--loses its normative mooring.
II. QUEsIONING THE AsSUMPTONs: A COGNITVE BIAS APPROACH TO
INTERGROUP JUDGMENT AND DECIsIONmAKrNG
In 1963, social psychologists Henri Tajfel and A.L. Wilkes performed a
series of simple experiments, asking subjects to estimate the relative lengths of
lines that differed in length by a constant ratio of 5 percent.103 In one condi-
tion, eight lines had not been presented as belonging to separate groups. In a
second condition, the longer four of the eight lines had been previously
presented as belonging to "Group A," the shorter four lines as belonging to
"Group B."
Tajfel and Wilkes found that once they introduced the concept of "group-
ness" into the situation, subjects perceived objects in different groups as more
different from each other, and objects in the same group as more similar to each
other, than was in fact the case. In the second condition, where the lines were
previously presented as belonging to one of two groups, subjects consistently
overestimated the variation between lines belonging to different groups and
underestimated the variation between lines belonging to the same group. Simi-
lar distortions were not observed in the "unclassified" condition. In other
words, subjects tended to "stereotype" lines based on their group membership.
Tajfel and Wilkes' findings replicated those of another social psychologist,
Donald Campbell, who in 1956 had performed a series of similar experiments
using groups of nonsense syllables located along a spatial continuum. Camp-
bell's results, like Tajfel and Wilkes', demonstrated that when subjects were
led to think about objects as belonging to separate groups, they systematically
exaggerated the variation between objects from different groups.' 0 4 Nonsense
syllables, like lines of varying lengths, can fall prey to human stereotyping.
Experiments such as these represented the earliest empirical investigation
of a theoretical claim made by psychologists such as W.E. Vinacke, who ar-
gued that stereotypes should be understood as cognitive structures no different
103. Henri Tajfel & A.L. Wilkes, Classification and Quantitative Judgement, 54 Br. J.
PSYCHOL. 101, 104 (1963). For a more comprehensible description of these experiments and their theo-
retical implications than can be found in the original article, see Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of
Prejudice, 25 J. Soc. Issuts 79, 83-86 (1969).
104. Donald T. Campbell, Enhancement of Contrast As Composite Habit; 53 J. ABNoRMAL &
Soc. PsYcHoL. 350, 355 (1956).
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from other categorization-related constructs.' 0 5 Vinacke also suggested that
principles derived from the investigation of human cognition be applied to the
study of intergroup perception and judgment.
Campbell, Tajfel, and Wilkes interpreted their findings along these lines. In
his 1956 study, Campbell suggested that what he termed the "bias of enhance-
ment of contrast," is, in either person or object perception, "a natural, auto-
matic, and inevitable aspect of imperfect learning about the individual members
of overlapping groups."'1 °6 Similarly, Tajfel wrote in 1969 that intergroup bias
was not necessarily motivational in origin. It may result, he suggested, from
the same processes of categorization, assimilation, and search for coherence
that underlie all human cognition, whether the objects judged be persons of
different races or lines assigned to different groups. 10 7 Campbell, Tajfel, and
Wilkes' findings lent the first empirical support to what became known as the
cognitive approach to intergroup bias, or social cognition theory.
The emergence of social cognition theory represented a profound shift in
psychologists' thinking about intergroup bias. As was discussed in Part I,"08
until well into the 1970s, intergroup prejudice was generally understood as
stemming from motivational processes.' 0 9 Stereotypes of members of "out-
groups" were seen as developing out of prejudice, and as serving to rationalize
it. While psychologists such as Gordon Allport recognized that stereotyping
was functionally similar to categorization, 10 stereotypes were seen as some-
thing "special," discontinuous with "normal" cognitive process."'l Before the
1970s, few psychologists seriously entertained the notion that normal cognitive
processes related to categorization might in and of themselves produce and per-
petuate intergroup bias.
This is a central premise of social cognition theory-that cognitive struc-
tures and processes involved in categorization and information processing can
in and of themselves result in stereotyping 21 2 and other forms of biased inter-
group judgment previously attributed to motivational processes. The social
cognition approach to discrimination comprises three claims relevant to our
present inquiry. The first is that stereotyping, as Vinacke suggested in 1957, is
105. W. Edgar Vinacke, Stereotypes As Social Concepts, 45 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 229, 229 (1957);
see also Joshua A. Fishman, An Examination of the Process and Function of Social Stereotyping, 43 J.
Soc. PSYCHOL. 27, 45-52 (1956) (implicating normal psychological and sociological processes involved
in language and communication in stereotyping and suggesting the study of these processes by research-
ers investigating intergroup relations).
106. Campbell, supra note 104, at 354.
107. Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, supra note 103, at 81.
108. See text accompanying notes 47-54 supra.
109. See, e.g., Ducrr, supra note 39; Richard D. Ashmore & Frances K. Del Boca, Conceptual
Approaches to Stereotypes and Stereotyping, COGNITIV PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP
BEHAVIOR 1, 10 (David. L. Hamilton ed., 1981).
110. See ALLPoRT, supra note 45, at 17-27.
111. See Ashmore & Del Boca, supra note 109, at 10. Butsee Fishman, supra note 105, at 27-39;
Vinacke, supra note 105, at 230.
112. For present purposes, I am adopting Hamilton and Trolier's definition of the term stereotype
as a cognitive structure that contains the perceiver's knowledge, beliefs, and expectancies about some
social category. David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An Overview of
the Cognitive Approach, in PPEguIcaE, DIscRImINATIoN, AND RACISM, supra note 39, at 127, 133-37.
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nothing special.113 It is simply a form of categorization; similar in structure
and function to the categorization of natural objects. According to this view,
stereotypes, like other categorical structures, are cognitive mechanisms that all
people, not just "prejudiced" ones, use to simplify the task of perceiving,
processing, and retaining information about people in memory. They are cen-
tral, and indeed essential to normal cognitive functioning.
The second claim posited in social cognition theory is that, once in place,
stereotypes bias intergroup judgment and decisionmaking. According to this
view, stereotypes operate as "person prototypes" or "social schemas." As such,
they function as implicit theories, biasing in predictable ways the perception,
interpretation, encoding, retention, and recall of information about other peo-
ple. These biases are cognitive rather than motivational. They operate absent
intent to favor or disfavor members of a particular social group.1 14 And, per-
haps most significant for present purposes, they bias a decisionmaker's judg-
ment long before the "moment of decision," as a decisionmaker attends to
relevant data and interprets, encodes, stores, and retrieves it from memory.
These biases "sneak up on" the decisionmaker, distorting bit by bit the data
upon which his decision is eventually based.
The third claim follows from the second. Stereotypes, when they function
as implicit prototypes or schemas, operate beyond the reach of decisionmaker
self-awareness. Empirical evidence indicates that people's access to their own
cognitive processes is in fact poor. Accordingly, cognitive bias may well be
both unintentional and unconscious.
A. Stereotypes As Categorical Structures
Every person, and perhaps even every object that we encounter in the
world, is unique, but to treat each as such would be disastrous. Were we to
perceive each object sui generis, we would rapidly be inundated by an unman-
ageable complexity that would quickly overwhelm our cognitive processing
and storage capabilities. Similarly, if our species were "programmed" to re-
frain from drawing inferences or taking action until we had complete, situation-
specific data about each person or object we encountered, we would have died
out long ago. To function at all, we must design strategies for simplifying the
perceptual environment and acting on less-than-perfect information. A major
way we accomplish both goals is by creating categories. As cognitive psychol-
ogist Eleanor Rosch wrote in 1977, "Since no organism can cope with infinite
diversity, one of the most basic functions of all organisms is the cutting up of
the environment into classifications by which nonidentical stimuli can be
113. See Vinacke, supra note 105, at 241.
114. Social cognition theorists do not maintain that affective processes play no role in intergroup
perception and judgement. Indeed, the most recent and in many ways most interesting investigations in
social cognition explore the interface between cognitive and affective determinants of intergroup stere-
otyping. For a thorough and thought-provoking collection of articles on this subject, see Armcr, COG-
NITION, AND STaERoTPiNG: INTERAcrvE PaocassEs IN GROUP PERCEPIroN (Diane M. Mackie & David
L. Hamilton eds., 1993).
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treated as equivalent."' 15 Categories and categorization permit us to identify
objects, make predictions about the future, infer the existence of unobservable
traits or properties, and attribute the causation of events.
What happens when we group objects into categories? First, we tend to
perceive members of the same category as being more similar to each other,
and members of different categories as more dissimilar to each other, than
when all the objects are viewed in aggregate.1 16 The same results adhere when
the "objects" we categorize are other human beings. 117
This should come as no surprise. Categories are guardians against com-
plexity. Their purpose is to simplify the perceptual field by distorting it, so that
we experience it as less complex and more predictable than it actually is. As
Eleanor Rosch observes, to categorize a stimulus object means to consider it,
for some significant purpose, as both equivalent to other stimuli in the same
category and different from stimulus objects not in that category."l 8 Categori-
cal structures can simplify the perceptual environment only if "fuzzy" differ-
ences are transformed into clear-cut distinctions. Complexity continually
threatens the balance of our categorical structures. Assimilation and enhance-
ment of contrast "guard the guardians." Thus, with object and social catego-
ries, one can predict a tendency towards thinking that "all 'x's are alike."
Second, although some debate exists on this issue, 119 it appears that we
create a mental prototype, often visual, of the "typical" category member.120
To determine whether an item is a member of a particular category, we match
the object perceived with the category prototype and determine the "distance"
between the two. We experience an object first as a member of its "basic"
115. Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization, in SrTurns IN CRoss-CuLru-Ar PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1-2
(Neil Warren ed., 1977) [hereinafter Human Categorization]; see also Eleanor Rosch, Principles of
Categorization, in CoGNInON AND CATEGORizATioN, 27, 27-48 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd
eds., 1978) [hereinafter Principles of Categorization]; Eleanor Rosch, Carolyn B. Mervis, Wayne D.
Gray, David M. Johnson, & Penny Boyes-Braem, Basic Objects in Natural Categories, 8 CoGNrma
PSYCHOL. 382, 385-428 (1976) (describing natural object categorization experiments).
116. Campbell, supra note 104, at 355; Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, supra note 103, at
81; see also Virginia Hensley & Shelley Duval, Some Perceptual Determinants of Perceived Similarity,
Liking, and Correctness, 34 J. OF PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 159-168 (1976) (describing experi-
ments finding exaggerated perceptions of similarity and dissimilarity with respect to ingroup and out-
group members).
117. See notes 170-175 infra and accompanying text. I am mindful that natural object categoriza-
tion will differ from social categorization in significant respects. However, the commonalities to which
I refer in this section appear widely accepted. See, e.g., John H. Lingle, Mark W. Altom, & Douglas L.
Medin, Of Cabbages and Kings: Assessing the Extendibiliy of Natural Object Concept Models to Social
Things, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SociAL CoGN o N 71, 73-78 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds.,
1984).
118. Principles of Categorization, supra note 115, at 28.
119. Compare, e.g., Lingle, supra note 117, at 90-98 (questioning the "exemplar" or "visual pro-
totype" approach to category representation and suggesting a mixed exemplar and probabilistic model of
category structure) with Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Protoypes in Person Perception, in 12 AD-
VANCES iN Exp im4EmN. SocLAL PSYCHOLOGY 2, 28-31 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1979) and Human
Categorization, supra note 115, at 2-15, and Principles of Categorization, supra note 115, at 27-48
(supporting an exemplar or visual prototype approach).
120. See, e.g., Principles of Categorization, supra note 115, at 35-38; Cantor & Mischel, supra
note 119, at 28-31.
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category-the category most accessible at the moment.121 Only with addi-
tional mental processing do we identify it as a member of its superordinate or
subordinate categories. According to this view, we carry in our heads images
of the "typical letter a," the "typical chair," the "typical law school professor,"
and the "typical urban gang member."
Cognitive psychologists refer to these categorical structures as "schemas."
Schemas function somewhat like theories. As Rumelhart states:
[I]t is useful to think of a schema as a kind of informal, private, unarticulated
theory about the nature of events, objects or situations which we face. The
total set of schemata we have available for interpreting our world in a sense
constitutes our private theory of the nature of reality. The total set of schemata
instantiated at a particular moment in time constitutes our internal model of the
situation we face at that moment in time.:
22
According to schema theory, when one must construe or make predictions
about an event or situation, a salient aspect of that event or situation will acti-
vate a relevant schema. Once activated, the schema influences the interpreta-
tion, encoding, and organizing of incoming information and mediates the
drawing of inferences or the making of predictions about the schematized ob-
ject or event. 123 Schemas, like other categorical structures, "enable the per-
ceiver to identify stimuli quickly ... fill in information missing from the
stimulus configuration, and select a strategy for obtaining further information,
solving a problem, or reaching a goal."' 2 4 But the price of this cognitive econ-
omy is that categorical structures-whether prototypes, stereotypes, or
schemas-bias what we see, how we interpret it, how we encode and store it in
memory, and what we remember about it later. In intergroup relations, these
biases, mediated through perception, inference, and judgment, can result in dis-
crimination, whether we intend it or not, whether we know it or not.
B. The Cognitive Origins of Stereotypes
Social cognition theory posits that categorization and related cognitive bi-
ases can themselves result in and perpetuate stereotypes. "Prejudice," under-
stood as systematic biases in intergroup judgment, can flow directly from those
121. See generally Jerome S. Bruner, On Perceptual Readiness, 64 PsycHOL. REV. 123, 132
(1957) (discussing how the accessibility of a category to the perceived object depends on both the
qualities of the object and the needs of the perceiver); E. Tory Higgins, William S. Rholes, & Carl R.
Jones, Category Accessibility and Impression Formation, 13 J. ExP'mERENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 141, 141-
42 (1977) (proposing that "prior activation" of a category increases its accessibility to subsequent per-
ceptions); Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., The Role of Category Accessibility in the Interpreta-
tion of Information About Persons: Some Determinants and Implications, 37 J. PMsONALrIY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 1660 (1979) (examining how individuals use the most accessible category of an object or
event to make subsequent judgments).
122. David E. Rumelhart, Schemata and the Cognitive System, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNI-
TION, supra note 117, at 161, 166.
123. Id. at 167; see also David L. Hamilton, Cognitive Representations of Persons, in 1 SocIAL
CoOrNmoN: THE ONTAmo SymposIuM 135, 149-56 (E. Tory Higgins, C. Peter Herman, & Mark P.
Zanna eds., 1981); Reid Hastie, Schematic Principles in Human Memory, in SOCIAL COGNmON, supra,
at 39, 60-66.
124. Shelley E. Taylor & Jennifer Crocker, Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing, in
SOCIAL CoGNmTION, supra note 123, at 89, 93-94.
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stereotypes, largely independent of motivational processes. 125 Research con-
ducted under this paradigm can be divided into three classes, each supporting
one or more propositions significant to our present inquiry. These include the
minimal group experiments, studies of salience and distinctiveness, and studies
concerning illusory correlation.
1. The minimal group experiments.
After his 1963 experiment showing what happens to length perception
when lines are categorized into groups, 126 Henri Tajfel began wondering
whether similar results would obtain when the categorized objects were people.
To investigate, Tajfel and his colleagues designed what is now called the "min-
imal group paradigm." Under this research design, subjects are grouped ac-
cording to what they are told127 is some minimal similarity, and are then asked
to evaluate members of their own and the other group or to allocate rewards
between the two groups. In some studies, subjects were told that they had been
grouped according to whether they tended to underestimate or overestimate the
sizes of dots. 128 In other studies, subjects were told that their group assignment
had been based on preferences for different paintings or photographs, 129 and in
yet others, subjects were informed that group assignment was random.130
The experiments showed that, as soon a people are divided into groups-
even on a trivial or even random basis-strong biases in their perception of
differences, evaluation, and reward allocation result. As soon as the concept of
"groupness" is introduced, subjects perceive members of their group as more
similar to them, and members of different as more different from them, than
125. Social cognition theorists do not maintain that all stereotypic conceptions of social groups
arise exclusively from cognitive processes. They acknowledge the role of social learning processes
occurring in the course of development. See, e.g., David L. Hamilton, A Cognitive-AttributionalAnaly-
sis of Stereotyping, in 12 A vA cEs IN EXPERIMENTAL SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 119, at 53, 64.
As Henri Tajfel explained:
The value and cognitive functions of social accentuation provide a basis for the understanding
of the structure and direction of biases in intergroup attitudes and stereotypes, but they cannot
tell us very much about the contents of the groups' reciprocal conceptions.... Conceptions of
outgroups are generated in their social and historical contexts and then transmitted to individ-
ual members of groups and widely shared through a variety of channels of social influence.
Henri Tajfel, Social Psychology ofIntergroup Relations, 33 ANN. Ray. PSYCHOL. 1, 22 (Mark R. Rosen-
zweig & Lyman W. Porter eds., 1982).
126. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
127. In all cases, group assignment was, in fact, arbitrary.
128. See, e.g., Henri Tajfel, M.G. Billig, R.P. Bundy, & Claude Flament, Social Categorization
and Intergroup Behaviour, I Eur. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 149, 154-55 (1971); John W. Howard & Myron
Rothbart, Social Categorization and Memoryfor In-Group and Out-Group Behavior, 38 J. PERSONALTY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 301, 302-03 (1980).
129. See, e.g., Vernon L. Allen & David A. Wilder, Categorization, Belief Similarity, and Inter-
group Discrimination, 32 J. PERsoNALrrv & Soc. PSYCHOL. 971, 971 (1975); W. Doise, G. Csepeli,
H.D. Dann, C. Gouge, K. Larsen, & A. Ostell, An Experimental Investigation into the Formation of
Intergroup Representations, 2 EuR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 202, 202 (1972); Tajfel, supra note 128, at 165-
66.
130. See, e.g., Michael Billig & Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization and Similarity in Intergroup
Behaviour, 3 EUt. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 27, 34 (1973); Anne Locksley, Vilma Ortiz, & Christine Hepburn,
Social Categorization and Discriminatory Behavior: Extinguishing the Minimal Intergroup Discrimina-
tion Effect, 39 . PERSONAL=TY & Soc. PSYcHOL. 773, 776-83 (1980).
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when those same persons are simply viewed as noncategorized individuals.' 3'
Indeed, when offered a choice minimal group subjects prefer to view informa-
tion indicating their similarity with ingroup members and their distinctiveness
from outgroup members.
132
While ingroup members perceive similarities between themselves and
others in their group, they perceive outgroup members as being even more ho-
mogeneous. In other words, subjects tend to perceive outgroup members as an
undifferentiated mass, while ingroup members are more highly differenti-
ated.' 33 For a social cognition theorist, the plant manager's reference to my
Salvadoran client as a "Mexican" would be highly relevant, as it tended to
show that he perceived Latinos as an undifferentiated outgroup. It belies his
contention that he "didn't even notice" Miguel's ethnicity. Or perhaps it is true
that he "didn't notice." That, in a sense, was part of the problem.
Group assignment results in biased evaluation of ingroup and outgroup
members even when subjects are divided into groups on an explicitly random
basis. Again, subjects evaluate ingroup members more favorably than outgroup
members on a variety of trait dimensions. 134 Subjects are better able to recall
undesirable behavior of outgroup members than similar behavior of ingroup
members,' 35 and they disproportionately attribute ingroup members' failures to
situational factors and outgroup members' failures to dispositional factors.
136
Subjects significantly overrate the product of their own group in comparison to
their evaluation of the product of an outgroup.1
37
Dividing subjects into even minimal groups also affects their allocation of
rewards between ingroup and outgroup members. In a 1973 experiment using
131. David A. Wilder, Perceiving Persons as a Group: Categorization and Intergroup Relations,
in CooNmvE PRocEssas rN STmaOTYPniO AND InTSRGROUP BanAVIoR, supra note 109, at 213, 217.
Similar results obtain when subjects are asked to evaluate the personalities of persons of different na-
tional origins, in this case, Canadians and Indians. See Henri Tajfel, A. A. Sheikh, & R.C. Gardener,
Content of Stereotypes and the Inference of Similarity Between Members of Stereotyped Groups, 22
AcrA PSYCHOLOGICA 191 (1964).
132. David A. Wilder & Vernon L. Allen, Group Membership and Preference for Information
About Others, 4 PERsoNALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 106, 106 (1978).
133. Hamilton & Trolier, supra note 112, at 131; see also Edward E. Jones, George C. Wood, &
George A. Quattrone, Perceived Variability of Personal Characteristics in In-Groups and Out-Groups:
The Role of Knowledge and Evaluation, 7 PERSONALrry & Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 523, 523-24 (1981);
Bernadette Park & Myron Rothbart, Perception of Out-Group Homogeneity and Levels of Social Cate-
gorization: Memory for the Subordinate Attributes of In-Group and Out-Group Members, 42 J. PEsoN-
ALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1051 (1982) (finding outgroup homogeneity effect in gender-based groups).
For a review of studies reflecting the outgroup homogeneity effect, in both minimal group and social
group contexts, see Patricia W. Linville, Gregrory W. Fischer, & Peter Salovey, Stereotyping and Per-
ceived Distributions of Social Characteristics: An Application to Ingroup-Outgroup Perception, in Pnam-
urucE, DISCRiMENATION & RACisM, supra note 39, at 165 (examining group perception bias as a function
of differentiation within categories).
134. See, e.g., Doise, supra note 129, at 203-04 (discussing intergroup bias in physical trait evalu-
ation); Locksley, supra note 130, at 776-83 (exploring intergroup bias in reward allocation using explic-
itly random group assignment).
135. Howard & Rothbart, supra note 128, at 303-06.
136. See id; Wilder, supra note 131, at 217.
137. Bernard M. Bass & George Dunteman, Biases in the Evaluation of One's Own Group, Its
Allies and Opponents, 7 J. CoNF IcT RESOL. 16, 18-20 (1963) (assigning subjects randomly to compet-
ing and collaborating groups); Robert R. Blake & Jane Srygley Mouton, Overevaluation of Own
Group's Product in Intergroup Competition, 64 . ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 237, 238 (1962).
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explicitly random groups, Michael Billig and Henri Tajfel demonstrated that
subjects permitted to allocate monetary rewards among ingroup and outgroup
members chose a strategy that would maximize differences in rewards between
ingroup and outgroup members. They chose that strategy over both fairness
strategy and maximum mutual gain strategies. 138 In short, intergroup discrimi-
nation, in both evaluation and reward allocation, appears to result almost auto-
matically from the categorization of people into groups. 139
2. The curse of salience: distinctiveness-based distortions in person
perception and judgment.
Under current disparate treatment doctrine, Miguel's status as the sole La-
tino in an otherwise Caucasian work group provided little evidentiary value in
proving discrimination. 140 But to a social cognition theorist, it would have
tripped a number of alarms.
One of those alarms was the subject of a now classic study by Harvard
psychologist Shelley Taylor and his colleagues, 14' who explored the conse-
quences of a minority group member's being a "token" or "solo" in a small
group. In the first experiment in that study, subjects listened to a tape recording
of a discussion among six males. As each person spoke, the experimenters
projected a slide of that person's picture. By playing the same tape recording,
while varying the race of the person supposedly speaking, Taylor and his col-
leagues compared subjects' judgments of a black person when he was the only
black person in an otherwise all white group and when he was in a fully inte-
grated group.
In the "solo" condition, participants judged the black participant in more
extreme ways and perceived him more prominently in the discussion than in the
"integrated" condition. In a second experiment, Taylor and his colleagues
found similar, even stronger effects on perceptions of solo men and solo wo-
men in mixed groups. From this study and others that replicated its findings, 142
it appears that ratings of salient individuals on evaluative dimensions will be
more extreme than ratings of nonsalient individuals. In the case of a solo,
"When she was good she was very, very good, and when she was bad, she was
horrid."
Similar results obtained when subjects evaluated the qualifications of mem-
bers of other racial, gender, and age groups. In 1980, Patricia Linville and
138. Billig & Taifel, supra note 130, at 37-48. These findings present an obvious challenge to the
view that market forces will eventually eliminate discrimination.
139. For a review of these studies, see, e.g., Marilyn B. Brewer & Roderick M. Kramer, The
Psychology oflntergroup Relations, 36 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 219,226-227 (1985); Locksley, supra note
130, at 776-83.
140. The total number of employees was too small to make the disparity statistically significant.
141. For a thorough discussion of these two experiments, see Shelley E. Taylor, A Categorization
Approach to Stereotyping, in CoGNrrVE PROCSSS IN STEREOTYING AND INTE4GROup Ba4-vioR,
supra note 109, at 83, 90-94.
142. See generally Leslie Z. McArthur, What Grabs You?: The Role of Attention in Impression
Formation and Causal Attribution, in SociAL COGNmON, supra note 123, at 201-06; Shelley E. Taylor
& Susan T. Fiske, Salience, Attention, andAttribution: Top of the HeadPhenomena, in I 1 ADvANcES IN
EXPERuMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 249, 264-65 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1978).
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Edward Jones conducted an experiment in which white male and female sub-
jects evaluated law school applications containing incidental indications of the
applicants' race and sex.143 In one experiment, evalutors judged black appli-
cants with strong credentials more favorably than otherwise identical white ap-
plicants. However, in a second experiment, where black applicants' credentials
were weak, they evaluated them less favorably than otherwise identical white
candidates. Similar effects were found in subjects' ratings of members of the
opposite sex on some, but not all, evaluative dimensions. 144 Such findings
again obtained in studies varying subject and target ages.145
Polarized evaluation of outgroup members could, of course, be attributed to
subjects' motivations and attempts to balance two competing needs: a desire to
enhance their relative social standing by disparaging outgroup members on the
one hand, and a need to preserve a belief in their own unbiased evaluative
fairness on the other. However, some social cognition theorists suggest an al-
ternative explanation based on cognitive rather than motivational factors.
According to one such explanation, 146 we pay more attention to salient or
distinctive stimulus objects than to those that are not salient or distinctive. The
more attention we pay to an object, the more information about it we perceive,
encode, and store in memory. Indeed, the more salient an object is, the more
likely we are to use visual rather than verbal processes to encode and retain
information about it, and substantial evidence exists supporting the proposition
that we recall visually encoded information more readily than verbally encoded
material.' 47 Accordingly, an impression formed under conditions of high atten-
tion can be expected to have a stronger valence, whether positive or negative,
than one formed under conditions of low attention, because the data supporting
that impression are more available to the perceiver. In a sense then, the po-
larized evaluation phenomenon can be understood as a variant of the availabil-
ity heuristic. 1
48
Looking through a somewhat different lens, Patricia Linville and Edward
Jones posit that polarized appraisal is a product of inferior outgroup differentia-
tion, referred to earlier as the "outgroup homogeneity effect."' 49 Drawing on
the minimal group research reviewed above and on their own experimental re-
143. Patricia W. Linville & Edward E. Jones, Polarized Appraisals of Out-Group Members. 38 J.
PERsoNALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 689, 693 (1980).
144. Id. at 698.
145. See, e.g., Patricia W. Linville, The Complexity-Extremity Effect andAge-Based Stereotyping,
42 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYcHoL. 193, 206-09 (1982); Linville, supra note 133, at 173-74.
146. See Hamilton, supra note 125, at 60-61; Hamilton & Trolier, supra note 112, at 134-36;
Russell A. Jones, Perceiving Other People: Stereotyping as a Process of Social Cognition, in IN THE
EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: CoNTMPoARY IssUEs IN STrEToT' rNo 41, 46-49 (Arthur G. Miller ed.,
1982); Taylor & Fiske, supra note 142, at 264-68. But see McArthur, supra note 142, at 201-09 (ex-
plaining how studies of salience and physical attributes on impressions have produced mixed results).
147. See Taylor & Fiske, supra note 142, at 271-73.
148. "A person is said to employ the availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or
probability by the ease with which instances or associations could be brought to mind." Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 CoGNIrrv
PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973). For further discussion of the availability heuristic, see text accompanying
note 196 infra.
149. See, e.g., Park & Rothbart, supra note 133, at 1054-58.
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suits, Linville and Jones posit that people have a more complex schema of their
own group than of other groups. 150 This greater schematic complexity results
in more moderate judgments of ingroup than outgroup members.
But why would schematic complexity result in evaluative moderation? Lin-
ville and Jones suggest the following explanation. First, the more familiar one
is with a group of people, the more experiences one has had with members of
that group. As familiarity increases, one's awareness of the number and com-
plexity of evaluative dimensions along which individual group members may
be characterized increases. Consequently, one feels the need for more data
before confidently evaluating group members. This increased appreciation of
the complexity of the evaluative task, and an awareness of the relative inade-
quacy of available information, makes us more conservative. It pulls our evalu-
ations, whether positive or negative, towards the "safer" mean. In contrast, we
evaluate members of an undifferentiated outgroup in global terms, as either
"good" or "bad." 151
3. _ilusory correlation in the formation and maintenance of stereotypes.
Stereotypes are correlational constructs. "Women are emotional." "Blacks
are athletic." "Hawaiians are friendly." Each of these statements expresses a
belief that membership in a particular group (female, black, Hawaiian) corre-
lates highly with a particular trait (emotionalism, athleticism, friendliness). In
situations where such correlational judgments are objectively unfounded, they
represent a phenomenon cognitive psychologists call "illusory correlation"--
the subjective perception of a strong correlation that objectively does not exist.
From a cognitive perspective, stereotypes can be understood as one variant of
this very common judgmental error. Thus, knowing something about the cog-
nitive processes underlying illusory correlation might inform our understanding
of how stereotypes form and what makes them so enduring in the face of con-
tradictory evidence.
Psychologist Loren J. Chapman coined the term "illusory correlation" in
1967 and defined it as "the report by observers of a correlation between two
classes of events which, in reality, (a) are not correlated, or (b) are correlated to
a lesser extent than reported, or (c) are correlated in the opposite direction from
that which is reported."15
2
In his original demonstration of this phenomenon, 153 Chapman presented
subjects with a series of twelve word pairs, constructed by pairing each word
from one list with each word from a second list. Each word pair was shown to
the experimental subjects the same number of times. When subjects were
150. Linville & Jones, supra note 143, at 689.
151. Id. at 691-92. If Linville and Jones are correct, increased familiarity with an outgroup should
correspond with decreased evaluative extremity. In a 1982 follow-up study, Linville demonstrated pre-
cisely such an effect-the more schematic complexity young, male subjects demonstrated with refer-
ence to the category of older males, the less polarized were their evaluations of older male targets.
Linville, supra note 145, at 193.
152. Loren J. Chapman, Illusory Correlation in Observational Report, 6 J. VERBAL LEaAunNG &




asked to estimate the frequency with which various words co-occurred, certain
systematic biases appeared. First, subjects consistently overestimated the co-
occurrence of words with a strong associative connection, such as "lion-tiger"
and "bacon-eggs." Second, each of the two lists contained one word which was
longer than the others; subjects overestimated the co-occurrence of these dis-
tinctively long words.
154
Some years later, psychologist David Hamilton sought to extend the illu-
sory correlation concept to the problem of social stereotypes. Specifically, he
sought to explore the possibility that stereotypic judgments could form out of
the same cognitive biases in the assessment of covariation that Chapman ob-
served. In two separate experiments, 155 Hamilton and his colleague Robert
Gifford read a series of sentences describing behaviors performed by members
of two groups, labelled simply as "Group A" and "Group B." In both experi-
ments, there appeared twice as many statements about members of Group A as
Group B. Group B membership became novel or salient by virtue of its relative
infrequency. The sentences described were either moderately desirable or
moderately undesirable behaviors. In the first experiment, sentences described
desirable behaviors twice as often as undesirable behaviors. The second exper-
iment reversed that proportion. In both experiments, the ratio of desirable to
undesirable behaviors was the same for both groups.
After the series of sentences had been presented, subjects were given a list
of the behavioral descriptions and asked to indicate whether each had been
performed by a member of Group A or of Group B. In both experiments, sub-
jects significantly overestimated the extent to which members of the minority
group performed the less frequent type of behavior.156 Hamilton and Gifford
interpreted these findings as supporting, in the context of social judgment,
Chapman's hypothesis that people tend to overestimate the co-occurrence of
distinctive stimulus events.
In later theoretical treatments of the connection between stereotyping and
illusory correlation, Hamilton drew out the implications of these findings for
154. Over the following two years, Loren and Jean Chapman replicated these findings in a variety
of experimental contexts. The results of those studies provide insight into how illusory correlation can
explain the persistence of flawed beliefs in the validity of certain commonly accepted but objectively
invalid psychodiagnostic signs. See Loren J. Chapman & Jean P. Chapman, Genesis of Popular But
Erroneous Psychodiagnostic Observations, 72 J. ABNORmAL PSYCHOL. 193 (1967) (studying illusory
correlations between psychological symptoms and drawing characteristics on the "Draw A Person" test);
Loren J. Chapman & Jean P. Chapman, llusory Correlation as an Obstacle to the Use of Valid
Psychodiagnostic Signs, 74 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 271 (1969) (explaining how practicing
psychodiagnosticians failed to report valid correlations and reported invalid correlations between male
homosexuality and Wheeler-Rorschach signs; naive observers replicated the practitioners' illusory
correlations).
155. David L. Hamilton & Robert K. Gifford, illusory Correlation in Interpersonal Perception: A
Cognitive Basis of Stereotypic Judgments, 12 J. ExsaimNmqrT Soc. PsYcHOL. 392, 392 (1976).
156. Hamilton and Gifford's findings have been replicated using favorable versus unfavorable
personality traits rather than specific behaviors. See, e.g., Russell A. Jones, Joanne Scott, Jose Solemou,
Audrey Noble, Joe Fiala, & Kathy Miller, Availability and Formation of Stereotypes, 44 PEnc'ruAL &
MOTOR SKILLS 631, 631 (1977). See generally Jones, supra note 146, at 41-77.
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stereotype formation.157 He observed that majority group members tend not to
have much contact with minority group members. This alone could make mi-
nority group members "salient" to members of the majority group. Negative
behaviors, which occur less frequently than positive behaviors, and which trig-
ger a kind of "automatic vigilance,"'158 are salient as well.' 59 Accordingly, one
can conclude that stereotyped conceptions of minority groups could result from
illusory correlations between two salient variables: minority group member-
ship and negative behavioral events.'
60
In addition to showing that people tend to overestimate the co-occurrence
of distinctive events, the Chapmans' original research indicated that people ex-
aggerate covariations between associatively related stimuli.' 6 ' This observa-
tion is significant for understanding how cognitive processes can perpetuate
stereotypes once they are in place.
In their 1967 study,162 Chapman and Chapman sought to understand the
persistence of psychological clinicians' belief in the diagnostic value of certain
signs on the Draw-A-Person Test in the face of mounting objective evidence
indicating their patent invalidity. What they found was that both clinicians and
untrained college undergraduate students consistently "discovered" in the data
objectively nonexistent correlations between psychological symptoms and
drawing characteristics which had been shown in pre-tests to be associatively
related.1 63 So, for example, both professional and undergraduate subjects over-
estimated the frequency with which patients manifesting the symptom "suspi-
ciousness" had produced drawings with atypical eye features. 164 These
distortions in subjects' views of the presented data persisted even when sub-
jects were provided monetary incentives for making accurate covariation esti-
mates.' 65 In the Chapmans' view, semantic associations between a particular
psychological symptom and a particular body part served as a prior expectancy,
157. Hamilton, supra note 125, at 59-64; David L. Hamilton, Illusory Correlation as a Basis for
Stereotyping, in CcoNrrv PROCESSES rN STERmOTiN AND INTrGROUP BEHAVIOR, supra note 109,
at 115, 124-31.
158. See Felicia Pratto & Oliver P. John, Automatic Vigilance: The Attention-Grabbing Power of
Negative Social Information, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 380, 380 (1991) (observing and
defining automatic vigilance as "a mechanism that serves to direct attentional capacity to undesirable
stimuli").
159. Although Hamilton and Gifford found that both desirable and undesirable behaviors could be
rendered salient by virtue of infrequency, other researchers subsequently demonstrated that negative
events are generally more salient than positive events. See, eg., id. at 381.
160. This conception of how biases in assessing covariation can lead to stereotype formation
makes sense only if we assume that people encode incoming information about a target person's behav-
ior according to that person's race, sex, ethnicity, or other social group membership. In a 1978 study,
Shelley Taylor and his colleagues at Harvard provided strong empirical evidence supporting this propo-
sition by demonstrating the existence of distinctive patterns in the distribution of within-group versus
between-group errors in attributing certain statements to members of different gender or racial groups.
Shelley E. Taylor, Susan T. Fiske, Nancy L. Etcoff, & Audrey J. Ruderman, Categorical and Contextual
Bases of Person Memory and Stereotyping, 36 J. PER oNALTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 778, 784-85 (1978).
161. Chapman & Chapman, Genesis of Popular But Erroneous Psychodiagnostic Observations,
supra note 154, at 193.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 197-99.
164. Id. at 196.
165. Id. at 202-03.
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which distorted subjects' assessments of the covariations between paired symp-
toms and signs.1
66
These early observations suggest a mechanism by which social stereotypes,
operating as correlational expectancies, might distort incoming information
about members of different social groups and thereby insulate those stereotypes
from the corrective effects of disconfirming evidence. As was discussed above,
a stereotype can be understood as a "schema," a network of elements represent-
ing a person's accumulated knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about a partic-
ular category. The elements of any schema are associatively related to one
another. Thus, an associative basis for an illusory correlation exists whenever a
schema is activated.
Our schematic expectations about members of social groups come, no
doubt, from a variety of sources. As H.J. Ehrlich stated:
Stereotypes about ethnic groups appear as a part of the social heritage of soci-
ety. They are transmitted across generations as a component of the accumu-
lated knowledge of society. They are as true as tradition, and as pervasive as
folklore. No person can grow up in a society without having learned the ste-
reotypes assigned to the major ethnic groups.
167
Stereotypic expectancies may arise from one's, own experiences with members
of other social groups. Alternatively, as Ehrlich suggests, they may be ab-
sorbed in much the same way as folklore is learned, through the vicarious ex-
periences of stories, television shows, movies, newspaper reports, and so forth.
But wherever they come from, stereotypes can be expected to bias our subjec-
tive perception of the covariation between group membership and traits stere-
otypically associated with that group. We do not ignore evidence and choose to
act instead on the stereotype. Rather, the stereotype, acting as an associative
construct, biases the way we see the evidence. We recall, through the same
cognitive processes that result in other forms of illusory correlation, stereotype-
confirming instances as having occurred more frequently than they actually
did.168
In summary, research conducted under the cognitive approach indicates that
normal cognitive processes can lead to the creation and maintenance of social
stereotypes. Seen in this way, stereotypes represent simply one manifestation
of generalized cognitive biases resulting from categorization, differential atten-
tion to salient events, and the search for meaning and coherence. In a sense, we
can say that human cognitive organization predisposes us to stereotyping.
166. Id. at 201.
167. H.J. EmHRcsI, TnE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PR.iurDicE 35 (1973).
168. See David L. Hamilton & Terrence L. Rose, Illusory Correlation and the Maintenance of
Stereotypic Beliefs, 39 J. PERSONALIrr & SOC. PSYCHOL. 832 (1980). See generally Hamilton, supra
note 157.
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C. How Stereotypes Cause Discrimination: The Information Processing
Approach
How exactly do stereotypes cause discrimination? As was discussed above
in Part ,169 current disparate treatment caselaw answers this question in two
ways. First, it recognizes that stereotypes, operating as role expectations, may
cause discrimination when members of certain groups are excluded from cer-
tain roles or occupations deemed "inappropriate" for members of their group.
In this circumstance, an employer doesn't even consider an prospective em-
ployee's qualifications; group membership trumps all other factors.
Alternatively, disparate treatment jurisprudence recognizes that stereotypes
cause discrimination when group status is consciously used as a "proxy" for
another trait. In either situation, however, current doctrine assumes that stereo-
types operate explicitly and independently from the processes of perception,
memory, or recall. They influence decisionmaking at the moment a decision is
made.
Social cognition theory provides a fundamentally different explanation of
how stereotypes cause discrimination. Stereotypes are viewed as social
schemas or person prototypes. They operate as implicit expectancies that influ-
ence how incoming information is interpreted, the causes to which events are
attributed, and how events are encoded into, retained in, and retrieved from
memory. In other words, stereotypes cause discrimination by biasing how we
process information about other people. Let us look more closely at the theo-
retical premises of this approach and at the empirical findings it has generated.
1. Schematic bases of person perception and judgment.
Schema theory 170 posits that, as people learn, they construct schemas, some
of which relate to social cognition. These are referred to as "social
schemas."' 17 1 They include trait schemas ("leader"), role schemas ("manufac-
turing plant foreman"), identity group schemas ("Hispanic men"), and person
impressions ('Miguer').
172
Each schema contains a number of interrelated elements that represent a
person's accumulated knowledge, beliefs, experiences (both direct and vicari-
ous), and expectancies regarding the schematized construct. A schema may
also contain visual representations of "typical" schematic exemplars. Con-
fronted with the task of construing a person or his behavior, one matches the
incoming perception against the relevant subset of schemas.173 An incoming
169. See text accompanying notes 28-38 supra.
170. For an overview of schema theory, particularly as it relates to social cognition, see, e.g.,
William F. Brewer & Glenn V. Nakamura, The Nature and Function of Schemas, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
SoctAL CoGNriToN, supra note 117, at 119; Hamilton, supra note 123; Rumelhart, supra note 122;
Taylor & Crocker, supra note 124.
171. Taylor & Crocker, supra note 124, at 91.
172. See id.
173. Schemas appear to be organized in a hierarchical structure, with certain "sub-schemas" em-
bedded into others. This structure is similar to that posited by Eleanor Rosch in her work on subordinate
and superordinate natural object categories. See Principles of Categorization, supra note 115, at 30-35.
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bit of information that "fits" an existing schema is said to "instantiate"' 174 that
particular schema. When this instantiation process activates a schema, other
elements of the schema are then imposed on the incoming experience. In other
words, once a particular schema is activated, incoming information tends to be
ordered in a manner that reflects the structure of the schema.175 In this way, a
schema acts as an implicit expectancy: We implicitly expect incoming infor-
mation instantiating a particular schema to be consistent with elements of that
schema already present in its cognitive representation.
Schemas serve essential heuristic functions in human cognition. They lend
structure to experience, enable us to identify the relationships between elements
of a stimulus field, impute meaning to behavior or other events, and fill in data
missing from a particular stimulus configuration. They provide a structure for
determining what information will be encoded into memory, how it will be
organized in relation to other stored information, and how it will be retrieved
from memory when required.
Unfortunately, all this cognitive efficiency also results in a certain biasing
of incoming information. These systematic biases may in turn lead to predict-
able types of error in social judgment. These include:
" errors in schema activation;
" errors in the interpretation and encoding of ambiguous events;
" errors in attributing the causes of events; and
" errors caused by biases in memorial storage and retrieval processes.
It is to these biases and the errors they may cause that our attention now turns.
2. Representativeness, salience, and schema activation.
A primary cognitive function of schemas is to help answer the questions,
"What is it?" and "How is it likely to behave?" The initial matching of a stimu-
lus object against a perceiver's existing schematic structures and the resulting
activation of a particular schema represent a significant source of error in social
perception and judgment.
Consider the following scenario. A twenty-five-year-old, 5-foot, 6-inch
woman with a 2-year degree in paralegal studies enters the police academy in a
major urban area. One of her classmates is a twenty-five-year-old 6-foot male
with a 2-year college degree in physical education. Their instructors, who must
evaluate them and eventually decide whether they will become part of the po-
lice force, ask as they meet these two new cadets, "Is it a police officer?" and
"How will it perform as a police officer?" To answer these initial questions
using normative rules of inference would be an elaborate process indeed. But
whatever those normative rules might prescribe, the training officers are not
likely to follow them. Rather, they are likely to form an initial impression
through the use of a cognitive shortcut which psychologists Daniel Kahneman
174. David E. Rumelhart & Andrew Ortony, The Representation of Knowledge in Memory in
SCHOOLING AND THE AQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE 99, 105 (Richard C. Anderson, Rand J. Spiro, &
William E. Montague eds., 1977).
175. Taylor & Crocker, supra note 124, at 97.
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and Amos Tversky call the "representativeness heuristic." 176 According to
Kahneman and Tversky, a person attempting to estimate the likelihood that a
person or an object falls into a particular category or class matches salient at-
tributes of the stimulus object (in our case, the cadet) with equally salient attrib-
utes characterizing the viewer's schema or prototype of the category in
question ("police officer'). If these two sets of salient attributes match, the
person judges the object likely to be a member of the category or class. If these
sets do not match, the person judges the object unlikely to be a member of the
category or class.
Thus, the specific content of the training officer's schema "police officer'
can powerfully influence whether the officer initially perceives each of our two
cadets as a good candidate for the job. If the most salient features in the train-
ing officer's schema for "police office?' include attributes such as "dominat-
ing," "physically imposing," or "authoritarian," or if he pictures a male as the
prototypical police officer, he may less readily categorize the female cadet as
"police officer material." If, instead, the training officer's schema for a police
officer includes attributes such as "calms people down in tense situations," "is
skilled at interviewing witnesses and writing reports," or "can understand legal
rules and apply them in novel situations," he may judge the female cadet, with
her degree in paralegal studies and her less intimidating physical aspect, more
favorably in this initial implicit assessment. In short, the initial categorization
of a person or event is influenced by schematic expectancies. 177 In forming our
initial impressions, we judge other people by the content of our categories.
What determines which schema will be primed by an incoming perceptual
object? Why does the training officer see a "woman," a "man," a "Caucasian,"
or an "Asian" at all when he meets a new recruit? And if he initially catego-
rizes cadets along those lines, does that simply confirm a sexist or racist predis-
position or does it evidence a more complex phenomenon?
As Eleanor Rosch observed thirty years ago, people categorize objects in
their environment in a particular way because it proves useful in understanding
their environment and predicting future events. 178 It would be difficult to argue
credibly that racial, ethnic, or gender distinctions have no utility in understand-
ing American society or negotiating experience within it. The antidiscrimina-
tion laws themselves make gender, racial, and ethnic distinctions salient. The
American history of slavery, race-based immigration restrictions, Jim Crow
laws, and persistent segregation in housing, schools, and economic status all
further serve to make race salient. Indeed, a fear that one might be racist or
sexist, or a desire not to be perceived as such, will make race and gender sali-
ent, even highly charged. As a theoretical matter, the notion that racial, ethnic,
176. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. Rlv.
237, 237 (1973).
177. For further development of this claim, including a discussion of empirical studies demon-
strating its application in several contexts, see Thomas K. Srull, Meryl Lichtenstein, & Myron Rothbart,
Associative Storage and Retrieval Processes in Person Memory, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEaR,-
INO, MEMORY, & COGNmON 316, 339 (1985).
178. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
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or gender distinctions could be ignored in the priming of schematic expectan-
cies is, at best, implausible. As an empirical matter, it is simply insupporta-
ble.179 Because gender, ethnic, and racial distinctions are often perceptually
apparent, and because these categories are made salient by our social and cul-
tural context, we can expect race, ethnic, and gender-based schemas to be im-
plicated in the processing of information about other people. Once activated,
the content of a schema will profoundly affect how we interpret a person's
subsequent behavior, what about that behavior we remember, and how we use
the behavior in judging the person later.
3. Schematic expectancies and the interpretation of ambiguous events.
According to schema theory, incoming information is processed within the
framework of the particular schema activated at that time. °80 The schema acts
as a lens through which subsequent events are viewed. Consequently, the acti-
vation of a social schema can be expected to influence how information is
interpreted and encoded into memory. A fair amount of empirical evidence
supports this proposition.
For example, in 1980, H. Andrew Sagar and Janet Schofield conducted a
study demonstrating the effect of social schemas on the interpretation of ambig-
uous information.18' In the study, school-age children were presented cartoon-
like drawings of two children and a verbal description of the scene, read by the
experimenter. One drawing showed two students sitting in a classroom, one
behind the other. The verbal description of the scene was: "Mark was sitting at
his desk, working on his social studies assignment, when David started poking
him in the back with the eraser end of his pencil. Mark just kept on working.
David kept poking him for a while, and then he finally stopped."'1 2 In one
condition, David was depicted as black, in the other condition, white. Subjects
179. I find no empirical support for the proposition that Americans no longer categorize by race,
ethnicity, or sex. Indeed, available empirical evidence strongly suggests the opposite. See e.g., John F.
Dovidio, Nancy Evans, & Richard B. Tyler, Racial Stereotypes: The Content of Their Cognitive Repre-
sentations, 22 J. ExPERnMENTAL PSYCHOL. 22 (1976) (explaining a category priming/reaction-time study
demonstrating the presence of racial categories similar in form and function to the "natural object cate-
gories" described by Eleanor Rosch); Shelley E. Taylor, Susan T. Fiske, Nancy L. Etcoff, & Audrey J.
Ruderman, Categorical and Contextual Bases of Person Memory and Stereotyping, 36 J. PERsoNAUrY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 778, 781-82 (1978) (concluding from error patterns in the attribution of statements to
actor/accomplices that subjects organized incoming social information into racial and gender catego-
ries). For a review of more recent empirical findings indicating the continuing existence of racially
differentiated categorical representations and accompanying race-based stereotypes, see Faye Crosby,
Stephanie Bromley, & Leonard Saxe, Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discrimination
and Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 546 (1980); Samuel L. Gaertner & John F.
Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PR-runIca, DiSCRImINATiON, & RAcisM, supra note 39, at 61.
180. See Rurnelhart, supra note 122, at 163-66; Taylor & Crocker, supra note 124, at 91. For a
more thorough consideration of schema activation or "priming" and its effect on the interpretation of
ambiguous information, see Bruner, supra note 121, at 135-37; Higgins, supra note 121, at 140-44;
Srull & Wyer, supra note 121, at 1661.
181. H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and White
Children's Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PErsoNALrny & Soc. PSYCHOL. 590
(1980).
182. Id. at 593.
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were asked to rate David's behavior on four scales, evaluating the extent to
which they thought it was playful, friendly, mean, or threatening. 83
The results demonstrated that the race of the actor had a significant impact
on the manner in which subjects categorized his actions. If the actor was black,
subjects judged his behavior to be more mean and threatening and less playful
and friendly. The opposite result obtained when the actor was white. Thus,
subjects interpreted the same behavior differently depending on the race of the
actor performing it.184
Sagar and Schofield's results replicated the finding of a similar experiment
conducted by Birt Duncan in 1976.185 In Duncan's study, white college stu-
dents watched one of four videotapes in which two males discussed alternative
solutions to a particular problem. Subjects were told they were watching a live
interaction happening in another room, and that its purpose was to develop a
new system for rating interpersonal behavior. While the videotape played, a
buzzer rang at specified intervals, signalling subjects to categorize the behavior
they were then viewing in one of ten categories 8 6 and to indicate its intensity
on an 8-point scale.
As the videotaped discussion progressed, the dialogue became increasingly
heated. Finally, one of the participants (the protagonist) shoved the other (the
victim). At that point, the buzzer rang-not for the first time-and subjects
were asked to characterize and rate the intensity of the protagonist's
behavior.' 8
7
As in the Sagar and Schofield study, the protagonist's race significantly
affected how subjects characterized the shove. If the protagonist was white, his
behavior was characterized as "playing around" or "dramatizes." If he was
black, it was characterized as "aggressive" or "violent."'
88
Once behavior has been interpreted and encoded into memory, its meaning
is in a sense "fixed," for once a person has constructed an explanation of an
event, it is this construction, not the raw information that stimulated it, that is
used in making subsequent judgments or predictions.' 8 9 Indeed, once a behav-
ior has been encoded as a trait, its effect on subsequent judgments increases
over time.190 It then supports and validates the preexisting stereotypic expec-
tancy. So, for example, when a female or Asian cadet performs a particular
behavior we may characterize it as "passive," yet characterize the same behav-
ior as "prudent" or "restrained" when performed by a male Caucasian cadet.
183. Id. at 594.
184. Id. at 594-95.
185. Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Test-
ing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 L PERsoNALrry & Soc. PSYCHOL. 590 (1976).
186. The ten categories included: "dramatizes, gives information, gives opinion, gives suggestion,
asks for information, asks for opinion, asks for suggestion, playing around, aggressive behavior, and
violent behavior." Id. at 594.
187. Id. at 593.
188. Id. at 595.
189. See, e.g., Lee Ross, Mark R. Lepper, Fritz Strack, & Julia Steinmetz, Social Explanation and
Social Expectation: Effects of Real and Hypothetical Explanations on Subjective Likelihood, 35 J. PER-
soNALrry & Soc. PSYCHOL. 817, 827-28 (1977).
190. Srull & Wyer, supra note 121, at 1662.
July 1995] 1203
1204
One might invoke "racism" or "sexism" to describe this discrimination. Less
dramatically, but perhaps more informatively, one could describe it as one way
that social schemas subtly distort information processing about other people
and result in intergroup bias.
4. Biases in causal attribution.
The significance we attach to an event depends largely on the causes to
which we attribute it. Without even being aware of it, we constantly ask and
answer the question "why?" "Why was Miguel late to work today?" "Why
were Mary's sales figures so high last year?" "Why do girls score lower than
boys on the math section of the SAT?" Causal attributions shape and are
shaped by our cognitive representations of persons, objects, and events. Most
importantly, causal attribution substantially affects how past events inform our
predictions about the future. If, for example, we attribute a behavioral trans-
gression to a stable personality trait (e.g., "Miguel was late because he's lazy"),
we are more likely to predict that the transgression will recur than if we attri-
bute the transgression to a transient environmental causes (e.g., "Miguel was
late because of the unusually bad traffic this morning"). Similarly, we are more
likely to see success as predictive of future performance if we attribute it to
stable dispositional factors (e.g., ability) than to transient situational ones (e.g.,
good luck, or even extraordinary effort).
Since the 1950s, cognitive and social psychologists have been studying the
ways in which ordinary people try to understand the causes and implications of
the events they witness. From this study has emerged a recognition that causal
attribution is subject .to systematic biases that distort person perception (how
we see others) and interpersonal judgment (how we interpret their actions).
While these biases generalize across attributional tasks, they are particularly
pronounced in tasks involving intergroup perception and judgment. Thus, to
understand the subtle ways that cognitive processes can cause intergroup dis-
crimination, we need to know something about attribution theory.
Attribution theory stems in large part from Fritz Heider's 1958 work, The
Psychology of Interpersonal Relations.191 Heider noted that we look for the
causes of an action in either the actor (the internal dimension) or the situation
(the external dimension),192 and that because people are so salient in any
perceptual array, their behavior has a tendency to "engulf the field."'193 Subse-
quent empirical research has established quite convincingly that in attributing
191. FRrrz HmEIER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1958).
192. E.g., id. at 146-59. Later research elaborated upon this bivalent approach. Most importantly,
Bernard Weiner and his colleagues noted that causal attributions can be characterized not only along an
internal/external dimension, but also along a stable/transitory dimension. According to this view, attri-
butions based on either internal or stable factors increase the predictive value assigned to an event, while
attributions based on either external or transient factors tend to depress an event's perceived predictive
utility. See Bernard Weiner, Irene Frieze, Andy Kukla, Linda Reed, Stanley Rest, & Robert M. Rosen-
baum, Perceiving the Causes of Success and Failure, in Ai-ruaUnTroN: PERCEIVING TmE CAUSES OF
BEHAVIOR 95, 113-17 (Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett,
Stuart Valins, & Bernard Weiner eds., 1971).
193. HEIDER, supra note 191, at 54.
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the causes of behavior, people tend to underestimate the impact of situational
factors and overestimate the impact of stable, dispositional factors. 194 This bias
is so basic and widespread that it is referred to as the "fundamental attribution
error."19
5
Susceptibility to the fundamental attribution error varies in a number of
ways relevant to our present inquiry. First, susceptibility depends on who is
doing the attributing: Actors tend to attribute their own behaviors to situational
forces or constraints, whereas observers tend to attribute those same behaviors
to the actor's personality, attitudes, or abilities. 196 Second, we tend to attribute
events that confirm our prior expectancies to stable, internal factors, while at-
tributing events that contradict prior expectancies to transient or environmental
causes. 197 Much empirical evidence now suggests that people tend to attribute
stereotype-consistent behaviors to dispositional factors and stereotype-inconsis-
tent behaviors to transient or environmental factors.' 98
The most dramatic demonstration of this bias, and of its effects on behav-
ioral prediction and the selection of sanctions, appears in two experiments con-
ducted by Galen Bodenhausen and Robert Wyer in 1985.199 In both
experiments, subjects read a case file describing a behavioral transgression 00
by a target individual. In the first experiment, the case file contained only
general biographic, demographic, and job-related information about the target.
In the second experiment, the case file also contained information about the
target's background and life circumstances at the time the transgression oc-
curred.201 After reading the case file, subjects were asked to predict whether
the transgression would recur and to recommend a negative sanction. In one
194. For a representative sampling of this literature, see Edward E. Jones, How Do People Per-
ceive the Causes of Behavior?, 64 AM. ScINTSr 300 (1976); Jones, supra note 146, at 57-64; Lee
Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, in Coo.
N1TIvE THnoRius iN SOCIAL PsycHoLory, 337, 347 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1978).
195. Ross, supra note 194, at 347.
196. The leading work on these actor/observer differences in susceptibility to the fundamental
attribution error is Edward E. Jones & Richard E. Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer: Divergent
Perceptions of the Causes of Behavior, in ATramUoN: PERCErVING ME CAUSES OF BEAviop, supra
note 192, at 79.
Actor/observer differences are widely thought to result from the differential salience of the actor
and the environment to actors and observers. For the actor, the environment is more salient than him-
self; for the observer, the actor is perceptually more prominent. In a sense, then, the fundamental attri-
bution error can be understood as a variant of the availability heuristic. For a thorough review of this
perspective, see Taylor & Fiske, supra note 142, at 253.
197. Jennifer Crocker, Darlene B. Hannah & Ren~e Weber, Person Memory and Causal Attribu-
tions, 44 J. PERSONALrTy & Soc. PSYCHOL. 55, 56 (1983).
For a discussion of how this differential attribution might contribute to the maintenance of social
stereotypes in the face of stereotype-disconfirming evidence, see text accompanying notes 205-210
infra.
198. See, e.g., Kay Deaux, Sex: A Perspective on the Attribution Process, in I NEw DmEcrioNs rN
ATrmrnoN REsEARcH 335 (John H. Harvey, William John Ickes, & Robert F. Kidd eds., 1976); Galen
V. Bodenhausen & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Effects of Stereotypes on Decision Making and Information-
Processing Strategies, 48 J. PEtsoNALrry & Soc. PSYCHOL. 267, 268, 279 (1985); Hamilton, supra note
125, at 65-68.
199. Bodenhausen & Wyer, supra note 198.
200. In the first experiment, the transgression involved job-related behavior, in the second, a crim-
inal act. Id at 270, 272.
201. Id. at 270, 273.
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condition, the transgression was stereotypic of the target's ethnic group, in a
second, the transgression was stereotype-inconsistent, and in a third, no stereo-
type was activated.
When the transgression was stereotypic of the target's ethnicity, subjects
perceived it as more likely to recur. They therefore assigned more severe pun-
ishments in that situation than when the transgression was stereotype-inconsis-
tent or when no stereotype had been activated.202 Furthermore, when the
transgression was stereotype-inconsistent with the target's ethnicity, or when
no stereotype was activated, subjects were better able to recall information
about relevant life circumstances presented in the file.20 3 From these results,
the experimenters reasonably inferred that subjects spent more time seeking
and considering potential situational causes for the transgression in the no-ster-
eotype and stereotype-inconsistent conditions than they spent when the behav-
ior suggested a stereotype-consistent explanation.
2°4
Bodenhausen and Wyer's findings bear substantial implications for how Ti-
tle VII jurisprudence might interpret differences in the treatment of "similarly
situated" workers. Assume that two employees, one male and one female, have
performed poorly on a stereotypically male task, and that the female employee
was disciplined more severely than the male. The employer maintains that her
poor performance, not her sex, motivated the disciplinary action taken.
Under current disparate treatment doctrine, evidence that the female em-
ployee was treated less favorably than her male counterpart would be inter-
preted as indicating that the employer's stated reason for imposing the
discipline was a "sham," a post hoc fabrication designed to cover up deliberate,
intentional discrimination.20 5 Attribution theory provides an alternative expla-
nation for cases such as this. As we have seen, a decisionmaker tends to im-
pose a more severe sanction for the same transgression when that transgression
is attributed to stable/dispositional as opposed to transient/situational causes.
And as we have also seen, stereotypes operate as judgment heuristics in causal
attribution. Once a stereotype is activated, observers tend to attribute stereo-
type-consistent behaviors to stable, stereotypic traits without bothering to
search for other potentially relevant information. The stereotype operates as a
kind of cognitive shortcut, bringing the search for additional causal antecedents
to a screeching halt.
20 6
Thus, in our hypothetical, the decisionmaker attributes failure by the female
employee to stable dispositional causes associated with her gender. This results
in a more severe sanction than similar failure by the male employee, whose
failure the decisionmaker treats as a product of transient, environmental causes.
202. Id. at 271, 275-76.
203. Id. at 277-78.
204. Id. at 280-81.
205. See text accompanying notes 73-82 supra.
206. As David Kanouse has recognized, people tend to think of unitary actions or events as having
a single, as opposed to multiple causes. Consequently, they exert more cognitive effort in seeking a
causal explanation when none has yet come to mind than they will exert in seeking additional explana-
tions. David E. Kanouse, Language, Labeling, and Attribution, in ATrrmtuoN: PERCEIVIG THE
CAUSES OF BEaAVIOR, supra note 192, at 121, 131.
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The decisionmaker may be wholly unaware that the employee's gender in any
way influenced his decisionmaking.207 As he sees it, the two employees sim-
ply are not similarly situated.
Attribution biases stem from other sources as well. First, people have a
tendency to engage in "defensive self-attribution." That is, we tend to attribute
our successes to internal causes and our failures to external causes.20 8 We
make similar allowances for our friends: an increasing level of intimacy corre-
lates with an increasing attribution of success to internal and failure to external
causes.209 Perhaps the strongest source of attribution bias is that referred to by
Thomas Pettigrew as the "ultimate attribution error."210 As various researchers
have demonstiated, we tend to attribute desirable behaviors by ingroup mem-
bers to internal, dispositional causes, whereas we readily attribute similar be-
haviors by outgroup members to environmental causes.
The causal attribution of success and failure plays a critical role in perform-
ance evaluation, promotion, compensation, and discharge decisions. Absent
corrective measures, systematic biases in causal attribution can be expected to
disadvantage members of stereotyped groups or individuals who are socially
"distant" from the decisionmaker or who, for whatever reason, the deci-
sionmaker has grouped in a different cognitive category. And as I explicate
below,21" these biases operate largely outside of the realm of decisionmaker
self-awareness, and can be expected to contaminate interpersonal judgment
even in the absence of any intent to discriminate.
5. The role of memory.
In 1979, Myron Rothbart and his colleagues investigated the extent to
which implicit expectancies about other people bias our memory for informa-
tion that either confirms or disconfirms our expectations. 212 To do this, they
presented subjects with identical sets of fifty behavioral descriptions of a target
male individual. The items presented described actions that could be character-
ized as either "friendly," "unfriendly," "intelligent," "unintelligent," or unre-
lated to any of these four constructs. Half of the subjects were led to believe
that the target was intellectual and half that the target was friendly. In each
207. See notes 237-245 infra and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 146, at 64-67; Ross, supra note 194, at 337, 346-47. It should be
noted that defensive self-attribution theory is not without its detractors. See generally D.T. Miller & M.
Ross, Self-Serving Biases in the Attribution of Causality: Fact or Fiction?, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 213
(1975).
209. See Shelley E. Taylor & Judith Hall Koivumaki, The Perception of Self and Others: Acquain-
tanceship, Affect, and Actor-Observer Differences, 33 J. oF PatsONALrry & Soc. PSYCHOL. 403, 404,
407 (1976).
210. Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Utimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport's Cognitive Analysis
ofPrejudice, 5 PEasoNA.urv & Soc. PSYcHOL. BULL. 461, 464-66 (1979).
211. See notes 233-247 infra and accompanying text.
212. Myron Rothbart, Mark Evans, & Solomon Fulero, Recall for Confirming Events: Memory




group, half of the subjects were given this expectancy before being presented
with the behavioral descriptions and half afterward.
213
The investigators found that subjects recalled behaviors which confirmed
their prior expectancies more readily than those which disconfirmed or were
unrelated to them. However, these results obtained only when the expectancy
was induced prior to the presentation of the behaviors; subjects who viewed the
behaviors before any expectancy was created were far more evenhanded in
their memory for confirming and disconfirming information. From these find-
ings, Rothbart and his colleagues inferred that selective retrieval alone could
not account for the observed memorial bias in favor of expectancy-confirming
events. Whatever was causing the bias operated much earlier in the attention/
encoding/storage/recall continuum.
Over the following years, these results were replicated,214 and their impli-
cations refined,215 by various researchers across a variety of experimental
contexts. Taken as a whole, these findings indicate that people do not even-
handedly encode, store, or recall information about other people. Rather, once
a target individual has been perceived as a member of a particular category,
people are more likely to remember the target as exhibiting attributes and be-
haviors commonly associated with that category. Indeed, once we have devel-
oped stereotypic expectancies of a person, we even tend to "remember"
stereotype-consistent behaviors that did not actually occur.
216
213. Id. at 346-48.
214. See, e.g., Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Prototypicality and Personality: Effects on Free
Recall and Personality Impressions, 13 J. Ras. iN PERsO NALrrY 187, 188-92 (1979); Claudia E. Cohen,
Person Categories and Social Perception: Testing Some Boundaries of the Processing Effects of Prior
Knowledge, 40 J. PERSONAL=TY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 441, 447 (1981) (observing that subjects more accu-
rately remembered features of a target woman that were consistent with their prototype of a person of
her occupation); Mark Snyder & Seymour W. Uranowitz, Reconstructing the Past: Some Cognitive
Consequences of Person Perception, 36 J. PERSONA=ITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 941, 941 (1978); see also
Myron Rothbart, Memory Processes and Social Beliefs, in CoGNrrrvE PRoCESSES iN Smano'-yNpr AND
INrERGoRouP BEHAVboR, supra note 39, at 145, 157-64.
215. Some researchers, notably Reid Hastie and Thomas K. Srull, find that in certain circum-
stances, expectancy-inconsistent information is retained at higher rates than either expectancy-confirm-
ing or expectancy-irrelevant information. See, e.g., Reid Hastie, Memory for Behavioral Information
that Confirms or Contradicts a Personality Impression, in PERSON MEMORY: THE CoaNrnvE BAsis or
SoCIAL PERcEPTIoN 155, 174-75 (Reid Hastie, Thomas M. Ostrom, Ebbe B. Ebbesen, Robert S. Wyer,
Jr., David L. Hamilton, & Donal E. Carlston eds., 1980); Reid Hastie & Purohit Anand Kumar, Person
Memory: Personality Traits as Organizing Principles in Memory for Behaviors, 37 J. PERSoNALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 25, 26 (1979); Thomas K. Srull, Person Memory: Some Tests of Associative Storage and
RetrievalModels, 7 J. ExPEmsAsmrAL PSYCHOL.: Hum. LEARNING Am MEmoRY 440,441 (1981). These
results have, however, been explained in a manner consistent with findings such as those reviewed in
note 198 supra. Specifically, the observed recall bias in favor of expectancy disconfirming events has
been explained as resulting either from an application of the availability heuristic built into Hastie &
Kumar's experimental design, or from the increased processing time accorded these events in the pro-
cess of causal attribution. See Crocker, supra note 197, at 63 (attributing heightened recall for incongru-
ent information to the extra processing time necessary to encode it); Gordon D. Hemsley & Harvey H.C.
Marmurek, Person Memory: The Processing of Consistent and Inconsistent Person Information, 8 PER-
SONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. Bu.L. 433 (1982) (describing the effects of Hastie & Kumar's experimental
design). Accord Reid Hastie, Causes and Effects of Causal Attribution, 46 J. PER oNALrrY & Soc.
PsYcHoL. 44, 53-55 (1984).
216. See, e.g., Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Traits as Prototypes: Effects on Recognition
Memory, 35 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 38, 41-45 (1978) (subjects led to think of a target person
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The fact that a decisionmaker might harbor a "phantom memory" about
another person does not, as Justice Souter concluded in St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks,217 turn him into a liar. In cognitive terms, the phenomenon is
no different than phantom memories for prototype-consistent but nonpresented
material found in experiments involving visual dot patterns, digit-letter series,
and stories about everyday experiences. 218 Once tagged with a category label,
a target person, like any other perceptual object, "comes more and more to
resemble our expectations for persons of that 'type.' ",219 Apparently, one
mechanism by which this occurs is that events that confirm schematic expec-
tancies are favored in memory over those that do not. This preference cannot
be attributed to simple response bias; it stems as well from biases in attention,
encoding, and memory storage processes.
Under current disparate treatment jurisprudence, courts construe facts
showing that stereotype-confirming information was overutilized in a decision-
making process as evidencing conscious discriminatory intent. Schema theory,
however, provides an alternative explanation. According to this view, schemas,
prototypes, or stereotypes operate as implicit knowledge structures which or-
ganize input into, storage in, and recall from memory. People learn and re-
member information by actively categorizing or coding that information
according to well-leamed conceptual schemas. Once a schema is activated,
subsequent confirming events are, in a sense, "tagged" with a category label
when stored in memory. When a person later attempts to recall specific events,
the category label functions as a retrieval cue. Items not encoded with the
schematic "tag" (i.e. expectancy-inconsistent information) are stored in a more
diffuse manner, making retrieval more difficult.2 0 Furthermore, at least in cer-
tain circunstances, perceivers attend more closely to and thus preferentially
encode expected as opposed to unexpected events. 21
Such a bias for expected events distorts the "subjective data set" from
which an employment decision is ultimately made such that, at the moment of
decision, a biased decisionmaker can in good faith believe that he was fairly
basing his decision on "the facts." Seen in this way, it becomes clear that
stereotypes, person prototypes, and other implicit knowledge structures bias
decisionmaking long before the "moment of decision" upon which Price
Waterhouse and its progeny focus Title VII's adjudicative attention. 2
as either "extrovert" or "introvert" exhibited enhanced recall of conceptually related but nonpresented
items).
217. 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2763-64 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
218. See, e.g., John D. Bransford & Jeffrey J. Franks, The Abstraction ofLinguistic Ideas, 2 CoG-
NMTVE PSYCHOL. 331,349-50 (1971). But see Judith S. Reitman & George H. Bower, Storage and Later
Recognition of Exemplars of Concepts, 4 CoGNI vE PSYCHOL. 194, 205 (1973).
219. Cantor & Mischel, supra note 214, at 5.
220. Regarding the theorized effects of schematic structures on memory encoding, storage and
retrieval, and empirical data supporting these views, see, for example, Cantor & Misehel, supra note
216, at 39; Taylor & Crocker, supra note 124, at 98-101; Endel Tulving & Donald M. Thomson, Encod-
ing Specificity and Retrieval Processes in Episodic Memory, 80 PSYCHOL. Rav. 352 (1973).
221. McArthur, supra note 142, at 233-34.
222. See text accompanying notes 32-39.
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6. The ef ects of prior theories on search and retrieval strategies.
All employment decisionmaking entails a form of hypothesis testing. To
decide, for example, whether to promote a particular employee, a deci-
sionmaker must first formulate an implicit judgment or belief about that em-
ployee on one or more dimensions ostensibly relevant to the decision in
question. Such a hypothesis might be that the applicant lacks initiative and is
thus unlikely to perform adequately under minimal supervision.
A tentative hypothesis of this sort may stem from any of a number of
sources. It may result from one particularly vivid event involving the target
employee, which, by virtue of its memorability, is subjectively viewed as
highly predictive of future behavior.223 It may stem from even superficial simi-
larities between this employee and another whose performance was unsatisfac-
tory.2 2 4 It may stem from schematic expectancies, stereotypes, or other
applications of the representativeness heuristic. 225 Another person's opinion
about the target individual may suggest the hypothesis. But from whatever
source, an implicit hypothesis, once formulated, can be expected to exert a
profoundly biasing effect on judgment and decisionmaking.
Now compare Title VII's model of social inference. The structure of proof
under Title VII's pretext theory assumes that, in formulating judgments about
other people, an employer.will first implicitly comprehend a proposition ("Mi-
guel lacks initiative") and then freely decide whether to believe it by testing it
evenhandedly against all reasonably available, relevant data. This view boasts
a long tradition, beginning with Descartes, in Western philosophy and psychol-
ogy.2 6  However, empirical investigation supports an alternative view,2 7
originating with Spinoza, that people initially accept as true every proposition
they comprehend and then go about deciding whether to "unbelieve" it. If peo-
ple are mentally preoccupied or otherwise unmotivated or unable to engage in
further processing, they may never move beyond their initial proposition.2
8
Thus, people may experience particular difficulty in rejecting false proposi-
tions. The "intuitive scientist" approaches the task of evaluating a tentative
hypothesis by building a case to support it rather than by seeking to disconfirm
it.
Accordingly, when asked to assess the validity of a hypothesis, subjects
systematically search available information for theory-confirming, at the ex-
223. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 148, at 207.
224. See Stephen J. Read, Once Is Enough: Causal Reasoning From a Single Instance, 45 J. or
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 323, 323 (1983) (finding that prediction and explanation are often based
on comparison to a single "representative" event). On representativeness, see Kahneman & Tversky,
supra note 176.
225. See text accompanying note 177 supra.
226. Daniel T. Gilbert, The Assent of Man: Mental Representation and the Control of Belief in
HANDBOOK OF MnerAL CONTROL 57, 60 (Daniel M. Wegner & James NV. Pennebaker eds., 1993) [here-
inafter The Assent of Man]; Daniel T. Gilbert, How Mental Systems Believe, 46 AM. PsYCHOL. 107, 108
(1991) [hereinafter Mental Systems].
227. The Assent of Man, supra note 226, at 108; Mental Systems, supra note 226, at 61-63.
228. For a review of the literature supporting this view, see Mark Snyder, Seek, And Ye Shall
Find: Testing Hypotheses About Other People, in SociAL CoGNrrON, supra note 123, at 277; for a
review of more recent material, see Mental Systems, supra note 226.
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pense of theory-disconfirming, data.229 They not only evaluate theory-confirm-
ing evidence as being more relevant than theory-disconfirming evidence but
also have better recall for the former than the latter. Indeed, people have a
good deal of difficulty in searching for and recognizing theory-disconfirming
information. 230 They accept theory-confirming evidence at face value, whereas
they subject theory-disconfirming evidence to critical evaluation.231 Unsurpris-
ingly, this results in a rather powerful bias towards confirming tentative judg-
ments or beliefs. This enormous quantity of empirical evidence suggests that
Title VII's assumption of a blank slate from which employers make decisions is
wholly unsupportable.
H. Rethinking the Assumptions Underlying Disparate Treatment
Jurisprudence
The assumptions underlying Title VII's disparate treatment theory have
been so substantially undermined by social cognition theory that they can no
longer be considered valid. As we have seen, disparate treatment does not nec-
essarily manifest discriminatory motive or intent. Even among the well-inten-
tioned, social schemas such as stereotypes, acting in concert with a variety of
other judgment heuristics, can be expected to bias intergroup perception and
judgment. Stereotyping, while it may in some contexts be socially undesirable
or otherwise maladaptive, is neither aberrant nor indicative of discriminatory
motivation. Stereotypes are simply a subset of the vast array of categorical
structures, expectancies and heuristics that characterize, and indeed make pos-
sible, human cognitive functioning.
The notion that decisionmaking is somehow separate from the perceptive,
interpretive, and memorial processes that precede it is utterly fallacious. These
various processes comprise a functional continuum which is vulnerable to dis-
tortion at every point. Thus, discrimination is not necessarily something that
occurs "at the moment of decision." Rather, it can intrude much earlier, as
cognitive process-based errors in perception and judgment subtly distort the
ostensibly objective data set upon which a decision is ultimately based. We
must, therefore, reconsider the very foundations upon which current Title VII
doctrine has developed.
229. Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Hypothesis Testing Processes in Social Interaction,
36 J. oF PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCaiOL. 1202, 1202 (1978). Interestingly, neither the origins of the
hypotheses being tested nor the structure of incentives for accuracy exerted an observable influence on
whether subjects adopted a theory-confirming or theory-disconfirming strategy.
230. Hillel J. Einhom & Robin M. Hogarth, Confidence in Judgment: Persistence of the Illusion
of Validity, 85 PSYCHOL. REV. 395, 397 (1978).
231. Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polariza-
tion: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PmtSONALrr- & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 2098, 2106 (1979).
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1. Cognitive bias and the assumption of rational decisionmaking.
At least since Furnco,232 Title VII's disparate treatment theory has been
premised on the assumption that, absent discriminatory motive or intent, em-
ployment decisionmakers can be expected to follow normative rules of infer-
ence and judgment. This is, in actuality, no small order. Furnco's "rational
businessman," when called upon to make a decision about a particular applicant
or employee, must perform a complex series of inferential tasks.
First, he formulates a tentative hypothesis or belief about the applicant or
employee on one or more dimensions relevant to the decision in question.
Then he proceeds to test it against all reasonably available relevant data.
To do this, he retrieves from memory, or from the record before him, all
decision-relevant traits or events, which might logically confirm or disconfirm
his tentative hypothesis. Next, he assesses the validity of each trait or event as
a predictor of future job performance. In a sense, he subjectively calculates the
expected utility of each piece of data to his ultimate decision. Furnco's rational
decisionmaker then weighs the quantum of confirming evidence against the
quantum of disconfirming evidence, and makes a final decision to accept or
reject the tentative hypothesis.
To perform these various tasks in accordance with normative rules of infer-
ence, our rational employer must be able to attend to, interpret, remember, re-
call, and utilize all relevant information evenhandedly. He must accurately
assess the relationships between a wide array of events and future outcomes,
and evenhandedly attribute the causes of an employee's success or failure. In
other words, Furnco's rational decisionmaker must be a" 'systematic' informa-
tion processor."
233
But real decisionmakers, even those of good intention, fall far short of
Furnco's presupposed ideal. As we have already seen, implicit knowledge
structures and judgmental heuristics systematically bias perception and judg-
ment at all points along the perceptual/judgmental continuum. Negative behav-
iors by minority group members are more salient and thus more readily
remembered than negative behaviors by members of the majority. Stereotypb-
consistent behaviors are better remembered and considered more predictive of
future behavior than stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. Indeed, stereotypic ex-
pectancies can go so far as to determine as a threshold matter whether a particu-
lar behavior is interpreted and subsequently encoded as positive, negative, or
neutral. Finally, stereotypes, like any other implicit expectancy, can be ex-
pected to charge a decisionmaker's ostensibly objective review of available evi-
dence with a powerful theory-confirming valence. The past thirty years of
research in cognitive social psychology tell us that people are anything but
"systematic information processors." Instead it is much more plausible to as-
232. Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). See text accompanying notes 80-81
supra.
233. Shelley Chaiken, Aldva Liberman, & Alice H. Eagly, Heuristic and Systematic Information
Processing Within and Beyond the Persuasion Context, in UNmrmTED THOUGHr 212, 212 (James S.
Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 1989).
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sume that, in a large proportion of employment discrimination disputes, the
following two propositions are true: first, that the nondiscriminatory reasons
proffered for the disputed decision were the decisionmaker's "real reasons" and
not a pretext for discrimination; and second, that the decision resulted from
intergroup bias. The "real reason"/"phony reason" dichotomy built into pretext
analysis does not accurately reflect the process by which cognitive sources of
bias distort intergroup perception and judgment.
2. Cognitive bias and the bifurcation of perception and judgment.
Just as social cognition theory undermines the assumption that well-inten-
tioned employers will be systematic information processors, it also subverts the
notion that discrimination necessarily occurs at the moment of decision. Cog-
nitive sources of intergroup bias corrupt decisionmaking not at the moment of
decision, but long before it, by distorting the interpretive framework through
which decisions are made. Social cognition theory teaches us that interpersonal
decisionmaking is an integrated system comprising perception, interpretation,
attribution, memory, and judgment. Decisionmaking is not, as the "moment of
decision" fallacy assumes, structurally disjoined from those perceptual and in-
ferential processes which comprise it.
Current disparate treatment jurisprudence, which focuses on decisionmaker
intent at the moment of decision, is ill-equipped to deal with bias of this sort.
An excellent illustration can be found in the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Wilson v.
Stroh Co.234 At trial, plaintiff Wilson had successfully argued that his immedi-
ate supervisor had been motivated by racial animus in reporting Wilson's be-
havioral transgression to upper management.235 The trial court and the Sixth
Circuit on appeal, assuming the truth of plaintiff's initial argument, based its
decision against the plaintiff on the observation that members of upper manage-
ment had conducted their own investigation of the transgression, and had made
an independent determination that the discharge was warranted. Because the
plaintiff could not show that the ultimate decisionmaker was racially motivated
"at the moment of decision," the court treated the supervisor's established bias
as irrelevant. Nowhere in the opinion does the court consider the possibility
that the supervisor's discriminatory animus, combined with management's bias
against disconfirming his initial hypothesis, constituted a form of discrimina-
tion actionable under Title VII.
3. Cognitive bias and the assumption of decisionmaker self-awareness.
As the plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse makes clear,236 current dispa-
rate treatment caselaw reflects a belief that employment decisionmakers know
when they are discriminating on a prohibited basis and when they are not.
More fundamentally, the normative efficacy of Title VI's rule against dispa-
rate treatment discrimination rests entirely on the assumption that deci-
234. 952 F. 2d 942 (6th Cir. 1992).
235. Id. at 944 n.3.
236. See text accompanying notes 84-102 supra.
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sionmakers know how particular stimuli influence their judgments and
decisions. Far from supporting the assumption of decisionmaker self-aware-
ness which disparate treatment theory takes for granted, a persuasive body of
empirical and theoretical research suggests that, in large measure, people lack
access to the mental processes involved in evaluation and judgment, and are
quite poor at accurately attributing the causes of their actions and decisions.
For example, as Shelley Taylor and his colleagues demonstrated, v2 7 sub-
jects remained unaware that they were using race and gender as structures for
organizing social information in memory, even though the experimental results
clearly demonstrated that they were doing so. This result should come as no
great surprise, however. There is virtually no evidence supporting the proposi-
tion that people possess conscious awareness of higher level perceptual and
memorial processes. This lack of awareness includes, of course, a lack of
awareness about the perceptual and memory-biasing effects of schemas, stereo-
types, and person prototypes examined earlier.
Along these lines, psychologists Laraine Winter and James Uleman have
demonstrated that when we observe an actor behaving in a particular way, we
do not simply store a representation of the event itself. Rather, along with
information about the event, we automatically and unconsciously encode dispo-
sitional judgments about the actor.23 8 These dispositional attributions, often
supplied by stereotypes and other forms of schematic expectancies, may then
serve to bias future judgments about the individual in question through the
operation of a "halo effect, '239 which also functions outside of decisionmaker
self-awareness.
In a groundbreaking pair of articles published in the late 1970s,240 Richard
Nisbett and Timothy Wilson demonstrated that people are actually quite poor at
identifying the effects of various stimuli on their evaluations, judgments,
choices, and predictions.241 In a series of experiments, Nisbett and Wilson
237. Taylor, supra note 141.
238. Laraine Winter & James S. Uleman, When Are Social Judgments Made? Evidence for the
Spontaneousness of Trait Inferences, 47 J. PERSONALI=Y & Soc. PsYcHOL. 237 (1984). Accord Laraine
Winter, James S. Uleman, & Cathryn Cunniff, How Automatic Are Social Judgments?, 49 J. PERSONAL-
ry & Soc. PSYCHOL. 904 (1985) (evidencing how experimental data indicated that dispositional infer-
ences are made at encoding, without intention and with little awareness); Leonard S. Newman & James
S. Uleman, Spontaneous Trait Inference, in UNiTrENDED THouGHT, supra note 233, at 155.
239. See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, The Halo Effect: Evidence for Uncon-
scious Alteration of Judgments, 35 J. PESONALrrY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 250 (1977) (describing how global
evaluations of a person induced altered evaluations of the person's specific attributes, even when there
existed sufficient information to permit independent assessment of those attributes and where subjects
were unaware of the influence of the global evaluations on their ratings of specific attributes).
240. Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal
Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PsYcHoL. REv. 231, 233-48 (1977); Timothy DeCamp Wilson &
Richard E. Nisbett, The Accuracy of Verbal Reports About the Effects of Stimuli on Evaluations and
Behavior, 41 Soc. PsYcHoL. 118, 119 (1978).
241. The experiments were designed so as to minimize possibilities of self-report bias and maxi-
mize the applicability of their findings to real life situations. Thus, the processes studied were represen-
tative of those routinely occurring in daily life. Care was taken to assure that subjects were aware of the
existence of both the critical stimuli and their own responses and choices. Most of the stimulus situa-
tions were designed to minimize self-report biases generated by social desirability or ego-maintenance
effects. See Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 240, at 242.
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systematically manipulated some component of a complex stimulus situation
such that the impact of a particular stimulus component on subjects' choices
and actions could be assessed. They found that subjects were virtually never
accurate in identifying the causal efficacy of the manipulated stimulus. Where
the stimulus had a significant effect on their responses, subjects typically re-
ported that it was noninfluential; in cases where a particular stimulus compo-
nent had no significant causal effect, subjects reported it as having determined
their response. When it comes to identifying the reasons why we make particu-
lar decisions, concluded Nisbett and Wilson, people tend towards "telling more
than we can know."242
Also significant was Nisbett and Wilson's finding that subjects' erroneous
self-attributions were neither random nor haphazard; they closely matched a
second group of subjects' predictions about why the actors they were observing
might have responded as they did. Thus, when subjects reported on their cog-
nitive process leading to a particular response, they did not appear to do so on
the basis of actual introspection. Rather, their self-attributions appear to have
been based on the same plausible, prior causal theories on which observers
relied in predicting why people in certain situations might act in a particular
way or make a particular choice.243
Nisbett and Wilson interpreted these findings as indicating that in making
causal self-attributions, people rely largely on the representativeness heuristic.
Specifically, they argue that when people are asked to attribute the causes of
actions or choices, they do not actually examine their cognitive processes, but
select from memory a causal theory which seems to them to be a plausible
explanation for what they have done.244
If Nisbett and Wilson are even partially correct 2 45 the implications for dis-
parate treatment compliance and dispute adjudication policy are profound. It
will be the rare employer indeed who can accurately identify the reasons why
he hired or promoted one employee over another, fired another, or set salary
increases as he did. Moreover, in the vast majority of cases, even after exten-
sive and costly discovery, it will be impossible as an empirical matter for either
party to prove whether or not a particular proffered causal theory in fact moti-
vated an employer. Unlike Wilson and Nisbett's laboratory, in the real world
one simply cannot control the multiplicity of possible causal antecedents so as
to determine the causal efficacy of race, gender, national origin, or age. Thus,
in the final analysis, each disparate treatment adjudication turns on the subjec-
tive attribution of causation by a trier of fact, a process prone to all the distor-
tions in attributional judgment explored earlier in this section.
242. See note 251 infra.
243. Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 240, at 247.
244. Id. at 233, 248.
245. Nisbett and Wilson's 1977 article generated a fair amount of controversy. See generally
Timothy D. Wilson & Julie I. Stone, Limitations on Self-Knowledge: More on Telling More Than We
Can Know, in SELF, SITUATIONS, & SociAL BAIAvIoR: REVIEw OF PERSONALITY AN SoCIAL PsYcHor-
oGY 167 (Philip Shaver ed., 1985) (reviewing and responding to a variety of methodological and theo-
retical challenges to the Nisbett & Wilson article).
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In fact, disparate treatment theory's central premise, that discrimination re-
sults from the conscious application of invidious intent, can be viewed as an
expression of one particular attributional bias. John Stuart Mill originally
termed this bias the "resemblance criterion."246 Myron Rothbart and Solomon
Fulero refer to it as the "profound motive fallacy."247 This bias leads us to
assume that the conditions or causes of an event will resemble the effect of the
event or the event itself. Thus, as Rothbart and Fulero observe, people have a
strong tendency to attribute emotionally relevant events to emotionally relevant
causes; a profoundly negative event tends to be attributed to profoundly nega-
tive causes. Accordingly, to the extent that we see employment discrimination
as a profoundly negative phenomenon, we will tend to attribute it to profoundly
negative causes, such as the morally reprehensible action of an invidiously mo-
tivated decisionmaker.
4. Rethinking the role of motivation in discrimination and equal
employment opportunity.
Viewed through the lens of social cognition theory, it appears that current
disparate treatment jurisprudence construes the role of motivation in intergroup
discrimination precisely backwards. A substantial body of empirical and theo-
retical work supports the proposition that cognitive biases in social judgment
operate automatically and must be controlled, if at all, through subsequent
"mental correction. '248 Intergroup discrimination, or at least that variant which
results from cognitive sources of bias, is automatic. 249 It does not result from a
motive or intent to discriminate; it is an unwelcome byproduct of otherwise
adaptive cognitive processes. But, like many unwanted byproducts, it can be
controlled, sometimes even eliminated, through careful process re-engineer-
ing.250 Cognitive biases in intergroup perception and judgment, though unin-
246. See RicHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STmraTEGS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUDGMENT 115-16 (1980) (discussing JoHN SrUART MILL, A SYsTEm OF Loaic RATIOCInATtvE
AND Iiuc~rv (1848)).
247. Myron Rothbart & Solomon Fulero, Attribution of Causality for Important Events: The
Profound Motive Fallacy 1 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review). Rothbart
and Fulero had subjects read stories in which a protagonist engaged in behavior that had either mild,
moderate or severely negative outcomes, and then had subjects attribute the causes of those outcomes.
Even after controlling for other factors, the attribution of profound motives to the protagonist was posi-
tively correlated with the severity of the outcome: the more severe the predictable outcome, the more
profound the motive attributed to the protagonist.
248. According to this view, social judgment consists of two sequential phases: an unconscious,
largely automatic process of dispositional inference referred to as "characterization," followed by situa-
tional adjustment or "correction," a deliberate form of conscious reason that occurs only with effort. For
a thorough exposition of this approach, see Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination
and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117
(1994); Daniel T. Gilbert, Thinking Lightly About Others: Automatic Components of the Social Influ-
ence Process, in UNrNTENDED THouGr, supra note 233, at 189.
249. For additional support for the view that cognitive biases in social judgment operate automati-
cally without intention or awareness, see John A. Barth, Conditional Automaticity: Varieties of Auto-
matic Influence in Social Perception and Cognition, in UNrNrENDED THOUGHT, supra note 233, at 3;
Newman & Uleman, supra note 238, at 155.
250. See Wilson & Brekke, supra note 248, at 130-35 (discussing difficulties inherent in and
potential techniques for correcting "mental contamination").
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tentional and largely unconscious, can be recognized and prevented by a
decisionmaker who is motivated not to discriminate and who is provided with
the tools required to translate that motivation into action. Seen in this way,
disparate treatment does not necessarily manifest discriminatory motive or in-
tent, but a motive or intent not to discriminate must be present to prevent it.
Given this psychologically more accurate view of discrimination, what
would a reformulated definition of nondiscrimination look like? To say that a
decisionmaker lacks discriminatory motivation is not to say that his perceptions
and judgments are unaffected by cognitive sources of intergroup bias. Indeed,
we should expect that a self-professed "colorblind" decisionmaker will fall prey
to the various sources of cognitive bias we have examined. For even if this
decisionmaker's conscious inferential process is colorblind, the categorical
structures through which he collects, sorts, and recalls information are not. In a
culture in which race, gender, and ethnicity are salient, even the well-inten-
tioned will inexorably categorize along racial, gender, and ethnic lines. And
once these categorical structures are in place, they can be expected to distort
social perception and judgment. Our decisionmaker is not colorblind; he is
simply "color-clueless," likely unaware that his perceptions, judgements, and
decisions are being distorted by cognitive sources of intergroup bias. He, like
the plant manager in my box manufacturing case, would be genuinely shocked
and profoundly offended if accused of discrimination, especially under a legal
and popular construction which equates discrimination with invidious intention.
And his plaintiff counterpart, experiencing disparities in treatment but unable to
prove discriminatory intent, would, like my client Miguel, be left embittered
and disillusioned by his encounter with the civil rights enforcement process.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COGNITIVE APPROACH FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY LAW AND POLICY
What implications derive from rejecting the assumptions currently under-
girding disparate treatment theory and accepting the proposition that a broad
class of discriminatory employment decisions result not from discriminatory
motivation, but from normal cognitive processes and strategies that tend to bias
intergroup perception and judgment? The overwhelming conclusion is that
there now exists a fundamental "lack of fit" between the jurisprudential con-
struction of discrimination and the actual phenomenon it purports to represent.
This lack of fit has created a number of serious theoretical and practical
problems. First, it is responsible for the increasing proliferation and deepening
theoretical incoherence of Title VII's various models of liability. Second, this
incoherence can be expected to decrease the validity of disparate treatment ad-
judications, increase adjudication-related information costs, and discourage the
voluntary settlement of employment discrimination cases. Third, and perhaps
most perniciously, it may be exacerbating rather than reducing intergroup ten-
sions. In each of the next three sections, I tackle these three main problems:
the incoherence of current liability theories, the effect of this incoherence on
dispute resolution, and its effect on intergroup relations.
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A. The Increasing Incoherence of Title VII Liability Theories
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,251 Thomas Kuhn observes that
the breakdown of a theoretical paradigm often follows the proliferation of ad
hoe adjustments designed to explain, within the existing theoretical structure,
phenomena for which the paradigm could not otherwise account. As this disin-
tegration progresses, Kuhn observes, the paradigm becomes so increasingly
complex, so incapable of consistent application, that it eventually loses its util-
ity as a guiding framework.
252
Kuhn's model aptly describes the development of Title VII's disparate
treatment paradigm. Over the past decade or so, courts have made ad hoe ad-
justments to Title VII liability theory to address three important employment
discrimination problems for which the original pretext model of discrimination
proof elaborated in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine had proven inadequate.
In the first class of cases, a plaintiff proved that his group status had played a
role in a challenged employment decision, but failed to prove, as pretext theory
required, that the nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by the defendant had
played no role at all. In such cases, pretext theory required judgment in favor
of the defendant, despite the fact that plaintiff's group status had been found to
have affected the employer's decisionmaking.
In the second class of cases, an employer's proffered nondiscriminatory rea-
sons were proven not to have motivated its decision, but the trier of fact re-
mained unconvinced that the employer had been motivated by discriminatory
intent. Pretext theory, with its rigid dichotomization of "real reasons" and
"cover-ups" for discrimination, seemed to dictate judgment for the plaintiff in
such cases, despite the fact that the plaintiff had failed to prove discriminatory
intent to the trier of fact's satisfaction.
Third, courts increasingly encountered cases in which an employer's overall
decisionmaking process consistently resulted in the statistical underutilization
of qualified members of a particular ethnic, gender, or racial group, though no
systematic intent to discriminate could be proven. Under systemic disparate
treatment theory, statistical disparities, without more, were deemed insufficient
to prove the required discriminatory intent.
The manifest injustice of results such as these functioned much like the
experimental anomalies Kuhn described,25 3 calling into question the disparate
treatment paradigm's utility as a guiding framework. While at least one quasi-
judicial decisionmaker reacted by rejecting pretext theory outright,254 the far
more prevalent response was as Kuhn's model predicts. Courts did not reject
the intent-based, pretext model of disparate treatment discrimination. Instead,
they devised ad hoc adjustments to disparate treatment and disparate impact
theory to "resolve" the observed anomalies.
251. THOMAS S. KuHN, TnE STRUCnRmE OF ScmaNmIc REVOLUTnoNs (2d ed., 1970).
252. Id. at 52-65.
253. Id. at 52-53.
254. See California Dep't of Fair Employment and Hous. v. Church's Fried Chicken, FEHC No.
90-11 (1990).
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For example, in response to the first anomaly described above, various cir-
cuit courts and later a sharply fragmented Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse,
added a mixed-motives variant to disparate treatment theory. However, neither
the Price Waterhouse Court, nor the district and circuit courts which applied it,
have been able to devise workable standards for delineating the respective
spheres of the pretext and mixed-motives variants of disparate treatment proof.
Indeed, under the current majority approach to this problem, neither the parties,
the court, nor the jurors are apt to know which of the two competing variants
will apply to determine liability until, at the earliest, the conclusion of the
plaintiff's case.
The second anomaly gave rise to what became known as the "Pretext-Plus"
controversy,255 which culminated in the Court's bitterly divided decision in St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.256 Over a scathing dissent authored by Justice
Souter, the Hicks majority held that the trier of fact's rejection of an employer's
asserted reasons for its actions may be sufficient to justify a plaintiff's verdict,
but it does not entitle a plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law.257 This result,
while it may have corrected one anomaly, undermined the logic supporting the
pretext model of proof.
In response to the third problem, circuit courts divided for many years on
the question of whether disparate impact theory could be used to challenge
subjective decisionmaking systems.258 And although in Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank and Trust259 and in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,260 the Supreme
Court held that disparate impact theory could be used in this way, the Court
was so troubled by how this might be accomplished without undermining com-
peting values and interests that they fundamentally altered the burdens of proof
and defense in disparate impact cases. When they were done, the disparate
treatment paradigm had all but swallowed the disparate impact model. And
while Congress in a sense overturned Wards Cove with the Civil Rights Act of
199 1,261 it simply ignored the grave practical and analytical problems that had
so troubled the Watson and Wards Cove Courts. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
does not resolve the many practical and theoretical problems associated with
applying disparate impact theory in subjective practices cases; it simply ignores
255. See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the
"Pretest-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HAsNGs L.J. 57, 71-90 (1991) (describ-
ing split among several circuits in applying the "pretext-plus" rule).
256. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
257. Id. at 2749.
258. See, e.g., Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923,925 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 825 (1975) (applying disparate impact theory to foreman's uncontrolled discretion to allocate on-
the-job training); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 241 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979) (applying disparate impact theory to subjective evaluations by all-white
superintendents); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1383 (4th Cir. 1972)
(applying disparate impact theory to employer's practice of announcing job openings only to current
employees); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 353 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying disparate
impact theory to foreman's recommendations based on employee "ability, merit and capacity").
259. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
260. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
261. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
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them. As a result, a substantial segment of Title VII jurisprudence now stands
in a state of practical uncertainty and analytical disarray.
In each of the next three subsections, I will explore the courts' treatment of
these three anomalies and describe the serious theoretical and practical
problems their responses now present.
1. The mixed-motives and pretext variants of disparate treatment proof.
which model for which case?
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,262 the Supreme Court held for the first
time that a disparate treatment plaintiff could prevail even if she were unable to
disprove the motivating significance of every legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason proffered by the defendant. Price Waterhouse thus seemed to stand for
the proposition that a plaintiff could shift the burden of proof to the defendant
by showing simply that her group status "played a role" in the decision or
action taken against her.2 63 She did not have to prove that it was the sole
reason, nor did she have to establish that the reasons proffered by the defendant
were "cover-ups" for a real discriminatory reason.2 4 Thus, it appeared, plain-
tiffs no longer bore the heavy burden associated with pretext proof; they could,
if they chose, plead mixed-motives .discrimination and avoid them.
However, as one commentator described,2 65 courts have floundered in their
efforts to define the respective spheres of application of the pretext and mixed-
motives theories of liability, creating a theoretical and practical morass. 2 66 In
what may well be a jurisprudentially unprecedented situation, most federal
courts now determine whether pretext or mixed-motives theory will apply to a
given case based on the type of evidence a plaintiff proffers. Presently, five or
six of the circuits hold that a plaintiff can use the mixed-motives theory of
liability only if she proves by "direct evidence" that her protected status was a
motivating factor.267 Three other circuits268 permit a plaintiff to use a mixed-
motives theory only if she proffers evidence "directly tied to" or "directly re-
262. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
263. Id. at 244. The Price Waterhouse rule was modified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Under
the Act, liability is now established upon a plaintiff's showing that his or her protected group status was
a motivating factor in an employer's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994). However, a prevailing
"mixed motives" plaintiff may still be denied certain individualized relief if the employer is able to
prove that he or she would have reached the same decision in the absence of the impermissible motivat-
ing factor. Id. at § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
264. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246.
265. Michael A. Zubrensky, Despite the Smoke, There Is No Gun: Direct Evidence Requirements
in Mixed-Motives Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 SrAN. L. REv. 959, 960-69
(1994) (surveying various federal court interpretations of plaintiff's burden of proof).
266. Id. at 970-80 (presenting the array of evidentiary standards that have been applied).
267. See Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff failed to show direct evi-
dence of discriminating intent); Brown v. East Mississippi Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th
Cir. 1993) (plaintiff successfully showed by direct evidence that race was a factor in a contested employ-
ment action); EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 923 (1 Ith Cir. 1990) (plaintiff showed
direct evidence of social animus); Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464,467 (Ist Cir. 1990) (plaintiff
failed to show direct evidence of gender discrimination in tenure decision); Gagne v. Northwester Nat'l
Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 315 (6th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff failed to proffer direct evidence of age discrimina-
tion in her dismissal); Randle v. LaSalle Telecom., Inc., 876 F.2d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff
failed to proffer direct evidence of racial animus). The Seventh Circuit presently suffers from an in-
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flecting" the alleged discrimination. Absent such evidence, a plaintiff's only
recourse is to the pretext model of proof, under which she must disprove the
motivating significance of each of the reasons proffered by the defendant and
show that her group status was the "sole motive" underlying the defendant's
decision.26
9
That the essential elements of proof and defense in a disparate treatment
case should vary depending on the type of evidence proffered by the plaintiff
would be perplexing enough. To make matters worse, no one agrees on the
meanings of "direct evidence," or "evidence directly tied to discrimination."
Consider, for example, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Brown v. East Missis-
sippi Electric Power Ass'n,270 a race discrimination case in which the plaintiff
proffered evidence showing that the decisionmaker had routinely used racial
slurs in referring to African Americans, including the plaintiff. Brown at-
tempted to proceed under a mixed-motives theory, but was not permitted to do
so by the district court because he had not provided "direct evidence" of dis-
crimination. Unable to prove that each of the reasons for his discharge profer-
red by his employer was pretextual, Brown lost at trial. The Fifth Circuit
reversed, defining "direct evidence" in a relatively straightforward manner:
"Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact without infer-
ence or presumption."271 The Court concluded that the supervisor's use of ra-
cial slurs constitute "direct evidence that racial animus was a motivating factor
in the contested disciplinary decisions." 272
This is nonsensical. Without inference or presumption, one cannot logi-
cally conclude from an employer's use of racial slurs that he was motivated by
race-based animus in malcing a particular decision. It may be a reasonable in-
ference to make, but it is an inference nonetheless.
Every circuit applying a direct evidence test in determining whether a plain-
tiff may proceed under a mixed-motives theory defines direct evidence as the
tracircuit conflict on this issue. Compare id. (applying direct evidence rule) with Robinson v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 23 F.3d 1159, 1165 (7th Cir. 1994) (arguably loosening the direct evidence requirement).
The "direct evidence" requirement derives from Justice O'Connor's Price Waterhouse concur-
rence, in which she stated that "in order to justify shifting the burden on the issue of causation to the
defendant, a ... plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial
factor in the decision." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis ad-
ded). No other justice expressed such a view.
268. See Brown v. Polk County, 37 F.3d 404, 410-11 (8th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff failed to produce
evidence that directly reflects religious or racial basis for termination); Griffiths v. Cigna Corp., 988
F.2d 457 (3rd Cir. 1993) (finding plaintiff presented no evidence that directly reflects a retaliatory mo-
tive for plaintiff's termination); Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding plaintiff entitled to burden-shifting jury instruction where evidence reflecting a discriminatory
attitude present). Only the Fourth Circuit imposes no evidence-based restrictions on plaintiffs attempt-
ing to proceed under a mixed motives theory. White v. Federal Express Corp., 939 F.2d 157, 160 (4th
Cir. 1991) ("plaintiff may carry its burden under ordinary principles of proof by any sufficiently proba-
tive direct or indirect evidence"). As of the writing of this article, the Ninth Circuit had not ruled on the
issue.
269. See notes 55-82 and accompanying text supra.
270. 989 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1993).
271. Id. at 861.
272. Id.
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Court did in Brown.273 But none of these cases, whether decided in favor of
the plaintiff or the defendant, actually involved "direct evidence" as the court
had defined it. From such a logically incoherent analysis, it is impossible to
derive a comprehensible standard or to predict what a court might do in any
future case.
The situation is perhaps worse in circuits applying the "directly-tied-to"
test. First, there are almost as many interpretations of the standard as there are
cases applying it. One court's "stray remarks in the workplace" are another
court's "evidence directly reflecting" discriminatory animus.274 Reasonable
people can differ far too easily on whether a particular piece of circumstantial
evidence reflects discriminatory attitudes with a directness sufficient to trigger
mixed-motives analysis. Given the substantial strategic advantage at stake, we
can expect Title VII litigants to delay settlement and to invest significant time"
and financial resources into discovery, motion practice, and post-judgment ap-
peals calculated to improve their position on this important issue.
275
To make matters worse, the applicability of mixed-motives analysis is not
necessarily amenable to resolution by the court as a matter of law. Determining
whether a particular piece of evidence "directly reflects" discriminatory animus
involves questions of credibility, contextualized interpretation, and inference.
These are matters for a jury, not a court. Thus, as the Seventh Circuit observed,
one cannot necessarily determine whether mixed-motives analysis is appropri-
ate until after the trier of fact has decided what inferences to draw from the
plantiff's evidence. 276 The result, as Justice Kennedy predicted in his dissent
in Price Waterhouse, is apt to be chaos in the formulation of comprehensible
jury instructions.
277
273. See note 267 supra.
274. Compare cases discussed in text accompanying note 267 supra with cases cited in note 268
supra.
275. See note 384 infra.
276. In deciding to remand the case to the district court for jury trial, the court in Robinson v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 23 F.3d 1159 (7th Cir. 1994) stated:
A factfinder might infer from these kinds of statements that PPG was motivated by age in its
termination decisions. That is not the only inference, of course-[the employer's regional
manager] might simply have meant that the company would not hesitate to discharge any
employee who did not meet its expectations, even if he or she were approaching retirement.
But this is for the finder of fact to sort out.
Id. at 1165 (citation omitted).
Similarly, in Griffiths v. Cigna Corp., 988 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1993), the Third Circuit stated: "A
court will categorize a case as mixed motives where the plaintiff can 'satisfy the fact finder that it is
more likely than not that a forbidden characteristic played a part in the employment decision.'" Id. at
472 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 n.12).
277. Justice Kennedy warned:
Perhaps [disparate treatment] cases in the future will require a bifurcated trial, with the jury
retiring first to make the credibility findings necessary to determine whether the plaintiff has
proved that an impermissible factor played a substantial part in the decision, and later hearing
evidence on the "same decision" or "pretext" issues. Alternatively, perhaps the trial judge will
have the unenviable task of formulating a single instruction for the jury on all of the various
burdens potentially involved in the case.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 292 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
958 F.2d 1176, 1185-87 (2d Cir. 1992) (warning of the potential for jury confusion accompanying the
pretext-mixed motives distinction), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 82 (1993).
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Why have the courts floundered so in their efforts to distinguish between
pretext and mixed-motives cases? The answer lies in the problem which gave
rise to mixed-motives analysis in the first place-the inadequacy of pretext
theory as a model for explaining how human cognition works. Kuhn's analysis
reminds us that communities of inquiry are reluctant to displace their guiding
paradigms. 278 Courts are accordingly engaged in an attempt to carve out sepa-
rate spheres for the two competing approaches. But the ad hoc solution they
have devised is theoretically incoherent and practically unworkable.
There is no sound reason for basing a decision as to which jurisprudential
model should apply in a given case on the type of evidence presented by the
plaintiff. Rather, courts should formulate rules defining the respective spheres
of the two models, if indeed both models are retained, 279 with reference to the
type of discrimination each is best equipped to identify and address.
As Price Waterhouse describes, pretext theory applies best in cases where
the defendant's discriminatory motive was the "sole cause"2 80 underlying an
employer's decision and where the employer's proffered reason in fact had no
actuating significance in his decision, but was simply a post hoc fabrication
designed to cover up his "real" discriminatory purpose.281 Such cases of bla-
tant, deliberate discrimination no doubt exist, but are likely to represent only a
small fraction of all employment decisions in which intergroup bias has played
a role. Ironically, it is in these cases, rather than in those involving mixed or
complex motivations, that one is more likely to find direct evidence of discrim-
ination, such as racial epithets or outright exclusion.
Mixed-motives theory reflects much more accurately than pretext theory
the processes by which cognitive sources of bias result in intergroup discrimi-
nation. First, very few actions or decisions derive from a single cause. Indeed,
a belief in monocausality, or what psychologists Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross
call the "hydraulic" model of causation, represents a common source of error in
attributional judgment.282 Pretext theory, with its rigid dichotomization of
"real reasons" and "pretexts for discrimination," both reflects and perpetuates
this single cause fallacy.
Second, a particular employment decision may be based on both the reason
proffered by the defendant and tainted by intergroup biases mediating the per-
ception, interpretation, encoding, and recall of decision-relevant information
and events. Thus, in a very real sense, every case of discrimination resulting
from cognitive bias is a "mixed-motives" case. In very few of these cases is
one likely to find either "direct" evidence of discriminatory animus or a prof-
278. KuHN, supra note 251, at 52-53.
279. I argue below that pretext analysis should be eliminated entirely and replaced with a unified
"causal factor" model of disparate treatment proof. See text accompanying notes 365-380 infra.
280. See, e.g., Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 472.
281. Both the plurality opinion and Justice White's concurrence in Price Waterhouse distinguish
pretext from mixed-motives cases by asking whether a single motive or a mixture of legitimate and
illegitimate motives informed the challenged employment decision. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258
(White, J., concurring).
For a more extensive discussion of the pretext model, see text accompanying notes 59-67 supra.
282. NIB-r & Ross, supra note 246, at 127-28.
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fered nondiscriminatory reason devoid of actuating significance, the subject to
which we now turn.
2. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks and the eroding presumption of
invidiousness.
In June of 1990, Melvin Hicks' race discrimination case against St. Mary's
Honor Center went to trial before United States District Judge Stephen N.
Limbaugh28 3 of the Eastern District of Missouri. After hearing the evidence
and analyzing it under the pretext model of proof, Judge Limbaugh found that
the nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by St. Mary's for Hicks' discharge
were, in fact, not the real reasons his termination.
284
Despite this finding, Judge Limbaugh ruled for the defendant on the
grounds that, although plaintiff had proven the existence of a crusade to termi-
nate him, he had not proven that the crusade was racially rather than personally
motivated.28 5 In so deciding, Judge Limbaugh refused to assume, as had the
Supreme Court in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, that "when all legitimate
reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for
the employer's actions, it is more likely than not that the employer ... based
his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race." 286 In short,
Judge Limbaugh rejected the presumption of invidiousness.
As was described in Part I, the logic of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
model of proof had long been based on a willingness to presume discriminatory
intent from a finding of pretext.287 The Supreme Court had never explicitly
labelled this a mandatory presumption, but it had long been treated as such.288
In other words, until the late 1980s, proving that the reasons offered by a dispa-
rate treatment defendant were pretexts was implicitly equated with proving that
these reasons were pretexts for intentional discrimination.289 But by the time
Hicks' case went to trial in June of 1990, a number of circuits had explicitly
283. For those readers who couldn't help but wonder, the answer is "yes-they are related."
Judge Limbaugh is Rush Limbaugh's uncle. John McCollister, The Rush Is On: Profile of Radio Per-
sonality Rush Limbaugh, SATURDAY EvEmNG Post, May 1993, at 54.
284. Hicks had produced powerful evidence of pretext, showing that he was the only supervisor
ever disciplined by St. Mary's for transgressions committed by his subordinates and that similar and
even more serious violations committed by his white coworkers were disregarded or treated more leni-
ently. Most importantly, he convinced the court that his supervisor deliberately provoked the final
verbal confrontation used to justify his termination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742,
2750-51 (1993).
285. Id. at 2752.
286. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
287. See generally Lanctot, supra note 255.
288. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,718 (1983) (Black-
mun, J., concurring) ("The McDonnell Douglas framework requires that a plaintiff prevail when ... he
demonstrates that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given by the employer is in fact not the true
reason for the employment decision."); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
254 (1981) (citing Furnco and noting that the successful prima facie case raises the inference that
unexplained acts are more likely than not based on consideration of impermissible factors); Furnco, 438
U.S. at 577 (calling McDonnell Douglas burden of proof a "sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evi-
dence in light of common experience").
289. See text accompanying notes 77-82 supra.
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rejected this equation. 290 And by the time Hicks' case was over, the Supreme
Court had rejected it as well.2 91
While many of my colleagues in the plaintiffs' employment bar saw the
pretext-plus controversy and the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks as but an-
other right wing assault on Title VII protections,292 1 hold a somewhat different
view. The pretext-plus controversy, in my opinion, developed out of a gradual
erosion of confidence in the premises underlying pretext theory itself-in par-
ticular, the assumption of rational decisionmaking and the presumption of in-
vidiousness. As my earlier analysis and arguments indicate,293 I do not
consider this erosion unwarranted. Neither of these assumptions is logically
supportable and both have been so thoroughly undermined empirically that they
can no longer be considered valid.
But without the presumption of invidiousness, the entire pretext approach to
disparate treatment proof loses its practical utility. If disproving the motivating
significance of each of the purportedly nondiscriminatory reasons identified by
the defendant in the adjudicative process is not sufficient to establish liability,
little remains of Burdine's promise that a Title VII plaintiff can prove discrimi-
nation "indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is un-
290. Of these, the 1st, 4th, 6th, 7th, and 10th Circuits had held that disproving the motivating
significance of the defendant's proffered explanation was never, in and of itself, sufficient to prove
intentional discrimination. See EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992) ("the plain-
tiff must show not merely that the proffered reasons are pretextual but that they are 'a pretext for
discrimination' ") (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253); Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275,
282-83 (6th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff bears ultimate burden of proving she was victim of discrimination),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1497 (1993); Samuels v. Raytheon Corp., 934 F.2d 388, 392 (Ist Cir. 1991)
(original case plus evidence of pretext, even if enough to raise inference of discrimination, not enough to
satisfy plaintiff's burden); Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 827-28 (4th Cir. 1989) (pretext in
and of itself does not prove discrimination); Benzies v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health and Develop-
mental Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1987) (spurious explanation by employer does not
compel inference of discrimination as a matter of law), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1988). On the other
hand, the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 8th, I Ith, and D.C. Circuits had held that disproving the motivating significance
of the proffered reasons did not compel-but could permit-the trier of fact to find in the plaintiff's
favor. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that once
defendant's proferred reasons for adverse treatment shown to be pretextual, plaintiff has met burden),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993); Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1554-57 (1 th Cir. 1990) (show-
ing discriminatory reasons are more likely explanation than proferred reason for discharge satisfies
pjaintiff's burden); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discrediting defendant's rebut-
tal to plaintiff's prima facie case satisfies burden); Thombrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760
F.2d 633, 639-40, 646-47 (5th Cir. 1985) (disproving defendant's proferred reasons for treatment satis-
fies burden); Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395-96 (3rd Cir. 1984) (show-
ing that proferred justification is pretextual satisfies burden).
291. The majority opinion in Hicks is internally contradictory and could be interpreted in either of
two ways. On the one hand, the opinion could be seen as simply supporting the proposition that the trier
of fact may, but is not compelled, to conclude from proof of pretext that the plaintiff was the victim of
intentional discrimination. On the other hand, it could stand for the proposition that proof of pretext
alone is not in and of itself sufficient to support a plaintiff's verdict. In my view, the first interpretation
is the better of the two. The majority explicitly disavows the dissent's interpretation: "rejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional dis-
crimination," Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
292. See, eg., Arnold Shep Cohen, Discrimination Standard Abandoned, NJ. LAWYER, July 19,
1993, at 6; Management, Civil Rights Attorneys Differ on Effect of Hicks Decision, 1993 DAIty LAB.
RaP., (BNA) No. 126, at 12 (July 12, 1993).
293. See text accompanying notes 55-82 supra.
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worthy of credence." 294 Without presuming the presence of discriminatory
intent from a finding of pretext, how will pretext theory serve its intended func-
tion, which was originally "to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual ques-
tion of intentional discrimination?"
295
If juries are permitted, but not required, to infer intentional discrimination
from a showing that the defendant's proffered reasons are false, what standards
should guide them in drawing one inference instead of another? Presumably,
they will have heard no direct evidence of discrimination, nor, in many circuits,
evidence "directly tied to" the alleged discrimination. In such cases, jury delib-
erations would proceed under a mixed-motives rather than a pretext approach.
What, other than jurors' preexisting biases regarding the prevalence of inten-
tional discrimination, or its plausibility as a causal theory, will inform disparate
treatment factfnding after Hicks?
The presumption of invidiousness, flawed though it may have been, at least
served to control the otherwise unrestrained biases about what might have
caused the employer's action. Faced with a choice between intentional dis-
crimination or some other explanation as the sole causal antecedent of the em-
ployer's decision, jurors can be expected to rely either on the relative salience
of the competing explanations or on whatever a priori causal theory they find
most representative of the situation at hand. Given that pretext theory applies
only when relatively more salient direct evidence of animus is lacking, discrim-
inatory intent is not likely to be viewed as a convincing explanation for what
occurred. This leaves us with one overwhelming influence on jury decision-
making: jurors' preexisting biases regarding the prevalence of conscious, in-
tentional discrimination.
Ironically, it is those very employment decisions that are now analyzed
under the pretext model of proof which are most apt to have been tainted by
unintended cognitive biases in intergroup perception and judgment. These de-
cisions are the least likely, however, to derive from a sole motive, in particular,
a conscious, deliberate intent to discriminate. Paradoxically then, after Hicks
and Price Waterhouse, courts instruct jurors to look for monocausal discrimina-
tory intent in precisely those cases where it is least likely to exist.
One could, of course, devise further ad hoe modifications to disparate treat-
ment theory in an attempt to correct these problems. I believe this approach
would ultimately fail. The present state of theoretical incoherence and practical
unworkability characterizing Title VII disparate treatment theory stems from its
equation of causation with intentionality. If Title VII doctrine is to regain its
theoretical coherence and practical utility, intentional and unintentional dispa-
rate treatment must be distinguished and doctrinal tools must be developed to
address each. Before considering these modifications, let us examine one fur-
ther anomaly generated by current disparate treatment doctrine and the ill-fated
attempts of both the courts and Congress to rationalize it within the existing
theoretical framework.
294. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
295. Id. at 255, n.8.
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3. Subjective decisionmaking, systemic disparate treatment, and the
disparate impact ' patch. "
While Part I of this article focuses on individual disparate treatment theory,
many of my observations apply equally to class-based or "systemic" disparate
treatment doctrine. As in the individual context, Title VII jurisprudence con-
structs class-based disparate treatment as manifesting discriminatory intent.
Thus, in order to prevail in a systemic disparate treatment case, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant maintains a pattern and practice of intentional
discrimination as its "standard operating procedure. '296 Statistical disparities
between a group's representation in the contested jobs and their representation
in the relevant selection pool may support a finding of discrimination, but they
are not sufficient to establish pattern and practice liability. Proof of discrimina-
tory motivation is required.
297
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, courts and employers became more
sophisticated in their understanding of the various statistical techniques used to
prove class-based discrimination.298 At the same time, federal judges became
increasingly hesitant to infer discriminatory intent from statistical disparities
alone.2 99 In response to these trends, plaintiffs' advocates sought alternate ave-
nues of redress. In particular, various members of the plaintiffs' bar endeav-
ored to apply Title VII's disparate impact paradigm, which did not require
proof of intent, to cases which formerly would have been analyzed under the
systemic disparate treatment model of proof.300 In these cases, plaintiffs ar-
296. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
297. As in the individual disparate treatment context, the Court in Teamsters equated causation
and intentionality: "'Disparate treatment' such as is alleged in the present case is the most easily under-
stood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others be-
cause of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical
....." Id. at 335 n.15.
298. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309-13 (1977) (finding error
in disregarding relevant statistical data about school's practices in hiring of black teachers); Gay v.
Waiter's & Dairy Lunchmen's Union Local 30, 694 F.2d 531, 555 (9th Cir. 1982) (concluding that
plaintiff's statistical and circumstantial evidence fails to establish prima facie case of disparate treatment
of black male writers); Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 396-410 (5th Cir. 1981) (hold-
ing that female plaintiffs failed to make prima facie case with statistical evidence of hiring, recruitment,
and compensation discrimination).
299. See, e.g., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115
(1985) (citing with approval district court statement that statistics alone would not permit an inference of
discrimination in promotions to positions above the GS-12 level.); Sweeney v. Research Found. of State
Univ. of N.Y., 711 F.2d 1179, 1187 (2d Cir. 1983); Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 699
F.2d 760, 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983); Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d
667, 670 (3d Cir. 1983); Gay, 694 F. 2d at 531.
300. See, e.g., Wilmore, 699 F.2d at 670 (applying disparate impact theory and using statistical
evidence); Wang v. Hoffman, 694 F.2d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that lack of objective crite-
ria for promotion can be analyzed for disparate impact); Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88,
94 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding that leaving rehiring decisions to the foreman's subjective judgment could be
challenged on disparate impact grounds). For a discussion of the frustrations leading to the use of this
approach, see generally Elizabeth BartholetApplication of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L.
Rzv. 947 (1982) (arguing that disparate treatment theory fails to identify discrimination in upper level
jobs).
This strategy had its roots in pre-Teamsters cases such as Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
494 F.2d 211, 241 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979), and Rowe v. General Motors
Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972), in which the courts applied disparate impact theory to cases where
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gued that seemingly neutral, subjective decisionmaking systems which resulted
in gender, ethnic, or racial selection disparities be found discriminatory under
Title VII's disparate impact theory. Under this approach, a plaintiff would be
required to prove only the existence of the subjective system and a statistically
significant disparity in selection rates between the plaintiff class and the fa-
vored group. Unless the system was deemed justified as a business necessity,
the defendant would be liable. Proof of intent would not be required.
30'
By the late 1980s, appellate courts had split on this use of disparate impact
theory to challenge subjective employment decisionmaking. The Fourth, Fifth,
Seventh, Eighth Circuits,302 and certain panels within the Second and Sixth
Circuits,3 03 refused to apply the disparate impact model to subjective decision-
making. These courts and some commentators maintained that the business
necessity defense, and in particular the cost of validation studies, would pose
too onerous a burden on employers in cases involving subjective selection cri-
teria.3°4 Additionally, they maintained that, as a conceptual matter, the dispa-
rate treatment paradigm provided the better analytical framework for subjective
criteria cases because "any discrimination which results from subjective deci-
sionmaking is inherently a result of disparate treatment." 305 Subjective deci-
sionmaking systems were seen as problematic because they failed to provide
safeguards against intentional discrimination by individual decisionmakers.
Accordingly, class-based disparate treatment theory, not disparate impact the-
ory, was deemed the more appropriate analytical framework.
In contrast, the Third, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits permitted
individual disparate impact challenges to subjective decisionmaking sys-
promotion decisions were left to the unfettered discretion of Caucasian supervisors applying subjective
standards. By the early 1980s, however, the Fifth Circuit had rejected this use of disparate impact
theory and required that courts analyze "subjective decisionmaking" cases under the systemic disparate
treatment model of proof. See, e.g., Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982).
301. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971)
(employment practices that disproportionately exclude blacks and are unrelated to job performance
struck down regardless of lack of discriminatory intent); Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645
F.2d 1251, 1257 (6th Cir. 1981) (proof of discriminatory intent not required in a disparate impact case).
302. The 4th, 5th, 7th, and 8th Circuits rejected application of disparate impact theory. See Grif-
fin, 795 F.2d at 1288-89; Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 723 F.2d 1195, 1201-02 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984); Talley v. United States Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505, 507 (8th
Cir. 1983); Carroll v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1983); Pegues, 699 F.2d at 765;
EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 639 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'don other grounds
sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); Pope v. City of Hickory,
679 F.2d 20, 22 (4th Cir. 1982); Pouncy, 668 F.2d at 800; Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651 F.2d 609, 611
(8th Cir. 1981).
303. The 2d and 6th Circuits demonstrated an internal division on the disparate impact/subjective
practices issue. Compare Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 605 (2d Cir. 1986) (refusing
to apply disparate impact theory) with Zahorik v. Comell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1984)
(applying both disparate treatment and impact theories); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007,
1010 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying disparate impact theory), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); compare also
Geisler v. Folsom, 735 F.2d 991, 994 (6th Cir. 1984) (refusing to apply impact analysis) with Rowa 690
F.2d at 92 n.9 (permitting disparate impact analysis).
304. See, e.g., Bunch v. Bullard, 795 F.2d 384, 393 n.10 (5th Cir. 1986).
305. Stacey B. Babson, Evaluation of Subjective Selection Systems in Title lI Employment Dis-
crimination Cases: A Misuse of Disparate Impact Analysis, 7 CARDozo L. RE,. 549, 582-83; 3 ARTHuR
LARSON & LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCIMNATION: REMEDIES, RACE, RELIGION, ANDn NATIONAL
Omiune (1993 ed.), § 76.34.
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tems.306 These courts, and a veritable swarm of academic commentators,30 7
argued that disparate treatment theory had proven inadequate to address the
subtle bias which characterizes subjective practices discrimination.308 Propo-
nents justified the use of disparate impact theory as a tool to staunch the flow of
"false negatives" generated by systemic disparate treatment analysis and to fur-
ther the general policies underlying Title VII. 309 Furthermore, proponents ar-
gued, from the perspective of their impact on a protected class, there exists
little meaningful distinction between objective and subjective practices.3 10
The Supreme Court resolved the split among the circuits in Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank and Trust,31' holding unanimously that disparate impact theory
could be applied in cases involving subjective decisionmaking criteria. How-
ever, four of eight participating justices312 were sufficiently troubled by how
disparate impact analysis could practically be applied in such cases without
undermining other values implicated by Title VII that they proposed an almost
complete reworking of the disparate impact paradigm. 3
13
306. See, e.g., Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1479 (9th Cir.) (en banc), reh "g
granted, 827 F.2d 439 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d
1516, 1522-25 (11th Cir. 1985); Hawkins v. Bounds, 752 F.2d 500, 503 (10th Cir. 1985); Lasso v.
Woodmen of World Life Ins. Co., 741 F.2d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099
(1985); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985);
Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1983); Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 646
F.2d 444, 450-51 (10th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Colorado Springs Sch. Dist., 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th
Cir. 1981).
307. See e.g., Susan Melanie Jones, Comment, Applying Disparate Impact Theory to Subjective
Employee Selection Procedures, 20 Loy. L.A. L. Rv. 375 (1987); Julia Lamber, Discretionary Deci-
sionmaking: The Application of Title VI's Disparate Impact Theory, 1985 U. ILL. L. Ray. 869; Mark
Maney, Comment, Application of the Adverse Impact Analysis to Subjective Criteria in Title VII Em-
ployment Discrimination Cases, 38 BAYLOR L. REv. 363 (1986); Jane Rigler, Title VII and the Applica-
bility of Disparate Impact Analysis to Subjective Selection Criteria, 88 W. VA. L. Rv. 25 (1985).
308. See, eg., Wards Cove, 810 F.2d at 1484 n.5. The Court stated: "If, in fact, the subjective
practices are a 'covert means' to discriminate intentionally, by definition intent will be difficult to
prove.... Proof of intent where adverse impact can be shown may be not only unnecessary but undesir-
able because of the animus the process generates." Id at 1484. See also Anita M. Allesandra, Com-
ment, When Doctrines Collide: Disparate Treatment, Disparate Impact and Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
and Trust, 137 U. PA. L. Rav. 1755, 1776-1778 (1989).
309. See Wards Cove 810 F.2d at 1483.
310. As the Court stated in Wards Cove, "[t]here is no bright line distinction between objective
and subjective hiring criteria, because almost all criteria necessarily have both subjective and objective
elements." Id. at 1485.
311. 487 U.S. 977, 999 (1988).
312. Watson produced three opinions, all of which concluded that disparate impact theory could
be applied to challenge subjective decisionmaking practices. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices
Relnquist, White, and Scalia, articulated the concerns and proposed the doctrinal modifications to which
I refer. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration and decision of the case.
313. For example, the Watson plurality proposed lowering the business necessity burden from a
burden of proof to a burden of production and endorsed a lenient interpretation of business necessity
which merely required an employer to produce evidence of "legitimate business reasons" for using a
particular employment practice. Watson, 487 U.S. at 997, 999. Additionally, the plurality rejected the
imposition of an obligation on employers to engage in statistical validation of selection devices, whether
subjective or objective. l at 998. The following year, in Wards Cove, a majority of the Court accepted
the doctrinal changes proposed in Watson, but remained silent on the question of formal validation.
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-61. Wards Cove prompted Congress to amend Title VII to restore dispa-
rate impact theory's elements of proof and defense as they had existed before Wards Cove. Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, §§ 2-3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
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All of the justices participating in Watson recognized that an unfettered
system of subjective decisionmaking could produce the same discriminatory
results as a system "pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination.
' 314
Furthermore, all acknowledged that the disparate treatment paradigm failed to
provide an adequate analytical framework for subjective practice adjudications.
As Justice O'Connor observed, even if one assumed that disparate treatment
theory was sufficient to address intentional discrimination, "the problem of
subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain. '315
However, the Watson plurality, led by Justice O'Connor, feared that apply-
ing disparate impact theory to cases involving subjective selection criteria
would pose a serious threat to other values and interests at stake in Title VII
cases. Specifically, the justices observed that, as a practical matter, subjective
decisionmaking practices would be so difficult and expensive to validate, that,
were traditional disparate impact theory applied to subjective decisionmaking,
employers would be forced to adopt and enforce numerical selection quotas to
avoid liability. Whatever one might think about this solution, it was unaccept-
able to the Watson plurality.
316
How, theoretically, should we understand the problem presented by the sub-
jective practices/disparate impact cases? In a sense, application of disparate
treatment theory to subjective practices cases produced anomalous results
which systematically violated appellate courts' sense of justice. This sense of
injustice serves as the jurisprudential equivalent of Kuhn's "experimental
anomalies" '317 which, left unaddressed, can erode a community's confidence in
its most important analytical tools.
The facts of Clara Watson's case provide a compelling example. At one
point in her long, unsuccessful attempt to secure a promotion to teller, Ms.
Watson was told by one of her superiors "that the teller position was a big
responsibility with 'a lot of money for... blacks to have to count.' "318 None-
theless, Ms. Watson was unable to prove that the bank had engaged in inten-
tional discrimination. Consequently, she lost both her individual and class-
based disparate treatment claims, an outcome Justice O'Connor noted with
some consternation.
319
The apparent injustice generated by the application of disparate treatment
theory in these cases might have prompted the Court to recognize that the equa-
tion of causation and intentionality in individual and class-based disparate treat-
ment jurisprudence is fundamentally flawed. The Court could have
acknowledged that at least some forms of disparate treatment caused by uncon-
scious stereotypes and prejudices do not necessarily manifest discriminatory
(1992)). Congress too remained silent not only on the validation question, but also on the question of
precisely what was meant by the term "business necessity." See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1992).
314. Watson, 487 U.S. at 997.
315. Id. at 990-91.
316. Id. at 990.
317. KuHN, supra note 251, at 52-53.
318. Watson, 487 U.S. at 990.
319. Id. at 983-85.
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motive or intent. With a more nuanced understanding of disparate treatment
discrimination, the Court could then have restructured disparate treatment the-
ory itself. In particular, it could have interpreted the Act as requiring simply
that a plaintiff demonstrate a causal connection between her group status and
the employer's decision rather than as requiring proof of a particular kind of
causation, namely specific intent to discriminate.
Unfortunately, the Court chose to do neither. Rather, it turned to disparate
impact theory to solve what is essentially a disparate treatment problem. Ulti-
mately this approach must fail. The disparate impact paradigm as currently
constructed is an inappropriate analytical tool for addressing the intergroup bi-
ases inherent in subjective decisionmaking.
This claim is based on three arguments-one practical, one political, and
one theoretical. From a practical standpoint, disparate impact theory is inade-
quate because the empirical tools on which it depends cannot effectively or
economically be applied in situations involving complex, subjective assess-
ments. Further, it is only disparate impact's grounding in empiricism which
provides its political legitimacy as a civil rights theory in the face of competing
normative claims. Finally, as a theoretical matter, I argue that disparate impact
theory is the wrong tool to address subjective decisionmaking because it pre-
supposes a significantly different type of bias from those at play in subjective
practices cases. From a phenomenological standpoint, subjective practices dis-
crimination is a disparate treatment problem, not a disparate impact problem,
and it requires a disparate treatment solution. Let us consider each of these
three arguments and their implications for our present inquiry.
Under current disparate impact theory320 after a plaintiff demonstrates that
a particular employment practice has a disparate impact on a protected class,
the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the challenged practice is "job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity."
'321
In fashioning the compromise which made passage of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act possible, Congress deliberately failed to define the terms "job-related" and
"business necessity. '322 However, the business necessity defense had long
been interpreted to require that employers formally validate disparately im-
320. Section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to reverse the stringent bur-
dens of proof proposed by the Watson plurality and ultimately adopted in Wards Cove. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1) (1992).
321. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1992).
322. Neither term is defined in the Act. Further, § 105(b) provides that no statements other than
an Interpretive Memorandum appearing at 137 CoNG. REc. S15,276 may be considered or relied upon as
legislative history in construing the disparate impact provisions of the Act. The brief memorandum to
which the Act refers states only that "the terms 'business necessity' and 'job related' are intended to
reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in [Griggs], and the other Supreme Court deci-
sions prior to [Wards Cove]." 137 CoNG. REc. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991). Previous Supreme
Court decisions defining these two terms were ambiguous and in many ways contradictory; the Act
merely codified this uncertainty.
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pacting 323 selection devices in accordance with professionally accepted statisti-
cal procedures.
324
Herein lies the practical problem with applying disparate impact theory to
subjective practices cases: Validating subjective decisionmaking systems in
accordance with professionally acceptable standards is neither empirically nor
economically feasible, especially for jobs where intangible qualities, such as
interpersonal skills, creativity, and the ability to make sound judgments under
conditions of uncertainty, are critical. Accordingly, if a court applies disparate
impact theory in subjective practices cases, one of two undesirable outcomes
will necessarily result: either the validation requirement will be weakened or
eliminated entirely, as already appears to be occurring, or its imposition will
place severe and ultimately unworkable burdens on small and medium-sized
employers.
Scholarly treatments of the subjective practices/disparate impact problem
divide sharply on the question of whether the law should require employers to
validate subjective decisionmaking systems.325 Those commentators who
favor application of the validation requirement rely on a combination of doctri-
nal arguments and appeals to fairness toward groups protected by Title VII.3 26
Although these commentators assert that validation is feasible in the subjective
decisionmaking context, a rigorous analysis of validation procedures is gener-
ally missing from their work. Rather than conducting their own analysis to
support their assertion that validation is technically feasible, these treatments
generally rely on the highly qualified conclusions of the American Psychologi-
cal Association ("APA") in its Watson amicus brief.327
The APA's brief in Watson argued that employers could validate subjective
decisionmaking systems with the same methods used to validate objective crite-
323. Validation is a statistical method which can determine whether a particular selection device
actually predicts successful performance in a particular activity. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1-.7 (1994).
324. See id. (stating that the use of any selection procedure which has an adverse impact will be
considered discriminatory unless the procedure has been validated in accordance with guidelines);
Dothard v. Rawlinson 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431
(1975).
325. Compare, e.g., Allesandra, supra note 308 (arguing that the validation requirement should
apply to subjective decisionmaking systems); Bartholet, supra note 300; Alfred W. Blumrosen, The
Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 Cm.-Kmrr L. Ray. 1 (1987); Lamber,
supra note 307; Steven L. Willbome, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and Lim-
its, 34 Am. U. L. Rav 799 (1985) with Babson, supra note 305 (arguing against imposition of the
validation requirement in subjective practices cases); Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991:
A "Quota Bill'" A Codification of Griggs, A Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43
CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 287 (1993); George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective
Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REv. 1297 (1987).
326. See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, The Reagan Court and Title VI1: A
Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1, 30 (1990); Merrill D. Feldstein, Watson
v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust: Reallocating the Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimination, 38 AM.
U. L. REv. 919, 946-947 (1989); see generally Christopher Dee, Comment, Disparate Impact and
Subjective Employment Criteria Under Title VII, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 957 (1987) (arguing against limita-
tion of plaintiff's challenges to objective criteria only); Jane Howard-Martin, A Critical Analysis of
Judicial Opinions in Professional Employment Discrimination Cases, 26 How. L.J. 723 (1983).
327. Brief for American Psychological Association, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977 (1988) (No. 86-6139).
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ria.328 This conclusion, however, is highly qualified. Specifically, the APA
states that subjective practices are amenable to validation only if they derive
from a "thorough analysis of the target job, '32 9 if they are sufficiently "behav-
iorally specific, '330 if "all ratings can be supported by objective, observable
evidence," 331 if the observations are "systematically recorded," 332 and if "raters
are trained to reduce sources of bias."333 These caveats effectively swallow the
APA's conclusion whole.
The process of validation assumes that a particular selection instrument will
produce a quantifiable and accurate "output" or score of a candidate's perform-
ance on a particular selection instrument. However, as the APA concedes, the
output of any subjective assessment is a personal, nonquantifiable determina-
tion subject to many forms of evaluator bias.334 Reducing an evaluator's sub-
jective evaluation of a candidate's persuasiveness, judgment, or analytical
ability to a reliable numerical score is a questionable endeavor. Thus, the accu-
racy of the very variable being validated cannot be assured.
A related problem stems from the questionable reliance of validation proce-
dures on statistical regression analysis. Regression analysis requires that the
selection device be an identified, isolated variable. But the separation of an
evaluator's subjective assessment of one trait or criterion from his assessment
of another related trait or criterion is often impossible. Subjective assessments
of intangible qualities are products of a combinative or synthetic process in-
volving many interrelated subjective and objective factors. 335 Thus, the inde-
pendence of various predictive variables cannot be assured.
Equally serious measurement problems appear with respect to quantifying
job performance. Criterion-related validity studies 336 require some quantified
measure of job performance with which performance on the challenged selec-
tion device can be correlated. Frequently, however, it is impossible to quantify
employee performance as criterion-related validity testing requires. In such sit-
uations, the only available measure of performance is itself likely to be subjec-
tive evaluations, often provided by the same supervisors who made the
subjective assessments involved in employee selection.3 37 This poses obvious
328. Id. at 22.
329. Id. at 17.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 21.
332. Id. at 4-5.
333. Id. at 21.
334. Id.
335. Babson, supra note 305, at 577 n.134, 577 n.142.
336. Criterion-related validity is demonstrated by establishing a statistically significant positive
correlation between successful performance on the selection instrument and success on some measure of
job performance. The 1970 Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures appear to favor
criterion validation over other methods. See 29 C.F.R § 1607.5(a), 35 Fed. Reg. 12,333, 12,334-35
(1970). See also Rutherglen, supra note 325.
337. See Ivan T. Robertson & Andrew Kinder, Personalities and Job Competencies: The Crite-
ron-Related Validity of Some Personality Variables, 66 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORGANIZA-IoNAL
PsVcHoL. 225, 241 (1993). Robertson and Kinder analyzed 20 individual criterion-related validity stud-




problems. First, a subjective selection device, such as the assessment of a par-
ticular personality trait, may be indistinguishable from the performance crite-
rion with which it is being compared. Even if the selection criterion and the
performance criterion can be distinguished, both may be affected by the very
evaluator bias that makes subjective decisionmaking problematic in the first
place. Accordingly, the use of supervisor ratings in criterion-related validity
studies comes coupled with profuse apologies for their inherent unreliability.
338
As one commentator reflects, justifying one questionable form of subjective
evaluation by appealing to another holds little meaning; the entire process is
subject to "a nearly inescapable circularity. '3
39
Content validation3 40 strategies are even less feasible in the subjective prac-
tices context. In order to distinguish content from construct validity,341 the
Uniform Guidelines restrict the application of content validation strategies to
situations involving concrete behaviors actually performed on the job.342 Sub-
jective decisionmaking criteria relate to abstract, intangible qualities, not tangi-
ble, objectively measurable skills or abilities. Content validity is simply
inapplicable in the context of jobs requiring abstract rather than concrete skills;
it is designed for situations involving simple, well-defined elements with easily
observable manifestations.
343
Unfortunately, construct validation, while theoretically the most appropriate
method for validating the intangible abilities or personality constructs at issue
338. See, e.g., Paul R. Sackett, Neal Schmitt, Mary L. Tenopyr, Jerard Kehoe, & Sheldon Zedeck,
Commentary on Forty Questions About Validity Generalization and Meta-Analysis, 38 PERSONNEL
PSYCHOL. 697, 731 (1985) ("We know supervisory ratings are flawed, but they're all we could get.").
339. Rutherglen, supra note 325 at 1342; see also Alessandra, supra note 308 at 1771, n.85 (ob-
serving that "[s]ubjective criteria... require qualities or skills which cannot be measured objectively').
340. Content validation requires that an employer analyze the job in question by breaking the job
down into the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) and determining the relative importance of and the
proficiency level required for each. The employer must demonstrate that the challenged selection device
tests the applicant's proficiency on each of these KSAs in accordance with the relevant levels of impor-
tance and required proficiency. See Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. City Police Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
633 F.2d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); see also Dennis Doverspike, Gerald V.
Barrett & Ralph A. Alexander, The Feasibility of Traditional Validation Procedures for Demonstrating
Job Relatedness, 9 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 35, 43 (1985).
341. Construct validity is demonstrated by establishing a statistically significant correlation be-
tween performance on an assessment instrument and the possession of some perceived trait, such as
"intelligence," "leadership," or "motivation," deemed necessary for the successful perfomance of a job.
Construct validation is uniformly viewed with suspicion. The Uniform Guidelines express skepticism
regarding the utility of construct validation in the employment testing context, as do testing profession-
als. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(D)(1); see also KENN= N. WExEY & GARY A. Yu, ORGANIZAIONAL
BEHAVIOR AND PERSONrEmL PSYCHOLOGY 443 (Kenneth N. Wexley & Gary A. Yuki eds., 1984);
Michael R. Carrier, Anthony T. Dalessio, & Steven H. Brown, Correspondence Between Estimates of
Content and Criterion-Related Validity Values, 43 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 85, 85 (1990). Very rarely
have employers even attempted to use a construct validation strategy to justify a challenged selection
device. See generally Barbara Lindemann Schlei & Paul Grossman, EMPLOYMmr DISCRMMNATION
LAW 153 (2d ed., 1982).
342. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(C)(l)-(4). See Rutherglen, supra note 325, at 1325 n.119, 1342.
343. The Uniform Guidelines state that "a content strategy is not appropriate for demonstrating
the validity of selection procedures which purport to measure traits or constructs, such as intelligence,
aptitude, personality, commonsense, judgment, leadership, and spatial ability." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.14(C)(1). For further discussion of this issue, see Michael R. Carrier, Anthony T. Dalessio, &
Steven H. Brown, Correspondence Between Estimates of Content and Criterion-Related Validity Values,
43 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 85, 97 (1990).
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in subjective decisionmaking cases, is practically and economically unfeasible.
Consider the dire warning contained in the Uniform Guidelines:
Construct validity is a more complex strategy than either criterion-related or
content validity... The user should be aware that the effort to obtain suffi-
cient empirical support for construct validity is both an extensive and arduous
effort involving a series of research studies, which include criterion related
validity studies and which may include content validity studies. Users choos-
ing to justify use of a selection procedure by this strategy should therefore take
particular care to assure that the validity study meets the standards set forth
below.
3 "
Those standards require, among other things, that criterion-related validity
studies be conducted before construct-related validation is undertaken.3 45 Con-
sequently, all of the problems which make criterion-related analysis technically
unfeasible in the subjective practices context render construct validation unfea-
sible as well.
Formal validation of employee selection devices are premised on an in-
creasingly outdated Tayloristic model of production in which job-related be-
haviors and performance outcomes can be readily segmented and quantified.
Their application to more complex jobs is open to serious question.
34 6
Even if there were solutions to these technical problems, additional practi-
cal problems would remain. First, small businesses, or enterprises of whatever
size with few workers in the same job classification, are precisely those types
of employers most likely to use subjective decisionmaking. 347 Consequently,
we can reasonably predict that, in the vast majority of cases, the challenged
subjective practice will not have been applied to a sufficiently large number of
candidates to provide a statistically adequate sample which to analyze the chal-
lenged subjective practice. Without sufficient data, validity studies, even if
otherwise feasible, could not produce statistically significant results.
Finally, legal policymakers cannot ignore the problem of cost. Formal vali-
dation of even relatively straightforward objective selection devices is an ex-
pensive and time-consuming process, often requiring several years and
hundreds of thousands of dollars in professional fees and employee time.348 As
the Uniform Guidelines recognize, construct validation studies are even more
344. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(D)(1).
345. Id. § 1607.14(D)(4).
346. See, e.g., Barry L Nathan & Ralph A. Alexander, A Comparison of Criteria for Test Valida-
don: A Meta-Analytic Investigation, 41 PEnsOaNEL PSYCHOL. 517, 533 (1988) (concluding that some
subjective criteria in the selection of clerical employees could be subjected to traditional criterion-re-
lated validity analysis, but not necessarily in selection of more complex managerial or professional
positions).
347. For a discussion of changes in the labor market leading to increased use of subjective deci-
sionmaking methods, see generally Blumrosen, supra note 325.
348. See James Gwartney, Ephraim Asher, Charles Haworth, & Joan Haworth, Statistics, the Law
and Title VII: An Economist's View, 54 NoTRE DAME L. Ray. 633, 634 (an employer seeking to validate
a single selection device, such as an arithmetic test for machinists, can expect to spend from $20,000 to
$100,000); Barbara Lemer, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity and Equality, 1979
Sup. CT. Ray. 17, 18 n.6 (reporting that adequate criterion-related validity studies generally cost be-
tween $ 100,000 and $400,000 and require approximately two years to complete); Rutherglen, supra note
325, at 1317-18 (cost of validation in cases studied exceeds $100,000).
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expensive and time consuming than criterion or content studies. Lastly, even if
completed, construct validity is sufficiently controversial that such studies
would provide little assurance against disparate impact liability.
One could, of course, apply disparate impact theory to subjective decision-
making without imposing a duty to validate. The Uniform Guidelines provide
for this possibility in section 1607.6, which provides in relevant part:
B. There are circumstances in which a user cannot or need not utilize the vali-
dation techniques contemplated by these guidelines. In such circumstances,
the user should utilize selection procedures which are as job related as possible
and which will minimize or eliminate adverse impact, as set forth below.
(1) When an informal or unscored selection procedure which has an ad-
verse impact is utilized, the user should eliminate the adverse impact, or mod-
ify the procedure to one which is a formal, scored or quantified measure or
combination of measures and then validate the procedure in accord with these
guidelines, or otherwise justify continued use of the procedure in accord with
Federal law.
34 9
This portion of the Uniform Guidelines fails to offer a politically viable alterna-
tive to validation.
The political legitimacy of disparate impact theory rests on a delicate bal-
ance of competing normative claims. On one side of this balance rest employer
claims to freedom and autonomy. According to these values, if an employer
wishes to use a particular employee selection device which she believes will
predict successful job performance and thereby enhance the productivity of her
enterprise, courts should generally permit her to do so. But, if the chosen selec-
tion device significantly and systematically excludes members of a group pro-
tected by Title VII, equality and autonomy-related values conflict.
Given that the persuasiveness of the employer's position is based on an
empirical claim-namely, that using a particular selection device will enhance
the performance of her enterprise-it comports with a subjective sense of fair-
ness to mediate the conflict between equality and freedom with an empirical
standard. If, in accordance with empirically acceptable methods, the selection
device is shown to be predictive of those particular elements of work behavior
which comprise the position in question, employer autonomy trumps equality.
If, however, the employer's empirical claim cannot be empirically justified,
equality trumps autonomy.
In a sense, the validation requirement uses mathematics as a neutral arbiter
of the conflict between two fundamental values-equality and freedom. In a
culture that trusts empiricism, it is the empirical grounding of the disparate
impact model that gives it political and philosophical legitimacy. If, as I have
argued, validating subjective decisionmaking systems in accordance with pro-
fessionally acceptable standards is neither empirically nor economically feasi-
ble, disparate impact theory, when applied to subjective criteria, loses its
grounding in empiricism. Individual judicial decisionmakers applying vague,
349. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.6(B), (B)(l). The Guidelines nowhere indicate what would 'justify contin-
ued use of the procedure in accord with Federal law."
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subjective, and unpredictable legal standards replace relatively objective empir-
ical methods as the arbiters of business necessity. Thus, the practical problems
inherent in applying disparate impact theory to subjective decisionmaking be-
come political problems as well.
Disparate impact theory was created to address two particular equality
problems which surfaced in the wake of Title VII's initial implementation. The
first originated in response to employers' substitution of ostensibly neutral re-
quirements for the blatant, race-based classifications previously used as proxies
for job-relevant characteristics. 350 Once judicially accepted, the model was ex-
tended to challenge gender inequities resulting from employers' reliance on the
representativeness heuristic in identifying attributes associated with successful
performance in stereotypically male jobs. 351 In each of these contexts, the de-
fendant employers had adopted ostensibly objective, neutral selection devices
which, either by accident or design, shielded them against accusations of inten-
tional discrimination. The model met these ostensibly empirical selection tools
on their own empirical terms. It was not designed to reckon with the phenom-
ena at play in subjective, individualized interpersonal decisionmaking, and it
remains ill-suited to that task.
The application of a jurisprudential model outside of its original practical
context is a process fraught with peril. Such attempts, even if initially success-
ful from a partisan point of view, can over time lead to the erosion of a legal
theory's "practical logic" and ultimately backfire on the theory's proponents.
This is, I suggest, precisely what happened in Watson and in Wards Cove, and
it may continue as the courts grapple with the many tough issues dodged by
Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
In short, if current disparate impact theory is applied to subjective practices
cases, we will find ourselves in one of two positions. Either the model will be
relegated to a narrowing range of cases, as already appears to be occurring, or
its application will place severe and ultimately unworkable burdens on employ-
ers in the fastest-growing and most promising segments of the national labor
market.35
2
350. The Supreme Court's initial exposition of disparate impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), evolved from a Title VII claim against an employer with a history of blatant
racial discrimination. Id. at 426-27. Following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Duke
Power Company replaced its blatant, racially exclusionary hiring practices with two facially neutral
requirements--a high school education requirement, and satisfactory scores on standardized aptitude
tests. These two requirements disqualified a disproportionate percentage of black applicants from con-
sideration. See id. at 426.
351. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). In Dothard, the Court invalidated on
disparate impact grounds a requirement that all correctional counselors with the Alabama Board of
Corrections meet a minimum 5'2" height requirement and weigh at least 120 pounds. Id. at 324-25.
After Dothard, an employer cannot presume a relationship between job performance and a particular
attribute or characteristic if such a presumption disproportionately excludes members of a group pro-
tected by Title VII. See id. at 330.
352. See generally Bartholet, supra note 320, at 945 (documenting judicial reticence toward ap-
plying disparate impact theory to upper level jobs).
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B. The Costs of Disjunction Between Theory and World: Effects of
Incoherent Theory on Equal Employment Adjudications and the
Exacerbation of Intergroup Tensions
I have argued that the disjunction between the jurisprudential construction
of disparate treatment discrimination and the real life phenomenon it purports
to represent has led to an analytical unraveling of Title VII's disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact liability models. The resulting doctrinal complexity
and theoretical incoherence has a number of negative practical consequences.
Consider the situation confronting the parties to a newly filed individual
disparate treatment case. They cannot know until well into the litigation which
liabil ty model will govern. Will this be a mixed-motives case, greatly improv-
ing the plaintiff's strategic position, or will it be a pretext case, advantaging the
defendant? In some jurisdictions, this determination cannot be made until the
case goes to the jury. In others, the rules are uncertain and the issue may not be
resolved until appeal.
Should the plaintiff proceed under a disparate impact theory, equally tan-
gled uncertainties will confront the litigants and the court. Is validation of the
defendant's decisionmaking system required? If not, what does "job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity 353 mean in the
context of subjective decisionmaking? More fundamentally, when does a par-
ticular subjective employment decision constitute a "particular employment
practice" 354 amenable to a disparate impact challenge? Answers to these ques-
tions greatly affect the parties' chances of success at trial, but, short of appeal,
the parties have little way of predicting what those answers might be.
Should the plaintiff proceed under traditional pretext analysis, different but
equally undesirable effects follow. As described earlier, the plaintiff in a pre-
text case must effectively disprove the motivating significance of each legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the defendant. After Hicks, he
must also be able to predict what additional reasons, not offered by the defend-
ant, might surface at trial and be deemed causally efficacious by the trier of
fact. To prove that race or some other protected status was the "real," ".sole"
reason for the defendant's decision requires the plaintiff to construct a kind of
informal multivariate analysis which controls for all potential causal factors and
supports the conclusion that the plaintiff's group status is the only plausible
explanation for the defendant's decision.
This requires the investment of substantial discovery and analysis costs,
even if the analysis is not technically statistical, but is based on a collection of
anecdotal comparisons with other "similarly situated" employees. Under the
pretext model of proof, plaintiffs will have to engage in extensive discovery,
thereby increasing litigation costs and delays. Indeed, failure to take the exten-
sive discovery required to support an effective pretext analysis could easily
constitute legal malpractice by plaintiff's counsel. In short, the nature of pre-
353. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1992).
354. Id. at § 20OOe-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
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text proof, particularly after Hicks, necessitates the investment of substantial
information costs in disparate treatment adjudications.
Even if the parties go to the extremes required by pretext analysis, it may
still be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish group status-related judgment
errors from errors based on other cognitive or motivational contaminants.3 55 If
in fact a broad class of discriminatory employment decisions results not from
discriminatory motivation, but from a variety of unconscious and unintentional
categorization-related judgment errors, current disparate treatment theory can
be expected both to underidentify and overidentify discriminatory employment
decisions. 356 Under the current interpretation of Title VII's disparate treatment
prohibition, a plaintiff who was victimized by cognitive as opposed to motiva-
tional sources of intergroup bias will have no remedy under Title VII unless he
can convince a jury that the discrimination was intentional. Thus, in many
cases, plaintiffs who were in fact subjected to cognitive sources of intergroup
bias will lose. In other cases, the well-intended decisionmaker whose inter-
group perception and judgment has been tainted by unconscious cognitive bias
will be found liable for intentional discrimination. Whether or not one has been
involved in a disparate treatment adjudication, it is easy to imagine the defen-
siveness, bitterness, and intergroup resentment such results might engender.
We take for granted that laws should serve a normative function. They are
enacted to encourage socially desirable behaviors and discourage socially unde-
sirable ones. But a law will be normatively ineffectual if it is structured, inter-
preted, or enforced in a manner that does not effectively communicate
compliance criteria to its target community. It is difficult to comply with a law
if you do not understand what it means or requires. But Title VII has become
just such a law. Mired in increasingly incoherent liability models and premised
on faulty assumptions about the nature of human social judgment, Title VII
disparate treatment jurisprudence is failing to explain what it means "not to
discriminate."
At the root of this problem lie the faulty assumption that disparate treatment
discrimination necessarily manifests discriminatory motive or intent and the
mistaken belief that a proscriptive duty "not to discriminate" can eliminate in-
tergroup bias. As I have attempted to demonstrate, intergroup discrimination
can be cognitive as well as motivational in origin. Further, not only are many
of the cognitive processes which cause discrimination automatic and beyond
ordinary conscious self-awareness, they are adaptive, indeed, essential to effec-
tive cognitive functioning. People will divide the natural and social environ-
ment into categories; they will use stereotypes, scripts, and schemas to
interpret, encode, and retrieve information relevant to social judgment. They
will rely on the availability and representativeness heuristics to estimate fre-
quency and predict the future. And, because race, ethnicity, and gender have
355. See, e-g., Mozee v. Jeffboat, Inc., 746 F.2d 365, 371 (7th Cir. 1984).
356. Given the difficulty involved in identifying individual instances of discrimination, the likeli-
hood of error in disparate treatment adjudications is quite high. See David A. Strauss, The Law and
Economics ofRacial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEo. LJ.
1619, 1644-46 (1991). A cognitive bias approach to discrimination plainly supports Strauss' view.
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been made salient by our history and by observable patterns of economic, dem-
ographic, and political distribution, people will continue to categorize along
those lines. Indeed, by proscribing discrimination on certain defined bases, Ti-
tle VII makes its own protected classifications salient.
A legal duty which admonishes people simply not to consider race, national
origin or gender harkens to Dostoevsky's problem of the polar bear: "Try...
not to think of a polar bear, and you will see that the cursed thing will come to
mind every minute." 35 7  For reasons this anecdote makes plain, the "color-
blindness" approach to the nondiscrimination duty embodied in current dispa-
rate treatment jurisprudence cannot succeed in eliminating category-based
judgment errors and thus cannot effectuate equal employment opportunity.
358
As Eleanor Rosch observed, people cannot be admonished out of categorical
divisions so long as those divisions help them explain and function in their
natural or social environment. 359 And so long as people categorize along
lines of race, gender, or ethnicity, we can expect the resulting categorization-
related distortions in social perception and judgment to bias intergroup
decisionmaking.
A colorblindness-centered interpretation of the nondiscrimination principle,
coupled with people's awareness that they do categorize along racial and ethnic
lines, may well account for much of the intergroup anxiety and ambivalence
which various social psychologists have posited as the underlying cause of
"aversive racism. ' 360 As these theorists have observed, racial ambivalence,
normative ambiguity, and fear of one's own potential prejudice all serve to
amplify white's discrimination against blacks in the giving and requesting of
assistance, 36 1 the evaluation of behavior,362 physical distancing,363 and the se-
lection of sanctions for social transgressions.364 Thus, not only might the pro-
scriptive approach toward nondiscrimination embodied in disparate treatment
357. Daniel M. Wegner, You Can 't Always Think What You Want. Problems in the Suppression of
Unwanted Thoughts, 25 AovAcas IN ExPERIAENTAL SoCiAL PSYCHOLOGY 193, 193 (Mark P. Zanna
ed., 1992) (quoting FYODOR DOSToEvSKY, WINTER NOTES ON SUMMER IMPRESSIONS).
358. For other critques of the "colorblindness" perspective, see generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1060, 1068 (1991); Alan David Freeman, Legiti-
mizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 Mmm. L. REV. 1049, 1066 (1978); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-
Blind, " 44 STAN. L. RE. 1, 68 (1991); David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. CT.
REv. 99.
359. See Human Categorization, supra note 115, at 40.
360. See, e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 179, at 61-62; Donald G. Dutton & Robert A.
Lake, Threat of Own Prejudice and Reverse Discrimination in Interracial Situations, 28 J. PERSONALrTY
& Soc. PsYcHoL. 94 (1973).
361. See, e.g., Faye Crosby, Stephanie Bromley, & Leonard Saxe, Recent Unobtrusive Studies of
Black and White Discrimination and Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL 546 (1980);
Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Subtlety of White Racism, Arousal, and Helping Behavior,
35 J. PERSONAL=TY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 691 (1977).
362. See, e.g., Irwin Katz, Glen R. Hass, & Joyce Wackenhut, Racial Ambivalence, Value Duality,
and Behavior in PauicE, DISCRIMNATION, AND RACISM, supra note 39, at 35.
363. See, e.g., Carl 0. Word, Mark P. Zanna, & Joel Cooper, The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-
Fulfilling Prophesies in Interracial Interaction, 10 J. EXPERMAENAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 109 (1974).
364. See, e.g., Katz, Hass, & Wackenhut, supra note 362.
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jurisprudence be normatively ineffectual, it may actually serve to exacerbate
intergroup tensions.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
In the early years following Title Vii's enactment, conscious, deliberate
discrimination was quite prevalent, and disparate treatment theory effectively
addressed it. But overt forms of discrimination, while they no doubt still exist,
are increasingly rare. The conscious, deliberate desire to exclude women and
minorities from the workforce has largely disappeared, but forms of intergroup
'bias stemming from social categorization and the cognitive distortions which
inexorably flow from it remain. Our antidiscrimination jurisprudence has
failed adequately to address this new type of disparate treatment discrimination,
to think rigorously about it, and to fashion doctrine equipped to reckon with it.
There is much that we can do, even without amending Title VII, to remedy the
various problems we have examined. We now turn to these easily-imple-
mented reforms, then to other potential approaches requiring further study and
development.
A. Reformulating Individual Disparate Treatment Theory
The pretext model of individual disparate treatment proof should be elimi-
nated entirely and replaced with a unitary "motivating factor" analysis similar
to, but in certain critical respects different from the framework used in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins. As I have demonstrated, pretext analysis is based on a
number of insupportable assumptions and fails to account for cognitive sources
of intergroup bias. Most importantly, the false dichotomy between "real
reasons" and "phony reasons" embedded in pretext theory fundamentally mis-
apprehends how cognitive processes distort intergroup judgment and decision-
making and cause disparate treatment discrimination.
In the vast majority of cases now adjudicated under the pretext model of
proof, the nondiscriminatory reason(s) articulated by the employer probably did
play an actuating role in the employer's decision. But it does not follow from
this that no discrimination occurred. The same employer might have inter-
preted the same event differently and made a different decision had the target
employee been a member of a different social group. To require a disparate
treatment plaintiff to disprove the motivating significance of every nondiscrimi-
natory reason articulated (or, after Hicks not articulated) by his employer im-
poses on plaintiffs an almost impossible burden, and will lead to the gross and
utterly unjustifiable underidentification of biased employment decisions.
Furthermore, pretext analysis should be eliminated because it logically re-
lies on a presumption of invidiousness that the majority of judicial deci-
siomnakers are, quite justifiably, no longer willing to accept. The fact that an
employer made an irrational or inconsistent decision does not mean that the
decision was motivated by conscious discriminatory animus. But, given the
ubiquity and biasing effects of social stereotypes, the tendency towards sche-
matic information processing, the salience of race, gender, and other social cat-
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egories, and the apparent automaticity of ingroup favoritism, it is reasonable to
presume in such situations that the employer's decisionmaking was contami-
nated by cognitive sources of intergroup bias. Accordingly, under the new ap-
proach I propose, evidence that an employer's decision was irrational or
unjustified in light of the relevant data set would still be important in proving
that discrimination occurred, but it would be interpreted differently. No longer
would the trier of fact be required to conclude that the employer was lying
about the reasons for its decision in order to rule for the plaintiff.
So, for example, in my case against the box manufacturer, much of the
same evidence now offered to prove intentional disparate treatment would be
used to prove unintentional discrimination. The fact that similarly situated
Caucasian employees were treated more favorably than Miguel would be rele-
vant to show that his ethnicity had affected his supervisor's decisionmaking,
but not to show that the supervisor's proffered reasons for acting as he did were
a cover-up for a "real" discriminatory motive. Similarly, the fact that Miguel
was the sole Latino in an otherwise all Caucasian work group would be rele-
vant not to show that management harbored a deliberate desire to exclude Lati-
nos but because of the biasing effect of solo status on social perception and
judgment. Comments reflecting ethnic stereotypes would, in such cases, be
relevant to show that the plaintiff's group membership had biased a deci-
sionmaker's perception and interpretation of, or memory for, decision-relevant
events, but they would not necessarily be offered as proof of discriminatory
intent.
Most fundamentally, under the approach I propose, courts would reformu-
late disparate treatment doctrine to reflect the reality that disparate treatment
discrimination can result from things other than discriminatory intent. To es-
tablish liability for disparate treatment discrimination, a Title VII plaintiff
would simply be required to prove that his group status played a role in causing
the employer's action or decision. Causation would no longer be equated with
intentionality. The critical inquiry would be whether the applicant or em-
ployee's group status "made a difference" in the employer's action, not whether
the decisionmaker intended that it make a difference. Accordingly, discrimina-
tory intent would constitute one among a number of actionable causes of dispa-
rate treatment discrimination.
No amendment to Title VII would be required to implement this aspect of
my proposed approach. Section 703(m) of Title VII, added as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, already provides that "an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice."
365
365. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994). It is important to note that § 703(m) does not limit its
motivating factor standard to cases involving "direct evidence" or evidence directly tied to
discrimination.
[Vol. 47:11611242
CONTENT OF OUR CATEGORIES
While the terms "motive" and "intent" are often used interchangeably in
Title VII caselaw,366 they are not in fact equivalent, as both Title VII scholars
and courts interpreting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act have recog-
nized. As the Seventh Circuit noted in Burlew v. Eaton Corp., "motive is what
prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind
with which the act is done or omitted. '36
7
Thus, we can understand the term "motivating factor" as a synonym for
"actuating factor"-something which causes a person to act or decide in a par-
ticular way. As Part II made plain, a person's group status can bias a deci-
sionmaker's perceptions, judgments, and actions through processes that are
quite independent of any invidious intention. Judicial decisions interpreting
section 703(m) should not conflate motivation and intentionality; they are dis-
tinct constructs and reflect distinct mental processes. Courts should construe
"motivation" as "actuation," thereby constructing a more flexible and ulti-
mately more accurate jurisprudential model of disparate treatment
discrimination.
To restore Title VII's analytical coherence, and ultimately its normative
efficacy, courts should differentiate more clearly between intentional and unin-
tentional forms of disparate treatment discrimination. Intentional discrimina-
tion should be understood as being equivalent to the ADEA's concept of
"willful" discrimination, and a 2-tier liability system, similar to that currently
utilized in ADEA cases, should be grafted onto Title VII.
Under such a system, first-tier disparate treatment liability would attach
when the plaintiff proved, by whatever type of evidence he chose, that his pro-
tected group status played a role in causing the employer to act or decide as he
did. Unless the defendant can thereafter prove that it would have taken the
same action or decision even absent the biasing effect of the plaintiff's group
status, 368 the disparate treatment plaintiff should be entitled to the same reme-
dies available in a disparate impact case.369 These include general and individ-
ualized injunctive and other equitable relief, including back and front pay and
attorneys' fees. Should the plaintiff also prove that the discrimination resulted
from the conscious use of his or her group status in the decisionmaking process,
he should also be entitled to compensatory and punitive damages as provided
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.370
Some of my colleagues in the plaintiffs' bar will no doubt criticize my
suggestion that compensatory and punitive damages be unavailable in cases
involving unintentional discrimination, but I believe that such limitation is jus-
tified and will, in the long run, best serve Title VII's social purpose.
366. See text accompanying notes 16-38 supra.
367. 869 F.2d 1063, 1066 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DIcnoNARY 727 (5th ed.
1979)).
368. This portion of my proposal also parallels existing law. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)
(1994).
369. See id. at § 2000e-5(g)(1).
370. See id. at § 1981(a).
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First, remedies for disparate impact and cognitive bias-based disparate
treatment should be similar because the types of bias giving rise to these two
forms of discrimination are in important ways quite similar. For example, a
particular selection criterion, such as a height and weight requirement for a
police officer job, may be imposed because the relevant characteristic, an im-
posing physical presence, is representative of the decisionmaker's cognitive
prototype of a successful police officer. Similar applications of the representa-
tiveness heuristic may bias a decisionmaker's evaluation of an individual candi-
date or employee and result in disparate treatment discrimination.371 Thus,
schema-driven information processing strategies and related misapplications of
the representativeness heuristic can manifest themselves in either disparate im-
pact or cognitive bias-based disparate treatment discrimination.
Additionally, social cognition research reminds us that we are more likely
to notice, protest, and strive to alleviate hardships or perceived injustices when
they befall ingroup as opposed to outgroup members.372 In addition, we are
often unconscious of our disparate levels of responsiveness in such situations.
From these findings, it is reasonable to predict that decisionmakers will less
quickly recognize and more readily tolerate the injustice that results from statis-
tically invalid selection criteria when those criteria impact more harshly on out-
group than ingroup members. Certainly, the same "discriminatory empathy"
which perpetuates disparate impact discrimination underlies much individual
disparate treatment as well as the subtle, often unconscious ingroup preferences
that determine whose hardships will be alleviated and whose will not. Again,
in the interests of normative coherence, disparate impact and social cognition-
based disparate treatment should be understood and remedied in substantially
similar ways.
Finally, limiting compensatory and punitive damages to cases involving
conscious, deliberate discrimination will best serve the goals of improving in-
tergroup relations and minimizing both cognitive and motivational sources of
discrimination. Categorization-related and other cognitive biases in intergroup
judgment are unintended and, for many people, earnestly undesired byproducts
of essential mental processes and strategies. Attaching moral opprobrium or
the risk of substantial financial liability to cognitive intergroup judgment errors
can only serve to heighten intergroup anxieties and make racial, ethnic, and
gender distinctions more salient. This enhanced salience can, in turn, be ex-
pected to exacerbate categorical responding. Accordingly, providing compen-
satory and punitive damages in cases involving first-tier disparate treatment
liability could well prove counterproductive.
371. See text accompanying notes 176-179 supra.
372. See, e.g., Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, supra note 361, at 548-52; Gaertner & Dovidio, supra
note 179, at 79; Lauren G. Wispte & Harold B. Freshley, Race, Sex and the Sympathetic Helping
Behavior: The Broken Bag Caper, 17 J. OF PERSONA=rT & Soc. PSYCHOL. 59, 64-65 (1971).
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B. Adopting a Prescriptive Approach to Nondiscrimination
Disparate treatment jurisprudence has long treated the nondiscrimination
principle as a proscriptive duty not to discriminate. However, social cognition
theory suggests that the nondiscrimination principle would be more effective in
reducing intergroup bias were it understood as prescriptive duty to identify and
control for errors in social perception and judgment which inevitably occur,
even among the well-intended. Accordingly, I agree with David Oppen-
heimer's suggestions that a negligence approach to discrimination and equal
employment opportunity would further Title VII's purpose.373
I am not confident, however, that we know enough about how to reduce
cognition-based judgment errors to enable us to translate such a duty into work-
able legal rules. Cognitive psychologists have told us more about the short-
comings of human social inference cognition than about how the various biases
they identify can be reduced or controlled.
Professor Oppenheimer proposes that "[w]henever an employer fails to act
to prevent discrimination which it knows, or should know, is occurring, which
it expects to occur, or which it should expect to occur, it should be held negli-
gent."374 However, imposing such a duty as a matter of law, it is important to
ask precisely what, short of using numerical quotas, an employer should do to
prevent discrimination from occurring. In other words, what would an affirma-
tive duty to prevent discrimination entail, and what actions would satisfy it?
Professor Oppenheimer suggests two answers to these questions. First, he
proposes that:
When a woman or minority job applicant is rejected, the rejection should act as
a triggering device, requiring the decision maker to instantly stop and examine
his or her own motives. If the decision cannot be justified with a reasonable,
nondiscriminatory reason, such as bona fide qualifications, the decision may
have been negligently reached. 375
Given what we know about attribution bias376 and the relative inability of so-
cial decisionmakers to identify accurately the causal antecedents of their ac-
tions and decisions, such an approach is unlikely to be effective. Additionally,
given the manner in which stereotypes and other social expectancies bias infor-
mation processing, few employment decisionmakers will perceive their deci-
sions, whether biased or not, as lacking a reasonable, nondiscriminatory
justification.
Professor Oppenheimer further suggests that where an employer has created
job screening or employee evaluation procedures that fail to correct for uncon-
scious discrimination, and such discrimination influences the process, the em-
ployer should be subject to negligence liability.3 7 7 As I have stated, I agree
that this is the direction in which Title VII liability theory must evolve, but I
373. Oppenheimer, supra note 14, at 900.
374. Id. at 969.
375. Id. at 970.
376. See text accompanying notes 206-211 supra.
377. Oppenheimer, supra note 14, at 970.
July 1995] 1245
1246
question whether we are ready to impose such an obligation without better un-
derstanding what specific steps employers can take to reduce cognitive bias.
Consider the problem of illusory correlation,378 the erroneous association of
one variable, for example athletic ability, with another, for example race, a
doubtless source of bias in the evaluation of employee performance. I could
find only one study, conducted in 1967, which investigated how illusory corre-
lation could be reduced through the implementation of specific process
controls.
379
Other empirical studies provide a few additional clues. For example, vari-
ous experiments indicate that carefully specifying evaluative criteria and pro-
viding decisionmakers with a large amount of information on those criteria can
reduce intergroup bias.380 Another study found that white evaluators were less
likely to deliver disproportionately harsh sanctions to black targets when they
believed that their actions would be subject to review and potential censure by
other whites.38' From this finding, one may infer that the once prevalent equal
employment opportunity/affirmative action reviews of employment decisions
might have done more good in reducing intergroup bias than policymakers
have recognized.3
82
Unfortunately, the most developed body of research regarding the reduction
of intergroup bias indicates that many of the conditions which reduce categori-
cal responding lie outside the control of any individual employer. The exist-
ence of cross-cutting category boundaries, cooperative interdependence
between members of different groups, the content of media and other cultural
depictions of women and minority group members, and appeals to categories
and values that transcend discrete social groups all appear to lessen intergroup
discrimination.383 But no single employer can integrate a community, alter the
378. See text accompanying notes 152-168.
379. Chapman and Chapman found that permitting subjects to review written materials from
which covariation assessments could be made, to make notes, and to arrange the relevant materials in
piles led to a statistically significant reduction in illusory correlation on four out of six illusory corre-
lates. Chapman & Chapman, Genesis of Popular But Erroneous Psycho-Diagnositc Observations,
supra note 154, at 202-04. Interestingly, this study also found that providing monetary incentives for
accuracy had no significant effect in reducing illusory correlation. We can thus infer that the threat of
potential liability alone may not reduce cognitive bias in the assessment of covariation.
380. Veronica F. Nieva & Barbara A. Gutek, Sex Effects on Evaluation, 5 AcAD. OF Momr. Ray.
267, 270-71 (1980).
381. Edward Donnerstein & Marcia Donnerstein, Variables In Interracial Aggression: Potential
Ingroup Censure, 27 J. OF PERSONALrr= & Soc. PSYCHOL. 143, 143-44 (1973).
382. After taking office in 1981, President Reagan dramatically reduced federal efforts to enforce
Executive Order 11246, which required government contractors to develop and file written affirmative
action plans. Later in the 1980s, the Reagan Administration seriously considered rescinding the Execu-
tive Order in its entirety. In response to these and other civil rights policy changes, many companies
eliminated their equal employment opportunity/affirmative action departments, which had previously
provided institutionalized review of hiring, promotion, and employment termination decisions. See gen-
erally THo ,s B. EDSALL & MARY P. EDSALL, CHAIN REAcioN (1991).
383. See, e.g., Marilyn B. Brewer & Norman Miller, Beyond the Contact Hypothesis: Theoretical
Perspectives on Desegregation, in GRouPs iN CONTACt: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DESEGREGATION 281,
283-84 (Norman Miller & Marilyn B. Brewer eds., 1984) (Categories are more apt to be salient if they
are based on "covergent boundaries" in which group identities based on many different distinctions such
as race, economic status, residence location, political persuasion, all coincide. Categorical distinctions
are rendered less salient in the presence of "cross-cutting" category boundaries.); Stuart W. Cook, Coop-
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depiction of minorities in the media, or transform the tone or content of our
cultural discourse on race. Upon careful reflection, we may conclude that im-
proving intergroup relations and reducing cognitive sources of intergroup bias
is a broad-based cultural problem requiring a broad-based cultural solution.
If our goal is to reduce race, gender, and ethnicity-based categorical re-
sponses, the imposition of a duty of care without defining what specific actions
an employer should undertake to fulfill that duty could prove counterproduc-
tive. As John Calfee and Richard Craswell have suggested, uncertainty about
legal standards can produce either overcompliance or undercompliance in the
targeted community, depending on a variety of largely unpredictable vari-
ables. 384 Perhaps more fundamentally, psychological research suggests that
normative uncertainty exacerbates intergroup anxieties and correlates with in-
creased levels of intergroup discrimination. These considerations counsel cau-
tion: We need additional theoretical, and perhaps even empirical,
investigations into how to reduce cognitive sources of bias before we move
disparate treatment theory beyond the modest doctrinal reforms I have pro-
posed. Specifying precisely what an affirmative duty of care would comprise
and what specific steps an employer should take to satisfy it is a critical task,
but one deserving a separate, more comprehensive treatment than it can be
accorded here.
V. CONCLUSION
Fires in the Mirror, Anna Deavere Smith's provocative play about racial
conflict in Crown Heights, includes these reflections of a New York social
worker:
I think you know the Eskimos have seventy words for snow? We probably
have seventy different kinds of bias, racism, and discrimination, but it's not in
our mind-set to be clear about it, so I think that we have sort of lousy language
on the subject and that is a reflection of our unwillingness to deal with it hon-
estly and to sort it out.
385
It is probably no accident that legal policymakers interpreting Title VII
have constructed all disparate treatment discrimination as manifesting a con-
scious, discriminatory purpose. This interpretation holds the problem of inter-
group bias at a safe distance, something those "other people," those "bad
people" do. Unfortunately, jurisprudential unwillingness to think rigorously
erative Interaction in Multiethnic Contexts, in GRoups IN CoNrTAcr: Tam PSYCHOLOGY OF DESEGREGA-
nON 15 (Norman Miller & Marilyn M. Brewer eds., 1984) (discussing the potential effectiveness of
cooperative interdependence, coupled with cooperative task interaction, in reducing intergroup hostility
and accompanying category-based social responding); Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization, Social Iden-
tity and Social Comparison, in DWFERENTIATION BETwEEN SocL4. GRoUPS 61 (Henri Tajfel ed., 1978);
Bernard M. Bass & George Dunteman, Biases in the evaluation of one's own group, its allies and
opponents, 7 J. OF Colmi.'cr Ras. 16 (1963) (finding perceived competition between groups increases
intergroup discrimination in the evaluation of ingroup versus outgroup performance).
384. Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. OF L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATION 279, 279-80 (1986).




about how and why discrimination occurs has had serious negative conse-
quences. As one scholar has observed, discrimination is not one thing, but
many, and the "[failure to recognize this results in intellectual and moral con-
fusion as well as bad policy. '386 Disparate treatment doctrine has labored too
long under a rhetoric of invidiousness that has outlived its social utility. If Title
VII is to retain its effectiveness as an instrument for improving intergroup rela-
tions, this rhetoric-and its reflection in disparate treatment doctrine-will
have to change.
386. Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Ste-
reotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 149, 153 (1992).
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